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Cognitive models of psychosis highlight the role of underlying differences in cognitive 
function and information processing in the development and maintenance of psychotic 
symptoms.  As a result there is now an interest in developing a greater understanding of 
these cognitive changes, in order to guide the development of evidence-based therapeutic 
interventions. An influential cognitive model of psychosis suggests that the core 
underlying cognitive difference in psychosis may be one of altered contextual processing.  
Recent work has suggested that this may be reflected in differential perception of visual 
illusions.  However, it is not clear if such differences are present early in the development 
of psychosis.  Such differences have also been reported to be associated with cannabis use.  
Further, it has been suggested that, in addition to being risk factors for the development of 
psychosis, psychoactive substances such as cannabis may provide a useful model for 
understanding psychosis.  The current thesis thus investigated, in two separate studies: (1) 
the consequences of cannabis use on contextual visual processing and (2), whether 
reported contextual processing differences in psychosis are present at illness onset.  
Study One 
Two main hypotheses were tested.  A. That THC, a key cannabis compound would 
reduce contextual visual suppression as measured using the Chubb illusion, and that this 
effect would be reduced via pre-treatment with another cannabis compound, cannabidiol 
(CBD).   B. That THC would transiently induce symptoms of psychosis and that this 
increase would be reduced via CBD pre-treatment.  No evidence was found to support the 
primary hypothesis.  However, the secondary hypothesis was supported by the data. 
Study Two 
The primary hypothesis was that contextual visual suppression, again measured with the 
Chubb illusion, would be reduced in patients with first episode psychosis relative to a 
control group.  Although not significant, the data supported this hypothesis. 
Discussion 
The results of Study One indicate that THC does not reduce visual contextual suppression 
as measured by the Chubb illusion.  This is in contrast to evidence from other illusions, 
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and may reflect different neural mechanisms underlying contextual visual processing.  
However, the study provided clear evidence that THC can induce psychotic symptoms 
and that this effect can be reduced by CBD pre-treatment.   Study Two replicates previous 
findings of reduced contextual processing in psychosis and provides evidence that this 
may be present from the onset of illness.  These findings are discussed and interpreted 
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1 Introduction	  
This thesis describes two separate but related studies investigating what may be referred 
to as context based processing.  Stated very briefly, visual context based processing has 
been reported to be altered in schizophrenia such that people with psychosis have greater 
difficulty in establishing attentional biases and have a tendency to continue to allocate 
processing resource to background ‘noise’ or invariant contextual stimuli in contrast to 
the normative tendency towards tuning out these stimuli as ‘irrelevant’. A similar pattern 
of processing has been found in non-clinical groups who score highly on measures of 
psychotic-like symptomatology, or schizotypy. Without these biases, people are more 
vulnerable to intrusions of unintended material into awareness, and thus such alterations 
of processing may plausibly underlie the development and maintenance of psychotic 
symptoms.  Overlapping alterations in visual context processing have been induced in 
non-clinical participant following administration of THC, a key active constituent of 
cannabis. 
The first study, based on the observation that psychotropic drugs can have 
psychotomimetic effects, and thus may inform us about the processes involved in 
psychosis, investigates the effect of the two primary psychoactive components of 
cannabis (delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol and cannabidiol) on visual context processing.  
The second study attempts to replicate previous findings of reduced context based 
suppression in chronic schizophrenia, but in patients who have recently experienced a 
first episode of psychosis; thus providing further insight into the relationship between 
these reported effects and the development of chronic psychotic conditions.   
Below I shall explore the background literature, before moving on to describe the 
extended rationale for the studies and state the primary hypotheses for these two studies.  
I shall begin with a description of the most relevant literature on information processing 
in schizophrenia and then discuss how this may fit with models of psychosis, with a 
particular focus on cannabis. 
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2 Literature	  Review	  
Before discussing schizophrenia and psychosis, it is worth briefly discussing what these 
terms mean and how they will be used in this thesis. 
2.1 The	  Validity	  and	  Utility	  of	  The	  Term	  ‘Schizophrenia’.	  
It has been suggested that the diagnosis of schizophrenia lacks validity and may be 
unhelpful from both clinical and research perspectives (Bentall, 2003; Read et al., 2004).  
It is certainly true that two patients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia may not only have 
quite dissimilar presentations, but actually may share no symptoms whatsoever; as 
pointed out by John Read, ‘there are 15 ways in which two people can meet DSM-IVs 
criteria for schizophrenia without having anything in common’ (Read et al., 2004, p. 46).  
Furthermore, disorders previously thought to be distinct from each other (perhaps because 
of the diagnostic aperture through which they have been viewed), are now increasingly 
considered to be overlapping.  In particular, bipolar disorder and schizophrenia are now 
considered to overlap not only in terms of their symptomatology, but also their genetic 
and environmental basis (Lichtenstein et al., 2009).  A detailed exploration of these issues 
and their implications is beyond the scope of the current discussion, however I shall 
briefly consider their relevance for psychological models of psychosis. 
The heterogeneity of presentations encompassed by schizophrenia is a problem for 
researchers.  The bio-psycho-social / stress-vulnerability model of schizophrenia suggests 
that underlying biological vulnerabilities, when exposed to a pro-psychotic environment, 
will result in the symptoms associated with schizophrenia (Zubin & Spring, 1977).  
Within this model, different symptoms may have different aetiologies (indeed similar 
symptoms may have different aetiologies in different people).  Thus looking for the 
aetiology of schizophrenia, as a unitary construct, is likely to reduce a study’s power 
relative to a more circumscribed, specific approach.  A number of alternative research 
strategies have been proposed including: (1) The derivation of a valid and reliable factor 
structure for psychosis (2) The use of continuous, dimensional approaches. 
Alternative Constructs.  The reliable identification of subtypes of schizophrenia has 
been a goal since the term schizophrenia was first used.  The DSM-IV has a number of 
subtypes (Paranoid, Disorganised, Catatonic, Undifferentiated and Residual), while 
researchers often divide the symptoms of schizophrenia into two/three types: positive 
(those things added to normative experience, such as hallucinations and delusions), 
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negative (those things removed from normative experience) and sometimes mixed 
(neither positive or negative being prominent) (Andreasen & Olsen, 1982).   Other 
authors have used statistical techniques such as factor analysis to identify groups of 
symptoms that cluster together (factors).  These attempts have led to a variety of solutions, 
with between three and seven factors (Cohen, 2005; Farmer et al., 1983; Nakaya et al., 
1999).   According to Bentall (Bentall, 2004, p. 196) the most common solution is the 
three factors solution, which maps onto positive symptoms, negative symptoms and 
cognitive disorganisation, although other authors argue that more factors are needed 
(Cohen, 2005; Liddle, 1987; Smith et al., 1998).   This concept can be extended to a focus 
on individual symptoms, rather than clusters. 
Dimensional Approaches.  A symptom based approach to psychosis fits with the 
emerging view that psychosis may be considered as phenomena at one end of a 
continuum of normal experience.  Strong evidence, from multiple perspectives supports 
this view, and has been recently reviewed by Van Os et al. (2010).  Some of the most 
influential evidence comes from epidemiological studies; this is predicated on the idea 
that if psychosis is one extreme of a continuum, then there should be evidence of sub-
clinical symptoms in the general population and that these symptoms will exist at a higher 
rate than diagnosable disorders.  There is evidence for this in the domains of both 
persecutory ideation and hallucination.   For instance, in the US national comorbidity 
study, 28% of individuals endorsed psychosis-screening items, while in the New Zealand 
Dunedin birth cohort, 25% of the sample reported hallucinatory or delusional experiences 
(Poulton et al., 2000).  Similarly, in the Dutch NEMESIS study of over 7000 adults, 
17.5% of the sample endorsed at least one psychosis item(van Os et al., 2000).  With 
regard to hallucinations specifically, a 4% annual incidence was reported in white UK 
adults (Johns et al., 2002), while studies investigating lifetime prevalence have reported 
rates in the region of 10-15% (Tien, 1991). 
Although the evidence appears to support the adoption of dimensional approaches to 
psychosis (certainly in research, but also clinically), the literature has mostly been built 
on categorical approaches.  Thus for the purposes of discussion, the term “schizophrenia” 
will be used in those cases where classical diagnosis has been used as the basis of 
selection and analysis.  Otherwise, the term psychosis will be used. 
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2.2 Differences	  of	  Information	  Processing	  in	  Schizophrenia.	  
It is now generally accepted that the schizophrenic syndrome results from the interplay of 
genetic and environmental factors that lead to the development of psychotic symptoms in 
an individual.  However, the process by which this happens is not well understood.  It is 
also clear that abnormalities of neurotransmitter function are important in psychotic states.  
Nonetheless, as noted by Fletcher and Frith, explanations such as ‘hallucinations are 
caused by overactive dopamine receptors’, while commonly repeated, leave an 
explanatory gap: ‘how can dopamine cause a voice or belief?’ (Fletcher & Frith, 2008).  
Cognitive models of psychosis may be able to help fill this gap. 
Cognitive models of psychosis highlight the role of underlying abnormalities or 
differences in cognitive function and information processing (Bentall et al., 2007; Garety 
et al., 2001, 2007).  However, although associations between schizophrenia and 
differences in cognitive functioning and information processing have long been 
recognised, the exact nature of the relationship remains unclear. 
Theories of abnormal perception in schizophrenia posit that delusions are often 
interpretations of unusual perceptual experiences, and may be the most accessible way of 
explaining these perceptions (Maher, 1988). For instance if a person perceives usual 
events as being somehow changed and unusual, they may form different beliefs about 
such events than those who perceive them as normal.  This idea is not new, Daniel 
Schreber’s doctor is quoted in a 1955 book as describing how Schreber developed 
delusional ideas: beginning with his experiencing hyperintense sensations and 
hallucinations “which falsified his conception of things… and how from these 
pathological events, at last the system of [delusional] ideas was formed from which the 
appellant has recounted.” (McAlpine (1955) via Bowers and Freedman (1966)). 
According to authors such as Hemsley, Frith and Kapur, the primary problem underlying 
positive psychotic symptoms is a difficulty in distinguishing between ecologically 
relevant and irrelevant stimuli (Frith, 1979; Hemsley, 1993, 2005a; Kapur, 2003).  Norma 
MacDonald described this vividly with regard to her own psychotic break (MacDonald, 
1960): 
“Each of us is capable of coping with a large number of stimuli, invading our 
being through any one of the senses. We could hear every sound within earshot 
and see every object, line, and colour within the field of vision, and so on. It's 
obvious that we would be incapable of carrying on any of our daily activities if 
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even one-hundredth of all these available stimuli invaded us at once. So the mind 
must have a filter which functions without conscious thought, sorting stimuli and 
allowing only those which are relevant to the situation in hand to disturb 
consciousness. And this filter must be working at maximum efficiency at all times, 
particularly when we require a high degree of concentration. What had 
happened to me in Toronto was a breakdown in the filter, and a hodge-podge of 
unrelated stimuli were distracting me from things which should have had my 
undivided attention” 
Fitting with MacDonald’s interpretation, evolutionary psychologists have argued that, in 
any given natural situation, the human brain must filter out relevant stimuli from 
irrelevant stimuli so that attention can be paid to those stimuli that are important to 
survival (Foster & Kokko, 2009).  
A number of different, but complementary approaches have been adopted to explain how 
the brain might achieve this task and how psychopathology may arise when it does not do 
so optimally.  Three interrelated concepts are particularly relevant to the current thesis: 
context, salience and the Bayesian brain. 
2.2.1 Context,	  Salience	  and	  Dopamine	  
The term ‘context’ is used very widely and with rather varied meanings. The word 
context (as noted by Hemsley (2005b)) is derived from the Latin “contexere’’, to weave 
together, and can mean variously, the ‘connection or coherence between parts of a 
discourse’ and concretely ‘The whole structure of a connected passage regarded in its 
bearing upon any of the parts which constitute it’.  Perhaps of most relevance here is its 
figurative use as illustrated in the Oxford English Dictionary with the quotes: 
“It is literally impossible, without consulting the context of the building, to say 
whether the cusps have been added for the sake of beauty or of strength” (Ruskin, 
1851) 
 “The position of facts in the context of experience” (Caird, 1877, p. 281). 
“We carry on with us from day to day the whole moral context of the day gone 
by. We are to-day all we were yesterday, and something more. We have no 
breaks in our personal identity—no new beginnings of our moral life” (Manning, 
1843). 
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Here, context is temporal in nature, a fact, person or inanimate object cannot be 
considered independently of past experience.   We cannot know the function of an object 
without reference to how it has been experienced in the past.  We experience the world 
with reference to how we have experienced it before.  Contextual information, though 
developed through experience, is applied in the here-and-now.  The spatial and very 
recent temporal context in which we view a stimulus affects how we respond to it. 
Recently, increased attention has been given to the possible role of altered contextual 
processing in psychosis.  A highly influential model of the ‘basic cognitive difference’ in 
psychosis is that of Hemsley (2005b).  Hemsley suggests that contextual processing may 
be altered in psychosis and that this abnormality may underlie positive psychotic 
symptoms and a number of experimental paradigms have demonstrated reduced 
influences of context in acute psychosis  (Hemsley, 2005b).   As he notes, the suggestion 
that context processing is abnormal in people with psychosis is not new, however, a 
number of recent studies have focused attention on the subject (these will be described 
later). 
How does the brain determine whether a given stimulus or stimuli set is worthy of 
attention and action?  An answer to this question is of course not readily forthcoming, but 
one thing seems clear: context is key.   On the savannah it may be useful to consider any 
rustling in the grass to be a potential predator, but this does not necessarily follow for a 
suburban garden.   The appropriate (adaptive) stimulus-response function clearly depends 
on context.    Thus, one’s vigilance and response to a stimulus must be able to change 
depending on the situation.   Risking a small number of false positives may be beneficial 
to an individual (as in the case of the lion in the savannah), but if the individual begins to 
consistently see irrelevant stimuli as important, their ability to function will be impaired. 
Distinguishing between relevant and irrelevant stimuli is thus dependent on their context, 
and in keeping with the continuum model, variations in the ability  to adaptively do this 
may result from individual differences in contextual processing mechanisms.  ‘Context’ 
here does not simply mean the current situation, but refers to a function of all previous 
experiences and their influence on the present.  Thus, contextual processing allows the 
brain to use past experience (and perhaps evolutionarily hardwired information) in 
reacting to a current stimulus.   
Phillips and Singer (Phillips & Singer, 1997) via (Hemsley, 2005b) suggest that: 
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“the contextual input is used to selectively enhance the transmission of that 
information in the processor’s receptive field that is coherently related to the 
context”.   
This however, as we will see later (see discussion of Bayesian processing), may actually 
be the opposite of what is happening in the brain.  The brain may be working to 
selectively identify that information which is inconsistent with its context, and is thus 
surprising and potentially important.  Nevertheless, the principle remains; the brain’s job 
is to distinguish relevant stimuli (appetitive or aversive) from irrelevant stimuli and doing 
this depends on the context of the stimuli. 
An influential current explanation of psychosis is that dopamine mediates the ‘salience’ 
of the elements of an individual’s perception (Gray et al., 1991; Kapur, 2003).  Here, 
‘salience’ refers to the degree to which a stimulus attracts attention and influences goal 
orientated behaviour, due to association with reward or punishment.  The salience 
mechanism allows the organism to focus attention where it is most important and convert 
motivation into action.  Kapur suggests that while under normal circumstances, dopamine 
mediates the process of salience development, it does not create this process; following 
from this, he suggests that in the psychotic state, neurochemical alteration “usurps the 
process of contextually driven salience attribution and leads to aberrant assignment of 
salience to external objects and internal representations” (Kapur, 2003, p. 15). It should 
perhaps be noted here that while dopamine is implicated in salience, it does not 
necessarily follow that dopamine dysfunction is the basic cause of aberrant salience.  
Changes in salience can be induced by sensory deprivation or manipulation of other 
neurotransmitters.  Dopamine changes may thus be cause or consequence, depending on 
the situation.  Dopamine dysregulation is thus proposed as the final common pathway 
thorough which these factors influence psychosis (Howes & Kapur, 2009). 
Salience and context can be considered as two sides of the same coin, context is the 
milieu within which stimuli are processed.  If a stimulus does not fit with its context, it 
becomes more salient.  One cannot have salience without context. 
A variety of evidence suggests that context processing is abnormal in schizophrenia 
(Hemsley, 2005b).  Before reviewing this however, it may be useful to first consider how 




2.3 Cognitive	  Function	  and	  Psychosis:	  A	  Bayesian	  Framework	  
2.3.1 The	  Bayesian	  Brain:	  A	  Very	  Brief	  Primer	  
Various authors (Clark, n.d.; Corlett et al., 2009; Friston, 2005; Hemsley, 2005a) have 
suggested that the brain can be seen as a Bayesian information processing system 
(sometimes called  the ‘Bayesian Brain’), and that the psychopathology of psychosis may 
be explained in terms of dysfunction of this system. A full review of this rationale is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, but is provided in a recent clear and fascinating review 
(Clark (in press)). In such a system, all incoming information is processed within the 
context of our prior experiences.   That is to say our cumulative prior experiences may be 
seen to lead to our current beliefs (priors) about the world and these in turn influence how 
we perceive and react to our environment1.  This is a powerful explanation in that it can 
be applied to the results of most, if not all, psychological problems (of course this may 
also be a significant weakness!).  To take just one example from a talk from Beau Lotto (Beau	  Lotto,	  2009), the reason we have no problem reading Figure 2.1, is that our prior 
experience tells us that, statistically, given the overall context of the letters and their 
distribution, it is most likely that there should be an ‘r’ (rather than an ‘l’) in ‘a e’, and an 
‘i’ (rather than a ‘u’) in ‘th s’.   
Figure	  2.1.	  	  Example	  from	  Beau	  Lotto.	  
 
In this Bayesian framework, learning occurs as the result of processing of mismatches 
between expected and actual inputs (prediction error).  Given a certain sensory input, the 
brain will produce a prediction of a future sensory input; if there is a mismatch, the 
system should update so as to reduce future prediction error.  The more accurate the brain 
is at predicting its immediate environment, the lower the prediction error will be.   
The Bayesian brain framework is radical in its implications, the full scope of which 
extends beyond the consideration of this current thesis.  However, one particular 
implication is worth emphasising here; in the Bayesian brain, the only information that is 
passed upwards in the system is the error signal.  If we see, hear, feel, smell, taste or 
otherwise sense only what we expect to, no upwards signalling is necessary.   The signal 
                                                   
1 Priors may also be preset by evolution and thus our genetic coding. Such priors have 
been described as ‘hyperpriors’ (Clark, in press). 
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passed downwards tells the lower levels what to expect, and if there is no mismatch (if 
our brain manages to predict our sensory input perfectly), no signal except noise is passed 
upwards in the system.    This signal represents the effect of context, both present and 
past.  If however, our predictions are not perfect, the resulting error signal will be passed 
upwards so that higher levels may adjust so as to better predict our environment in future.  
The real work of the brain is in detecting when our environment differs from what we 
expect and adjusting our model of the world to incorporate this new information. 
In such a system, the influence of prior experience may be referred to as ‘top-down 
processing’, while the direct influence of sensory input may be referred to as ‘bottom-up 
processing’.   However, it is important to note that what is proposed is a cascading multi-
level system, whereby there are top-down and bottom up processes at each level of the 
brain.  Thus, for instance in the visual cortex (which consists of a number of areas, V1 to 
V5), V1 sends error signals to V2, while V2 sends prediction signals to V1; at the same 
time V2 sends error signals upstream while higher areas send prediction signals to V2.   
The exact architecture underlying this proposed system is currently unclear, however, it 
has been shown that the model can explain various aspects of visual processing (eg Rao 
& Ballard, 1999).  The nature of these processes are necessarily constrained by the 
underlying neuroanatomy of the brain. For instance, early in the visual system, neurons 
only have access to information from one eye, higher up information from both eyes can 
be integrated, while higher structures such as the frontal lobes may integrate information 
from multiple senses.  
2.3.2 The	  Bayesian	  Brain:	  How	  It	  Might	  (Not)	  Work.	  
Corlett, Frith and Fletcher (Corlett et al., 2009) provide a detailed description of how this 
system may be represented in the brain.   The main points of relevance for this thesis are 
summarised below. 
In Corlett’s model, top-down processing may be represented by feedback from the 
NMDA system, while bottom-up processing (prediction error) may be represented by the 
feed-forward AMPA and GABA systems.  The impact of prediction error may be 
modulated by neurotransmitters such as dopamine, acetylcholine and serotonin, which 
interact with membrane potassium channels (thus altering the likelihood of neurons 
firing).   Friston has suggested that these modulatory transmitters may work as a form of 
‘confidence estimate’ for transmitted information, thus the feed-forward signal is given 
both amplitude and uncertainty (Friston, 2005).  At a single neuron level, feed-forward 
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inputs may be specified by glutamatergic signalling, while priors may be specified by the 
number and function of potassium channels in the cell membrane (potassium channels 
shape action potentials and specify a neuron’s input response threshold).  In support of 
this, Corlett notes that individuals with autoimmune disorders affecting potassium 
channels may experience delusional beliefs. 
This hierarchical system, although efficient, is sensitive to disruption, such that a 
relatively minor alteration in prior beliefs may become progressively distorted.  Corlett, 
(following Lyons and Kashima 2003) liken this to the children’s game ‘telephone’ (or 
Chinese whispers) where children sit in a circle and a message is passed around one child 
at a time as they whisper in their neighbour’s ear.   At each transaction, the message is 
processed according to the priors at that level, until it bears little resemblance to the 
original. When the Bayesian system malfunctions in psychosis, it is possible that  new 
prior beliefs start to develop and establish themselves, thereby aberrantly shaping our 
interpretations of the world in such a way that they become self-maintaining. 
As noted by other authors (Hemsley & Garety, 1986), delusions may represent a 
deviation from optimal Bayesian interpretation of the world.   Linking back to the earlier 
discussion (Context, Salience and Dopamine), psychotic symptoms arise when stimuli 
that would not normally be considered relevant become abnormally salient.  This salience 
needs to be interpreted by the brain and this leads to delusions and hallucinations. 
  Corlett, Frith and Fletcher summarise the model as below: 
”Our beliefs and percepts emerge from the interaction of bottom-up and top-
down processes.  Strong top-down effects (akin to prior beliefs) change sensory 
experience, leading perhaps to sensory percept in the absence of a genuine 
stimulus (a hallucination).  Conversely, aberrant bottom-up signals strongly 
indicate that the currect priors are wrong and that beliefs (priors) must be 
changed to explain the world.  Such aberrant changes in beliefs may provide the 
germ of a delusion and will, moreover if they can account for the aberrant 
sensory signals, be maintained.”   
The authors suggest that delusional beliefs may result from giving too much weight to 
bottom-up signalling, especially in the context of weakened top-down processing.  
Conversely, hallucinations may result if too much weight is given to top-down processing, 
especially when combined with noisy or unpredictable bottom-up inputs (see (2009) for a 
detailed explanation with regard to auditory hallucinations).  Strong top-down processing 
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may also result in the maintenance of established delusional beliefs.  It should be noted, 
that the authors’ admit that this is a simplistic model, and that the interaction between 
top-down and bottom-up processes is likely more complex. 
We shall return to this model later in the introduction, when discussing the 
psychotomimetic effects of psychoactive substances.  First though, we shall move to a 
discussion of evidence that some of these processes may be disrupted in schizophrenia. 
2.3.3 Hallucinations	  Vs.	  Perceptual	  Distortions.	  A	  Note	  
Psychiatric researchers commonly treat hallucinations and perceptual distortions as 
separate phenomena.  The reality may be more complex.   The Oxford English Dictionary 
defines Hallucination as follows: “The apparent perception (usually by sight or hearing) 
of an external object when no such object is actually present.”.  
The definition is clear, but it may miss something about the experience of the psychotic 
patient.  In clinical practice, ‘auditory hallucinations’, whether they are words or sounds, 
are often described as occurring ‘on top of’ other sounds, indicating that they may be 
misperceptions of those sounds.  This is backed up by evidence that people prone to 
psychosis are more likely to hear words in white noise (Galdos et al., 2010).  In this case, 
increased noise may be considered to produce an increase in bottom-up signalling.  By 
itself, this might not result in hallucinations, but if paired with impaired top-down 
processes, may lead to false positive identification of sounds, i.e. Hallucinations. In the 
above case, the external object (a sound) does exist, but is misperceived. 
Voice hearing has been attributed to misattribution of internal speech to an external 
source (Allen et al., 2007).  Thus, a normal experience (internal speech) is turned into a 
‘hallucination’, due to altered perception of that experience, considered to be a failure of 
self-monitoring.  This is supported by the report that patients with auditory 
hallucinations/passivity phenomena are more likely to be able to tickle 
themselves(Blakemore et al., 2000), again interpretable as a result of impaired self-
monitoring.  In the case of internal speech being perceived as external, the OED 
definition would be met.  However the case of tickling (or, to take a more clinical 
example, say unusual tactile sensations) may be considered as a misperception (the brain 
fails to identify the self generated nature of the sensation) rather than a classic 
hallucination. 
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With regard to visual hallucinations, the fact that hallucinations in the elderly (Charles 
Bonnet syndrome) are consistently reported to be associated with eye pathology again 
indicates that misperception may play a significant role in the hallucinatory experience 
(Berrios & Brook, 1984; ffytche, 2009).  Here, hallucinations may occur as a 
misperception by a normal brain of visual input or they may result from damage to the 
brain itself or a combination of both factors.  The key message is that a subjective report 
of hallucination, on a self-report measure may be either a ‘true’ hallucination or a 
perceptual distortion, and only with further investigation may the nature of the individual 
experience be better understood. 
2.3.4 Visual	  Context	  Processing	  in	  Psychosis.	  
Having considered how contextual processing may occur in the brain, we may return to 
the evidence indicating that context processing may be altered in psychosis.  Although 
there is a considerable body of evidence from other domains, especially language 
processing (e.g. Cohen & Servan-Schreiber, 1992), for the purposes of this thesis I shall 
focus on evidence from the visual processing literature.   The majority of the evidence for 
visual context processing differences in schizophrenia comes from studies employing 
illusions.  People with a diagnosis of schizophrenia have been shown to exhibit reduced 
susceptibility to a variety of illusions, which will be discussed below.   Explanations of 
many visual illusions emphasise the importance of lateral inhibitory neurons, both in 
early cortical and sub-cortical visual areas, which (for instance) act to suppress the 
stimulus response of neurons based on spatial context.   More recent developments have 
suggested that these explanations may not be sufficient and the involvement of other 
higher cortical layers may be necessary to fully explain some illusions.  Regardless of the 
exact cortical mechanisms, recent literature has  indicated that visual illusions should not 
be considered as perceptual failures, but as Bayes-optimal perception in the absence of 
clear information; that is to say, they represent the ‘most likely explanation for 
ambiguous sensory input’ (Brown & Friston, 2012).   I shall start by focussing on two 
important relevant illusions, the Binocular Depth Inversion Illusion and the Chubb 
illusion and then broaden the discussion to other relevant evidence. 
The Binocular Depth Inversion Illusion (BDII), is an illusion in which incoming visual 
information is manipulated so that the information normally reaching the left eye is 
replaced by that normally reaching the right eye, and vice versa.  This should result in an 
inverted percept of the viewed object (e.g. a face should be seen as concave rather than 
convex).  However, this generally does not happen, and the object is seen in the 
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objectively incorrect, but more plausible, normal manner.  This may be interpreted as 
resulting from the interference of top-down processing, as the brain attempts to make 
sense of incoming information in the context of past experiences (see (Gregory & 
Langton, 1966)).  Several studies have shown that people  with a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia have a markedly decreased illusion susceptibility to the BDII (Emrich et al., 
1997; Koethe et al., 2006, 2009; Schneider et al., 2002). This may be most pronounced in 
acutely psychotic states and may remit when symptoms recede (Schneider et al., 2002).  
This reduced susceptibly to illusions is often reported as being a deficit; however, the 
finding is of particular interest because it actually represents a more accurate (albeit less 
adaptive) perception of the world. Paradigms predicated upon more accurate performance 
by people with psychosis compared to the general population are valuable for 
psychological research, as deficient performance may be influenced by the generic 
negative impact of a history of illness, poor self-care, life adversity, poor schooling, and 
medication, rather than psychosis-specific processes (Hemsley, 2005).   
In the Chubb Illusion (Chubb et al., 1989), the participant is shown a patch of random 
texture superimposed on a background of similar texture.  Chubb et al. showed that the 
‘perceived contrast of the texture patch depends substantially on the contrast of the 
background’.   If surrounded by a higher contrast texture, the bright points of the texture 
patch appear dimmer, while its dark points appear less dark.  Participants may thus be 
said to demonstrate a bias when the surround is present.   This effect is illustrated in 
Figure 2.2.   
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Figure	  2.2	  Chubb	  Effect.	  	  	  
The physical contrast of the ringed target is 40%.  However contextual suppression makes it appear 
lower. 
Chubb’s initial and plausible explanation for this effect was that neurons tuned to detect 
similar spatial contrast frequencies were acting to inhibit each other.   However, Lotto 
and Purves (Lotto & Purves, 2001), inspired by top-down explanations of other 
brightness illusions, have shown in an elegant series of experiments that this explanation 
may not be correct.  Essentially they show that the Chubb illusion is dependent on the 
patch of foreground texture representing a imperfectly transmitting medium (for instance 
a cloudy piece of glass).   For instance, in Figure 2.3 (top row only), the foreground patch 
is identical in A, B and C and the background is identical in B and C, yet, the foreground 
patch looks lighter in B than in C.  The only difference is that the background is rotated 
so that C is not consistent with the patch representing a cloudy transmitting medium.  
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Figure	  2.3	  	  Example	  adapted	  from	  Lotto	  and	  Purves	  (2001)	  
Thus they propose that the Chubb illusion can be explained ‘in wholly empirical terms’, 
and that their experiments “add further support to the general conclusion that visual 
percepts are entirely determined by the experience of the human visual system 
[presumably both evolutionary and recent] with the frequency of occurrence of the 
possible sources of inherently ambiguous stimuli”. However, it is not clear that the 
invocation of higher level processing is necessary to explain Lotto and Purves’ 
observations .  For instance, in the above example, by rotating the stimuli, extra 
luminance contrast has been introduced (at the centre-surround border).  This can be seen 
in the bottom row of Figure 2.3 (which we have generated by calculating the RMS 
luminance contrast values from Lotto & Purves’ example).  Thus, it is possible that the 
perceived difference is due to local luminance mechanisms, rather than the influence of 
higher level processing. 
Dakin, Carlin and Hemsley reported that when viewing the Chubb illusion, patients with 
paranoid schizophrenia (15 males from a forensic inpatient ward) showed a significantly 
reduced bias compared with both psychiatric controls (13 male and female psychiatric 
inpatients from the same hospital) and non-psychiatric controls (20 male and female 
participants recruited either from a job centre or university offices) (Dakin et al., 2005).  
This was interpreted as representing a weakened suppression of visual context.  As with 
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the BDII, this finding is striking in that it represents a more accurate view of the world 
and is perhaps less likely to be part of a general deficit. 
Deanna Barch and colleagues recently published a replication of this study with a much 
larger sample of 130 healthy control participants and 132 participants with a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia (Barch et al., 2012).  A modified version of the Chubb task was used with 
an adaptive algorithm to reduce the amount of time needed to collect data.  The authors 
found that the patient group showed a reduction of normal bias in the Chubb illusion, but 
that this reduction was of smaller magnitude that that found by Dakin et al.  The authors 
suggest three possible explanations for this finding:  1.  The study, for pragmatic reasons 
used less sophisticated methods; 2. The patient group were stable outpatients, as opposed 
to chronically ill forensic inpatients in Dakin et al.; 3. The sample size was much larger, 
and effect sizes tend to be smaller in large N studies.   Of more concern, however, is the 
fact that when the authors attempted to control for inattention (as measured by 
performance on ‘catch’ trials where the correct response should have been obvious), the 
difference between groups was no longer significant.  However, controlling for variables 
on which groups differ significantly (the SZ group showed greater inattention) is, as the 
authors note, problematic, as group membership and performance cannot be easily 
disentangled (eg Miller & Chapman, 2001).   This finding is also in contrast to Dakin et al, 
who found no evidence of reduced attention in their patient group. 
Most recently Tibber et al (submitted), have expanded on Dakin et al’s study.  Patients 
with schizophrenia (n=24) and controls (n=24) were tested with the Chubb task and three 
analogues that used size, luminance and orientation stimuli in place of contrast stimuli.  
In this study, participants had to say which of two stimuli were larger, brighter or tilted 
closer to the horizontal.  As for the Chubb task, one of the stimuli was surrounded by a 
background of similar consistency, which is predicted to bias processing of the central 
stimuli (see Figure 2.4).  The schizophrenia group demonstrated reduced bias in contrast, 
orientation and size tasks, but not the luminance task.   Thresholds were greater in all 
conditions, indicating a generalised increase in response variability associated with 
patient status.  This study provides evidence that reduced contextual suppression is a 
more general effect in schizophrenia and that it is not limited to contrast effects.  
Furthermore, this pattern of results provides insight into a neuroanatomical specificity of 
processing differences.  Luminance signals are believed to be processed early in the 
visual pathway, in the retina and lateral geniculate nucleus, while size and orientation are 
believed to be reliant on cortical mechanisms.  Contrast, as noted above, is perhaps 
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intermediate, being processed by early cortical mechanisms.  Thus contrast suppression 
effects in schizophrenia may be predominantly cortical in nature.  The authors also argue 
out that the effects noted are unlikely to be an artefact of inattention, as they were not 
common to all conditions, with patients showing no reduction in bias for the luminance 
task, which was well matched to the other tasks, which were also presented in random 
order.  
Figure	  2.4.	  	  Representation	  of	  Stimuli	  Used	  by	  Tibber	  et	  al	  (submitted).	  A.	  Luminance.	  	  B.	  Contrast.	  	  C.	  Orientation.	  D.	  Size.	  	  Reference	  patch	  shown	  centrally,	  surrounded	  by	  contextual	  surround.	  	  Eight	  example	  target	  patches	  are	  shown	  (in	  the	  actual	  experiment	  these	  are	  shown	  centrally).	  
 
 
Complementary evidence of reduced context suppression comes from a study of center-
surround interactions in visual motion processing (Tadin et al., 2006).  In human vision, it 
has been shown that ability to perceive the motion of the stimulus decreases as the size of 
the stimulus increases, a finding that has been explained in terms of center surround 
suppression mechanisms in the MT area of the human brain (part of the dorsal stream and 
sometimes known as V5).  Tadin et al found that this suppression was abnormally weak 
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in patients with schizophrenia especially those with severe negative symptoms.  Further 
they found that in those patients with the weakest surround suppression, ability to detect 
the direction of motion was better than that of control subjects. 
Other evidence supporting these findings comes from studies that utilise tasks that require 
the integration of spatial information, a process commonly thought to rely on cortical 
inhibition.  For instance, patients with schizophrenia have been shown to have difficulty 
with contour integration tasks, in which participants are asked to detect shapes embedded 
in an array of locally oriented elements (Silverstein	  et	  al.,	  2000;	  Uhlhaas	  et	  al.,	  2004,	  2006).  In such tasks, identification of shapes is normally impaired by nearby elements 
with similar properties – an effect which is reduced in schizophrenia (Robol et al, under 
review).   However, these findings are not consistent, a study by Silverstein (Silverstein et 
al., 2006) attempted to show that performance on contour tasks could not simply be 
explained by lateral inhibition, but involves top-down processes evidenced by practice 
effects (learning by experience is conceptualised as top-down).   Learning effects were 
observed, and these were reduced in schizophrenia.  However, there was no evidence of a 
general deficit associated with schizophrenia; this failure to replicate may be explained by 
reduced chronicity/severity of the sample compared to other studies, as indicated by a 
trend relationship between severity and performance.   
2.3.5 Schizophrenia	  Subtypes	  and	  Context	  Processing	  
Some evidence suggests that visual context processing may be particularly affected in 
those patients with disorganised schizophrenia. In a sample of 32 schizoptypal and 37 
non-schizotypal participants selected from a large nonclinical population, Uhlhaas found 
that thought disordered schizotypal participants had more accurate performance on a size 
perception task (Ebbinghaus) than non-disordered schizotypal and non-schizotypal 
participants (Uhlhaas et al., 2004).  The opposite pattern of performance was found for a 
contour detection task.  This finding fits with that of Silverstein, who also found that 
disorganisation correlated with impaired performance on a contour detection task.  
Finally, Longevialle-Hénin (article in French so based on abstract) reported that for two 
tasks (the Faverge task and The Group Embedded Figure Task) involving temporary 
maintenance of visuospatial information and executive functioning of visual working 
memory system, patients with disorganised schizophrenia had impaired functioning, 
while patients with non-disorganised schizophrenia did not (Longevialle-­‐Hénin	  et	  al.,	  2005).   
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2.4 Cannabis	  as	  a	  model	  for	  understanding	  psychosis	  
It has been suggested that psychopharmacological models of psychosis have the potential 
to play an important role in understanding how cognitive changes may result in psychotic 
symptoms (eg (Fletcher & Honey, 2006)).  Cognitive pharmacology provides ways of 
exploring links between drug and psychotic states in terms of both cognitive 
abnormalities and symptoms.  Importantly, experimental pharmacological manipulations 
may provide an invaluable tool for testing and developing models linking cognitive 
alterations to psychosis like symptoms in non-clinical groups.  Understanding these 
processes in the general population can cast light on processes involved in the 
development of psychosis (Garety et al., 2007), without the confounding factors 
associated with the status of a psychiatric patient.   Although non-clinical samples are not 
without problems (for instance, non-clinical samples do not typically match clinical 
samples in terms of social economic class and gender distribution (see Maric et al (2003)), 
they have significant potential for aiding in psychosis research.  Better understanding of 
cognitive processes will inform both psychological models of psychosis and, in turn, 
therapeutic approaches. Further, such studies may provide insights into the neural 
substrates of both specific cognitive processes and symptoms of psychosis, allowing 
further development of pharmacological treatments, and even the potential for better 
informed synergistic pharmacological and psychological interventions (Menon et al., 
2008).  
A wide variety of psychoactive compounds have been used to produce symptoms of 
psychosis in healthy volunteers.  These compounds include NMDA antagonists such as 
ketamine and PCP, dopamine agonists such as amphetamine, serotonergic substances 
such as LSD and cannabinoids such as delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol (Δ9-THC).  Each of 
these substances has its own psychoactive profile, however there is considerable overlap 
in the symptoms produced by each substance.   Of these substances, cannabis has recently 
gained significant prominence due to the hypothesis that it may trigger psychosis (see 
below: Cannabis and Psychosis: Evidence of a Causal Link.) and this, along with the 
identification and cloning of endogenous cannabis receptors has triggered renewed 
interest in how it may affect the brain.   
For the purposes of the current thesis, discussion will focus on cannabis.  Before moving 
on, it may be useful to consider the face validity of this link, which I will do via a 
discussion of the phenomenological similarities between the effects of drug intoxication 
and psychotic disorders. I shall then move on to discuss the specific effects of cannabis 
 34 
and then to explanations of possible mechanisms of the psychotomimetic effects of 
cannabis. 
2.4.1 Phenomenological	  Similarities	  between	  drug	  intoxication	  and	  psychotic	  
disorders.	  
It is commonly acknowledged that the symptoms of drug intoxication and psychosis 
overlap, yet little has been published on the phenomenology of the association between 
substance use and psychosis.  Of particular interest is a paper by Nelson and Sass (Nelson 
& Sass, 2008), which compares the experience of the ‘psychotic break’ to hallucinogen 
intoxication, in particular Huxley’s writings on the experience of mescaline ingestion 
(Huxley, 2010).  Although this hallucinogen (mescaline is perhaps most similar to LSD, 
with effects on the serotonin and dopamine systems) is not the focus of the current thesis, 
there are enough commonalities with the experience of cannabis use to make an 
interesting comparison. 
The authors conclude that a shared factor in psychosis and drug use, described as 
‘psychotic-like experience’ involves the ‘breakdown of the sign-referent relationship (see 
below) and the relationship with the common-sense, practical world’; they go on to 
suggest that a key difference is that in psychosis, this breakdown is experienced as a 
sense of alienation from self and world, while in the hallucinogenic state, a sense of 
mystical union and revelation may predominate [although this is often a temporary state 
in psychosis].  Another significant difference between the two experiences, is that in 
psychotic disorder, onset is normally insidious, over days, weeks, months or even years, 
while in drug induced psychosis, onset is typically within minutes or hours (Kapur, 2003; 
Nelson & Sass, 2008) .  An important psychological difference not raised by these 
authors, that may alter the perception of experience is that when one takes a drug, one 
generally knows what is causing the experiences, whereas, in psychosis, the explanation 
for the experience is missing, and thus the experience is potentially more frightening and 
alienating.  Perhaps, the negative experiences of drug taking (such as extreme transient 
paranoia and panic) may also be explained by a loss of perceived causal link between 
trigger and symptom, and thus a loss of sense of control. 
Sass and Parnas (Sass & Parnas, 2003) describe a kind of aura at the onset of psychosis, 
in which all aspects of experience are suffused by a strange and enigmatic atmosphere, 
where the person becomes suspicious and restless, often filled with dread and altered 
awareness.  There is a sense of unveiling of reality in which the world feels qualitatively 
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different.  This shift may fascinate and disturb the individual leading to their staring 
intently at the world trying to find meaning.  Sass calls this the ‘truth-taking stare’ and 
refers to the state of mind that accompanies this stare as the Stimmung; this may include 
contradictory feelings of significance and insignificance, and a perception of world in 
which familiar coherent meanings have given way in favour of new idiosyncratic 
meanings.  This state of mind is hypothesised to lay the foundation for more obvious and 
elaborated later symptoms.  Sass argues that the Stimmung may be broken down into 
three related elements, Unreality, Mere-Being and Fragmentation, and their putative 
consequence, Apophany.   Unreality describes experiences such as the feeling that the 
world has changed subtly or that objects and people seem unreal or fake.  Mere-Being 
describes the sense of disconnection between objects and their functions and meanings.  
Fragmentation describes the loss of relationships between different objects in a scene, 
such that each object gains its own individual importance, this may also be considered as 
a ‘loosening of overall Gestalt’.  Apophany, sometimes described as the ‘delusional mood’ 
is a resulting sense of meaningfulness, in which everything seems significant, but it is not 
yet clear why.  This state may be followed by the ‘delusional percept’ in which this sense 
of significance resolves into a specific delusional interpretation of experience. 
The above, rather philosophical concepts have a parallel in the ideas of contextual 
processing, salience and the Bayesian brain.  When Nelson and Sass talk of a breakdown 
in sign-referent relationships, they are referring to a change in how people perceive the 
world.  For instance, a chair is no longer seen as a chair, but is seen in a new light, 
stripped of its normal meaning (mere-being).  This can be seen as a loss of context, that is 
to say our past experiences of a chair (or person, place, experience) no longer hold 
dominance, and new, less usual meanings may take the place of past experience.   
Likewise, fragmentation and ‘more-being’ may be considered as a loss of figure-ground 
relationship or loosening of Gestalt, but may also be considered as a loss of contextual 
awareness or reduction in top-down processing.  The loss of usual top-down influence 
may result in a greater intrusion of bottom-up signalling, resulting in normally 
insignificant stimuli becoming aberrantly salient.  The brain, deprived of normal 
contextual meaning, fills the vacuum with whatever it can based on the inputs and context 
it has available.  At some stage, perhaps, the balance shifts back towards top-down 
processing, except now the priors are dysfunctional and a delusion is established.   
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2.4.2 Cannabis	  and	  the	  Cannabinoid	  System	  
Cannabis is prepared from plants of the genus Cannabis (generally Cannabis sativa or 
Cannabis indica), and is unique in producing compounds known as cannabinoids.  
Cannabis has been used, both in contemporary culture and traditionally, for both its 
psychoactive and putative medicinal properties.  Cannabis can be smoked like a cigarette, 
in water pipes or using a vaporiser; it can also be ingested with food or drunk as an 
extract.  Cannabis contains over 400 compounds, including over 60 cannabinoids (Ashton, 
2001).  The most potent of these cannabinoids is delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol (Δ9-THC, 
hereafter referred to as THC), which along with another important compound, 
cannabidiol (CBD), has been isolated and synthesised.    
2.4.2.1 Delta-­‐9-­‐tetrahydrocannabinol	  (Δ9-­‐THC)	  
Δ9-THC binds to cannabinoid receptors CB1 and CB2, which are the primary known 
receptor sites for endogenous cannabinoids.  As noted by Ashton (2001), the 
identification of CB1 and CB2 receptors (in 1988 and 1993 respectively) stimulated a 
search for endogenous ligands.  A number of these have now been identified and are 
referred to as ‘endocannabinoids’.  Endocannabinoids and their receptors may reside 
primarily within neuronal lipid membranes and act as neuromodulators that control 
calcium and potassium ion flow (they are G-protein coupled receptors).  Through this 
mechanism, they may have regulatory effects on neurotransmitter release, and have been 
shown to inhibit acetylcholine, noradrenaline, GABA and glutamate release, and may 
indirectly influence the dopamine system (Fujiwara	  &	  Egashira,	  2004;	  Svíženská	  et	  al.,	  2008).  For a more detailed review of the pharmacokinetics and pharmacodynamics, 
please see Svíženská	  et	  al	  (2008).	  	  	  	  
Although the exact mechanisms are unclear, it has been suggested that a reciprocal 
interaction between endocannabinoid and dopamine systems may explain the 
psychotomimetic effects of cannabis (D’Souza	  et	  al.,	  2004;	  Henquet	  et	  al.,	  2010).  As 
noted, in normal function, CB1 activation has been shown to inhibit presynaptic 
neurotransmitter release, thereby modulating the action of other neurotransmitters such as 
GABA and glutamate and indirectly influencing dopamine.  Δ9-THC may disrupt the 
normal modulatory functioning of the cannabinoid system.  For instance Δ9-THC 
increases dopamine concentrations in the striatum (Bossong et al., 2008).  Linking to the 
salience hypothesis of psychosis, striatal dopamine is implicated in the attribution of 
salience to stimuli – and thus excess dopamine may result in false attribution of salience.  
Further, Δ9-THC has been shown to inhibit GABA neurons in the hippocampus, 
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disrupting neuronal synchronisation and inducing psychotic symptoms (D’Souza	  et	  al.,	  2004).  As neuronal synchronisation in the hippocampus has been linked to sensory 
integration, it is possible that this interference in synchronisation may account for 
cannabis effects such as altered sensory association and perhaps altered contextual 
processing.   
2.4.2.2 Cannabidiol	  (CBD)	  Unlike	  THC,	  CBD	  does	  not	  cause	  psychotomimetic	  effects.	  	  	  Indeed	  importantly	  it	  has	  been	  reported	  that	  CBD	  has	  both	  anxiolytic	  and	  antipsychotic	  effects	  (Leweke	  et	  al.,	  2000,	  2007).	  	  CBD	  appears	  to	  be	  an	  antagonist	  of	  CB1	  and	  CB2	  receptors,	  although	  it	  has	  low	  affinity	  for	  these	  receptors,	  and	  its	  antagonism	  is	  hypothesised	  to	  work	  via	  other,	  as	  yet	  unclear,	  mechanisms	  (Mechoulam	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  	  Confirmation	  of	  CBDs	  antagonistic	  effects	  has	  come	  from	  studies	  that	  have	  shown	  that	  the	  anxiolytic	  and	  psychotomimetic	  effects	  Δ9-THC can be reduced via co-administration (Zuardi et al., 
1982) or pre-treatment with CBD (Bhattacharyya et al., 2010). 
2.4.2.3 A	  Potent	  Change	  
The amount of Δ9-THC found in modern cannabis preparations can be very significantly 
higher than it was in the heyday of 1960s and 1970s counterculture, although there is 
some controversy over the degree of difference.  It is reported that the Δ9-THC content of 
the average joint has increased from 10mg to 60-150mg since the 1970s (Ashton, 1999).   
In South East London, where much research has been conducted regarding cannabis and 
psychosis, skunk sinsemilla (cannabis both selected and especially grown for its potency) 
is estimated to contain between 12-18% Δ9-THC and <1.5% CBD, compared to 2% THC 
for low grade cannabis.  In the Netherlands, THC levels have doubled from 10% to 20% 
between 2000 and 2005 (UN	  World	  Drug	  Report,	  2006).  This is likely the effect of 
years of selective breeding, advanced cultivation techniques and market forces.  As 
pointed out by Ashton (1999), as the effects of THC are dose dependent, this makes much 
of the research into cannabis (which was carried out in the 1960s and 1970s) out of date.  
Cannabis use currently has a high prevalence rate in the UK.  For instance, in a survey of 
over 3000 university students, 60% reported having used cannabis, with 20% reporting at 
least weekly usage (Webb et al., 1996). 
2.4.2.4 Subjective	  Effects	  of	  Cannabis	  
In popular culture, the psychotomimetic effects of cannabis are well documented (e.g. the 
1938 film ‘Reefer Madness’ (Gasnier, 1936)).  By contrast there are surprisingly few 
 38 
attempts to formally describe these effects in the literature.  Much of the research into the 
subjective psychological effects of cannabis was carried out in the 1970s (Dornbush & 
Kokkevi, 1976; Keeler et al., 1971; Tart, 1970).  A classic Nature paper by Charles Tart 
(Tart, 1970), using a questionnaire based on initial qualitative interviews, attempted to 
identify common and less common experiences associated with cannabis.  The list is long 
and includes effects in all sensory domains, as well as in perception of time, body and 
movement, sexual effects, effects on thought processes, memory, emotions, identify, 
perceived self-control and sleep.   Tart quotes: 
“Sensations are enhanced and clarified; sight, hearing, taste, touch.  Time 
perceptions changes.  Attention becomes more unified, and moves more into 
awareness.  The many broad processes of association, such as social meanings, 
memory images, expectancies and plans, reduced in number and relevance. 
Inhibitions and submissions relax, allowing emotions, thoughts, fantasies and 
memories to flow more freely. The development and strength of these effects will 
depend on the individual, the times he has used marijuana, how he has used 
marijuana, and the environment”.   
In the same paper, Tart comments that due to the probable enthusiasm of his participants, 
more negative aspects of cannabis use were probably underreported. At the least, it seems 
likely that those people who experience significant adverse effects will be more likely to 
discontinue from using cannabis than those who don’t, leading to a bias in more chronic 
users.   The most common negative effect was paranoia, which 80% of participants had 
experienced.  20% of participants reported that they ‘had lost control and been ‘taken 
over’ by an outside force or will which is hostile or evil in intent for a while’. Asked how 
often  they had seen others ‘freak out’, 36% of respondents said fewer than 1 in 20 times, 
2% said more often and the rest said never.  
More recently D’Souza (D’Souza	  et	  al.,	  2004) have explored the subjective effects of 
Δ9-THC in a randomised, counterbalanced, double blind, laboratory study, in which 
participants received either 2.5mg, 5mg or no IV Δ9-THC.  Transient effects were 
reported including increases in positive symptoms, negative symptoms, perceptual 
alterations, euphoria, anxiety, and deficits in working memory, recall, and the executive 
control of attention without altering general orientation.  Positive symptoms included 
suspiciousness, delusions (paranoid and grandiose), disorganisation, derealisation, altered 
sensory and body perception, unreality and slowing of time.  Negative symptoms 
included blunted affect, reduced rapport and spontaneity, psychomotor retardation and 
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emotional withdrawal.   The authors conclude that given the overlap between the 
symptoms induced by cannabis and those of psychotic disorder, the study provides 
evidence for a cannabinoid model of psychosis.  A limitation of this study is that it was 
conducted (unsurprisingly) in a laboratory under carefully controlled conditions in which 
fixed doses of IV Δ9-THC were administered.  This does not mimic real life conditions in 
which the environment in which cannabis is used may vary dramatically and in which the 
user has some control over their intake and generally smokes or ingests a mixture of 
cannabinoids.  It is likely that an individual’s response to cannabinoids will be mediated 
by a number of factors such as how comfortable they feel with the people with whom 
they are sharing the experience.  To date, only one study has addressed these issues, and 
found no significant effect of setting, however it is arguable how well the study 
manipulated the affective components of the setting(Hollister et al., 1975). 
Morrison et al (2009), in a double blind, placebo controlled study, also report that 2.5mg 
of  Δ9-THC induced positive symptoms in 22 healthy controls, increases anxiety and 
results in deficits in cognitive function (working memory/executive function).  There was 
no relationship between degree of psychotic reaction and either anxiety or cognitive 
impairment. 
Individual predispositions may play a significant role in an individual’s reaction to 
cannabis.  In an experience sampling study, Henquet et al (2010) investigated the effects 
of cannabis is the daily life of 42 patients with psychotic disorder and 38 controls.  They 
found that cannabis use predicted increases in positive affect in both groups, with 
decreases in negative affect seen in patients.  Cannabis also predicted increased levels of 
hallucinatory (primarily auditory, but also visual) experience in patients, but not controls.  
In terms of temporality, mood effects were reported as acute effects, while psychosis 
effects were reported as sub-acute.  Thus, in this study, cannabis appears to enhance 
hallucinatory experiences in those who are predisposed, but not induce them in those who 
aren’t.  This data also fits with Spencer’s model of cannabis use in psychosis, where 
patients are better aware of the acute, rewarding effects of cannabis, and less aware of the 
chronic and negative affect inducing effects. 
 
2.4.3 A	  Bayesian	  Interpretation	  of	  the	  Psychotomimetic	  Effects	  of	  Cannabis	  
Corlett, Frith and Fletcher(Corlett et al., 2009), have used a Bayesian model to explain 
the effects of psychotomimetic compounds (ketamine, cannabinoids, amphetamine, LSD) 
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and sensory deprivation.  The authors suggest that the different psychoactive compounds 
exert their psychotomimetic effects by causing perturbations in the normal function of the 
Bayesian system.  They summarise these effects in a table, which is presented in adapted 
form below: 
Table	  2.1	  Effects	  of	  Pharmacological	  Manipulation	  on	  Top-­‐down	  and	  Bottom-­‐up	  processing	  (adapted	  
from	  Corlett	  et	  al.)	  
Manipulation	   Bottom-­‐up	   Top-­‐down	   Delusional	  
Ideation	  
Hallucinations	  
Cannabinoids	   ↔	   ↓	   ++	   -­‐-­‐	  
Ketamine	   ↑	   ↓	   ++	   -­‐-­‐	  
Amphetamine	  
(repeated	  dose)	  
↑	   ↑	   ++	   ++	  
Amphetamine	  
(single	  dose)	  
↔	   ↑	   +	   -­‐-­‐	  
LSD	   ↓	   ↔	   -­‐-­‐	   ++	  
Sensory	  
Deprivation	  
↓	   ↔	   ?	   ++	  
 
Corlett at al suggest that cannabis reduces top-down influence in the brain, while leaving 
bottom up processing relatively unchanged.  It may do this via its effects on dopamine 
and glutamate, which are, according to the earlier discussion, implicated in the 
specification of priors. According to the discussion of the Bayesian brain, delusional 
beliefs may arise from relative increases in the influence of bottom-up processing.  Such 
increases may either represent an increase in bottom-up signalling or a reduction in top-
down processing.  Reduction in top-down processing proposed as a consequence of 
cannabis use may reduce the impact of past regularities on interpretation of the present, 
thus allowing the formation of novel, and dysfunctional beliefs about the world.  Corlett’s 
theory could be extended to explain the long-term maintenance of delusions.  As the 
effect of cannabis wears off, one would expect the delusional ideas to reduce, and indeed 
this is consistent with what is commonly seen.  However, if priors are updated during 
cannabis use such as to encode the new beliefs, and such priors can plausibly explain the 
world, they may persist.  Furthermore, one might speculate that if experiences under the 
influence of cannabis are particularly salient (as they might be in traumatic paranoia), 
they may be more likely to inform the development of new priors.  Equally, if the 
cannabis user has had a traumatic past, it is possible that a shift to priors encoding a 
‘dangerous world’ might be more likely, thus biasing future perception of the world.  It is 
interesting to consider how this process might fit within the Sass and Parnas’ (2003) ideas 
(discussed earlier) of a progression in psychosis from ‘Unreality’ though ‘Mere Being’ 
and ‘Fragmentation’ to ‘Apophany’ and the ‘Delusional Percept’.  Further, these ideas, 
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although speculation fit with the evidence on cannabis use as a risk factor for psychosis 
(discussed below). 
 
2.4.3.1 Hallucinations.	  	  
It is noteworthy that hallucinations are not considered by Corlett et al. to be an effect of 
cannabis.  Although delusional beliefs, especially paranoid ideation, are prominent effects 
of cannabis, hallucinations are also reported in non-scientific literature and on cannabis 
Internet forums.  In the scientific literature, however, hallucinations are not widely 
reported.  Tart refers to experiences that may be described as perceptual changes rather 
than hallucinations (seeing patterns forms and figures in visual material), while Bressloff 
reports that cannabis has been associated with people seeing geometric patterns (Bressloff 
et al., 2002).     Peters et al, in a retrospective questionnaire study of cannabis experiences, 
report that 2% (1/50) of controls reported auditory hallucinations and 8% (4/50) report 
unusual visual experiences.  Percentages in ultra high risk for psychosis were 18 and 25% 
respectively; and for patients with schizophrenia 27% and 29% (Peters et al., 2009).  In 
the scientific literature, auditory hallucinations associated with cannabis mostly appear 
only in reference to those who have experienced psychotic episodes.  Even if cannabis is 
not associated with hallucinations in the general population, it is definitely associated 
with perceptual distortions (as reported above).  Interestingly, one suggested explanation 
for the relative prevalence of auditory hallucinations over that of visual hallucinations in 
psychosis considers the degree of environmental structure in each domain.   Margo 
(Margo et al., 1981) played people with auditory hallucinations auditory stimuli with 
varied degrees of interest and structure, from interesting speech to white noise.  They 
found a strong correlation negative between degree of structure and duration and loudness 
of hallucinations.  Following Feinberg (Feinberg, 1962), they suggest that the 
predominance of auditory hallucinations in psychosis may reflect the relatively lack of 
structure in natural auditory input (relative to visual input).  Arguably, typical 
experimental environments are especially high in visual structure and low in ambiguity, 
and thus may lead to reduced reports of visual distortions and hallucinations. 
2.4.3.2 Experimental	  Evidence	  of	  Cannabis	  Induced	  Reductions	  of	  Top-­‐Down	  
Processing	  
Experimental evidence for the hypothesis that cannabis reduces top-down processing 
comes from one of the visual illusions that were discussed earlier as evidence for 
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reduction in top-down processing (of which contextual suppression is an example) in 
psychosis:  the Binocular Depth Inversion Illusion (BDII).  In schizophrenia, 
susceptibility to this illusion is decreased.  Similarly, regular cannabis users have been 
found to exhibit decreased illusion susceptibility on the BDII (Semple et al., 2003) and to 
be indistinguishable in terms of illusion susceptibility to either prodromal or antipsychotic 
naïve patients with schizophrenia (Koethe et al., 2006).  The BDII illusion is commonly 
explained in terms of the top-down brain processes overriding bottom-up processing 
based on existing priors.  Thus reduced susceptibility to the illusion may be interpreted as 
representing weakened top-down processing.  A cannabis-induced reduction in top-down 
processing may underlie both this reduction in susceptibility to the illusion and contribute 
to delusional ideation in cannabis users. 
2.4.4 Cannabis	  and	  Psychosis:	  Evidence	  of	  a	  Causal	  Link.	  
It is now generally agreed that there is a connection between cannabis use and psychosis, 
however the question of causality remains controversial.   This question has attracted 
growing attention over the last decade, perhaps partly due to concerns about the possible 
public health consequences of increasing cannabis use (Webb et al., 1996) and concerns 
regarding the increasing potency of available cannabis (Ashton, 1999; Murray et al., 
2007).   
Proponents of the idea that cannabis use may trigger psychotic disorders point to a variety 
of evidence.  For instance, cannabis use is greater in those with a diagnosis of a psychotic 
disorder than those without and there is a strong relationship between age of onset of 
psychosis and cannabis use (Large et al., 2011).   Epidemiological evidence suggests that 
cannabis is associated with a twofold increase in the  risk of psychosis onset  (Tien & 
Anthony, 1990);  this is supported by a survey of 50,000 Swedish army conscripts that 
reported a similar overall risk, and found that the risk was usage related, with those who 
had smoked more often having greater risk, with a risk ratio of up to 6.7 for those who 
had smoked more than 50 times (Manrique-Garcia et al., 2011; Zammit et al., 2002).  
Results from longitudinal studies are also supportive (Arseneault, 2002; Van Os et al., 
2002; Stefanis et al., 2004; Weiser et al., 2002); for instance in the Dunedin 
multidisciplinary health and development study, people who were cannabis users before 
the age of 15 had a fourfold increased risk of developing schizophrenia (Arseneault, 
2002).   There is also evidence that an individual’s experience of cannabis use may be 
moderated by their vulnerability to psychosis, such that individuals at high risk are less 
likely to experience the euphoric effects of cannabis and more likely to experience 
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unusual perceptions and thought influence (Verdoux et al., 2003).  However, Verdoux et 
al fail to consider how an individual’s environment may affect their perception of 
experiences.  People at high risk of psychosis may have poorer support networks and be 
more isolated, which may interact with their experience of cannabis.  Such possible 
psychological interactions are often overlooked and untested in the biological literature. 
Despite the evidence of a connection between cannabis use and psychosis, causality is 
hard to prove.  Smit et al (Smit et al., 2004) examined five possible hypotheses that might 
explain the link between cannabis and psychosis:  1, that people use cannabis to self 
medicate; 2, that the other drugs used by cannabis smokers explain the link; 3, that 
confounding factors explain the link; 4, that there is a stronger effect in predisposed 
people; and 5, that cannabis can directly trigger psychosis.   They argue that converging 
evidence makes hypotheses 1 and 2 unlikely, and while confounding factors may play a 
part, they are unlikely to explain all the relationship.  They conclude that there is strong 
evidence for both hypotheses 4 and 5.  Thus they conclude that cannabis likely makes its 
own unique contribution to the risk of psychotic disorder and that this risk is moderated 
by an individual’s other vulnerabilities to psychosis. 
More recently, authors such as Shapiro and Buckley-Hunter (Shapiro & Buckley-Hunter, 
2010) have argued that the evidence for causality is convincing and the research fulfils 
most of Bradford Hill’s criteria2 for causation; in reviewing the evidence, they conclude 
that cannabis poses a significant risk to adolescent health and that, in at least some 
vulnerable individuals, it may trigger chronic psychosis.  The authors and others go 
further and say that these results should inform public health policy (Large et al., 2011; 
Shapiro & Buckley-Hunter, 2010).  It should be noted that the authors do show rather 
selective interpretation of some of the papers they quote, for instance, Harley’s (Harley et 
al., 2010) report of an additive effect of childhood abuse and cannabis use on later 
psychosis is reported as an a multiplicative effect of ‘brain trauma’ and cannabis use. 
One explanation for how drug use could have a causal relationship to chronic psychotic 
experience is that the individual is given a ‘taste of psychotic like experience under the 
influence of a hallucinogen, which then triggers, or somehow inspires further psychotic 
experience independent of substance use’ (Nelson & Sass, 2008).   It is possible that if a 
                                                   
2 Sir Austin Bradford Hill and Richard Doll are credited as the first researchers to 
demonstrate the connection between lung cancer and smoking.  The Bradford Hill criteria 
are minimal conditions necessary to provide evidence of a causal relationship. 
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person has a particularly traumatic drug experience, then this, in a manner similar to 
PTSD, may be re-experienced as a flashback.  If the person who had previously 
experienced symptoms under the influence of a drug now experiences them without this 
known trigger, they may well find the experience more aversive and perhaps begin to 
search for alternative explanations of their experience (‘I’m going mad’, ‘something has 
changed’ etc.).  To quote from admission interview of a person who experienced a 
psychotic episode two years after using LSD: “It’s the same now as it was with the drug, 
only then I knew I was coming back. Now there is nothing to hold onto” (Bowers & 
Freedman, 1966).  Perhaps also, if these flashbacks are experienced as aversive, they may 
become self-sustaining though a feedback loop where they are experienced as continuing 
traumas, leading to further flashbacks.  This would fit with evidence showing that distress 
at hallucinatory experiences is a consequence of catastrophic/negative appraisals of the 
experience (Chadwick & Birchwood, 1994) and that distress/anxiety may trigger 
symptoms of psychosis. In such a formulation, we may consider the negative drug 
experience to be equivalent to a traumatic life experience. 
One’s idiosyncratic reaction to drug use (or its sequelae) may depend on a variety of 
factors at different levels of explanation including genes, biology, past experience 
(especially childhood trauma), personality and setting of drug use and affective state at 
the time of use.   
What is beyond dispute is that cannabis use can result in experiences that closely parallel 
those of people with diagnosed psychotic conditions.  Although these experiences are 
generally confined to the acute stage of cannabis use, they may continue afterwards and 






3 Aims	  And	  Hypotheses	  
It is clear from the preceding literature review that altered contextual processing may 
underlie the symptoms of psychosis, and that cannabis has clear psychoto-mimetic effects 
and is linked to psychosis onset. Cannabis may also impact on contextual processing, and 
it has been hypothesised that this may be the common mechanism through which 
cannabis and psychosis are linked. However, this area of research is in its infancy, and 
cannabis is a complex substance with multiple ingredients varying in their neural impact. 
Further investigation of the effect of the component compounds of cannabis on both 
context processing and psychotic symptoms, and of context processing in psychosis, are 
required.  
This thesis consists of two related but separate studies.  Both studies focus on the 
relationship between psychosis and contextual processing.   The rationales for the 
individual studies are presented separately below: 
 
3.1 Study	  1:	  The	  effects	  of	  THC	  and	  CBD	  on	  a	  task	  engaging	  top-­‐down	  
processing.	  
This  study aims to investigate whether cannabinoids, in particular THC (delta-9-
tetrahydrocannabinol), result in alterations of processing matching those observed in 
clinical psychosis.   To my knowledge, the BDII study detailed above is the only 
experimental study to date to support the theory that the psychotomimetic effects of 
cannabis are due to reduction in top-down processing.    
The main aim of the study is to build on the current literature attempting to elucidate the 
mechanisms underlying the ability of THC to elicit paranoid thinking.  If THC does 
indeed weaken top-down processing, we would expect it to also weaken susceptibility to 
the Chubb illusion.   
The secondary aim of the study is to investigate the relationship between THC and CBD.  
Due to the potentially schizophrenogenic nature of cannabis strains with low CBD/THC 
ratios, understanding of the relationship between THC and cannabidiol is important from 
a public health perspective. 
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3.1.1 Hypotheses:	  
1. The primary hypothesis is that, following administration of THC, participants will 
show a psychotic-like reduced influence of context on processing manifested as 
reduced susceptibility to the Chubb illusion.  This will be reflected by a reduction 
in bias. 
a. The THC induced bias reduction predicted in hypothesis 1 will be blocked 
by pre treatment with CBD. 
2. Administration of THC will increase symptoms of psychosis as measured by 
PANSS (positive and negative) scores as well as State Social Paranoia Scale. 
a. The THC induced increase in symptom scores will be blocked by pre-
treatment with CBD. 
3. Susceptibility to the Chubb illusion (bias) before THC administration will be 
negatively correlated with 
a. Scores on the Cardiff Anomalous Perceptions Scale. 
b. Scores on the paranoid-dysphoric factor of the cannabis experience 
questionnaire. 
c. Scores on the Green Paranoid Thoughts Scale. 
d. Scores on the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire. 
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3.2 Study	  2:	  	  An	  investigation	  of	  contextual	  processing	  in	  first	  episode	  
psychosis.	  
There is compelling evidence that contextual processing is altered in schizophrenia.  In 
particular, various studies have shown that patients with psychosis show reduced 
susceptibility to visual illusions, indicting a reduction in suppression mechanisms or top-
down processing.  Limited evidence indicates that this may be linked to the chronicity of 
psychosis.  Study 2 aims to investigate whether the reported differences in contextual 
processing are present in patients who have recently experienced a first psychotic episode. 
3.2.1 Hypotheses:	  
 
1. 1st Episode Patients will show a reduced influence of context, indicated by 
reduced bias on the Chubb illusion 
2. Susceptibility to the Chubb illusion (bias) before THC administration will be 
negatively correlated with: 
a. Scores on the Cardiff Anomalous Perceptions Scale. 
b. Negative symptoms as measured by the SANS 






4 STUDY	  One.	  The	  effects	  of	  cannabinoids	  on	  
contextual	  processing	  and	  psychosis	  
symptoms	  
4.1 Methods	  
Data collection for this thesis was conducted as part of the larger ESCAPE study, of 
which this thesis formed a part.  The complete study protocol is described briefly in 
order to provide relevant context.  However, only the data from measures directly 
relevant to the current thesis was analysed.   
4.1.1 Ethical	  approval	  and	  Consent.	  
The study was approved by the Joint Institute of Psychiatry and Maudsley Hospital 
Ethics committee. All subjects provided written informed consent.  Safety protocols 
have previously been described (Morrison et al., 2009). 
4.1.2 Study	  Design	  
The study employed a 2 X 3 mixed design in order to detect change due to THC and 
pre-treatment with placebo.   Administration of cannabidiol was randomised and 
double blinded.  All participants received THC.  Each participant was assessed in 
three separate sessions: 1. Baseline, 2. Post-capsule (CBD/placebo), 3: Post THC.  All 
participants were administered THC.   
Groups from the two arms of the study are hereafter referred to as ‘Placebo’ and 
‘CBD’. 
4.1.3 Experimental	  Task	  and	  Measures	  
The measures can be divided into state (baseline predictive) measures, which were 
delivered just once, and trait measures which were delivered at all three timepoints. 
4.1.3.1 Trait	  Measures:	  
The trait assessment battery involved the following measures: 
• Cannabis Experience Questionnaire (CEQ) 
A measure of the subjective experiences of cannabis use.  Has three 
subscales: pleasurable experiences, psychotic like experience and after 
effects.(Barkus et al., 2006) 
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• Green Paranoid Thought Scale (GPTS). 
A multi-dimensional measure of persecutory ideas developed for use across 
the general population(Green et al., 2007). 
• Schizotypal Personality Scale (SPQ) 
Measures presence of schizotypal symptoms.  Has a three factor structure: 
cognitive-perceptual, interpersonal and disorganised symptoms(Raine, 1991). 
• Wechsler Test of Adult Reasoning (WTAR) 
The WTAR is a quick reading and pronunciation tool designed to estimate IQ.  
It has been co-normed to the WAIS-III and WMS-III. 
4.1.3.2 State	  Measures	  
The State assessment battery involved the following measures: 
Measure	  of	  Top-­‐Down	  Processing	  /	  Contextual	  Processing	  
• Chubb task. 
This is the primary task in the present study and is described in detail below. 
Measures	  of	  Affect	  
• University of Wales Mood Adjective Checklist (uMACL).  
Measures mood in three dimensions: energetic arousal, tense arousal and 
hedonic tone (Matthews et al., 1990). On each dimension, participants rate 
their levels of agreement with eight adjectives, four positive and four negative.  
• Beck Anxiety Index (BAI). 
21 item anxiety scale measuring anxiety (Beck et al., 1988).   
Measures	  of	  positive	  psychotic	  symptoms	  
• Positive and Negative Symptom Scale (PANSS). 
Standard scale for the assessment of psychotic symptoms.  A 30-item scale 
with positive and negative subscales(Kay et al., 1987). 
• State Social Paranoia Scale (SSPS). 
Measures recent paranoid thinking in social situations.  The SPSS has ten 
persecutory items, each rated on a 5-point scale.  The measure has ten items 
and has good internal, convergent and divergent validity and good reliability 
(Freeman et al., 2007). 
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Cognitive	  Measures	  
• Hopkins Verbal Learning Task (HVLT). 
Verbal learning and memory test providing a measure of immediate and 
delayed recall (Benedict et al., 1998).  Similar to the California Verbal 
Learning Task, but is shorter and importantly has different forms to enable 
repeated measures.  Participants are asked to remember a list of 12 items.  For 
immediate recall, this is read three times with a recall stage after each reading.  
Delayed recall is after 25 minutes. 
• Digit Symbol Recoding (DSR) 
Taken from the WAIS-III (Wechsler, 1939).  A speed of processing task, 
requiring participant to match numbers to symbols using a provided key. 
• Digit span (DS) 
Taken from the WAIS-III (Wechsler, 1939).  A measure of attention and 
working memory. 
• N-Back  
The N-back is a measure of continuous attention and working 
memory(Kirchner, 1958).  This measure was selected specifically for the 
EEG component of the study.  Unlike digit span, it is not co-normed with 
other tasks.  Alternate forms were generated for repeated measures. 
• NAB-Mazes 
Participants are scored on a composite measure of accuracy and speed on a 
series of seven progressively more difficult maze-tracing tasks(Hartman, 
2006).  Only two equivalent versions are available, thus the task was only 




4.1.3.3 Chubb	  Illusion	  Procedure	  
The Chubb Illusion Task used was a modified version of that used by Dakin, Carlin 
and Hemsley (Dakin et al., 2005).  In this task, the participant was sequentially 
presented with two stimuli disks of equal size.  Both disks were centrally presented 
on a computer screen.  One disc was presented in isolation (the ‘test patch’), the other 
disk (the ‘reference patch’) was presented with a larger reference surround.   The 
observer had to verbally report which of two stimuli (the reference or the target) was 
‘stronger’, by reporting ‘first’ or ‘second’.  This response was entered by the 
researcher.  If the observer reported losing concentration for a particular trial,  the 
experimenter was able to repeat the presentation. 
Each disk and the surround consisted of identically filtered noise (11.25cpd; 0.4 
octave bandwidth, luminance fixed at 50cd/m2).  The contrast of the test patch was 
varied from trial to trial, within a 4-80% range.  The constrast of the reference patch 
and reference were fixed (at 40% and 95% respectively).   Example test patch 
contrasts are shown in Figure 4.1.  The reference patch and surround are shown in 
Figure 4.2 
 
Low Contrast                            High Contrast  




Figure	  4.2.	  	  Example	  of	  Reference	  Patch	  and	  Surround	  
 
Reference and target stimuli were presented centrally in a randomized order for 
500ms each, separated by an inter-stimulus interval of 1250ms. Stimuli were disks 
with a radius of 0.34 degrees of visual angle (DVA) when presented at a viewing 
distance of 120cm. The reference stimulus was embedded in a circular surround with 
a radius of 1.91 DVA.  Fixation was assisted by the presence of a central black cross, 
which turned white when stimuli were presented onscreen. 
Stimuli were presented on a CRT monitor (spatial and temporal resolution of 1024 x 
768 pixels and 75 Hz respectively) fitted with a Bits ++ box (Cambridge Research 
Systems) operating in Mono ++ mode to give true 14-bit contrast accuracy. 
Experiments were controlled under the Matlab programming environment 
(MathWorks, Cambridge, MA) in conjunction with Psychtoolbox (Brainard, 1997; 
Pelli, 1997) running on an Apple MacBook computer. 
Runs consisted of 64 trials, during which the signal level (contrast) was manipulated 
under the control of the adaptive probit estimation toolbox (APE; Watt and Andrews, 
1982).  Each participant undertook two runs of the test at each session, thus each 
participant completed 128 trials at each session.  Data from the two runs was merged 
in Matlab, before functions were fitted.   
Use	  of	  APE	  algorithm,	  Output	  and	  Outlier	  Removal.	  
There are a number of approaches to gathering the psychophysical data for analysis.  
The most rigorous approach is to systematically vary the contrast difference at set 
points across a range.  This method however requires very many trials and is time 
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consuming for participants.  Where sufficient time is not available to use this method, 
an adaptive method can be used.  Such methods attempt to characterise the 
psychophysical function based on a smaller number of iterations.  In this case the 
APE algorithm was used.  Here, signal level (degree of contrast of the test patch) was 
manipulated under the control of the adaptive probit estimation toolbox (APE; Watt 
and Andrews, 1982).  
Output:  Threshold and Bias Variables: 
Full psychometric functions were derived, so that the threshold (standard deviation of 
a cumulative Gaussian fit to the data) and bias (the point of subjective equality) could 
be obtained. Threshold corresponded to the signal level of the test needed to support 
83% correct performance. Negative biases indicated suppressive effects.    Previous 
research indicates that control subjects should demonstrate such negative biases.  
Outliers:  Ninety-five percent confidence intervals (C.I.s) of fit parameter estimates 
(threshold and bias) were obtained through bootstrapping (re-sampling) and re-fitting 
of the raw data. The level of confidence associated with each parameter estimate was 
subsequently used to exclude data points for which relative confidence was low. Thus, 
C.I.s for both parameters were converted into Z-scores (i.e. expressed as signed units 
of standard deviation), and any data points for which C.I.s exceeded 2.5 for either 
threshold or bias (i.e. fell beyond 2.5 standard deviations of the mean) were excluded.  
4.1.4 Procedure	  
Recruitment and data collection for the study took place in four stages. 
1. Recruitment and screening via email. 
2. Initial data collection via online questionnaire. 
3. Final screening and baseline data collection 
4. Drug administration and testing 
Details of the procedure are discussed below and parts two to three of the procedure 
are shown in diagrammatic form in Figure 4.3. 
4.1.5 Recruitment,	  Screening	  and	  Initial	  Data	  Collection	  
Participants were recruited via a King’s College London, University-wide email (see 
Appendix).  The inclusion criteria were: 
• Males or Females aged 21-50 
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• A history of cannabis use, but not meeting threshold for cannabis abuse 
disorder. 
• No drug use in the last month 
• Any gender or ethnic background 
• No history of major psychiatric illness 
• No current or past treatment with psychotropics 
• No current physical illness 
• No family history (first-degree) of psychiatric illness 
• Not currently pregnant 
The inclusion of a history of cannabis use was necessary to avoid exposing cannabis 
naïve participants to a potentially addictive substance. 
The initial email received over 300 responses.   A response was sent to all potential 
volunteers asking them to fill out three online questionnaires: The Cannabis 
Experience Questionnaire (CEQ) (Barkus et al., 2006), The Schizotypal Personality 
Questionnaire (Raine, 1991) and Green Paranoid Thought Scale (GPTS, (Green et al., 
2007)). The CEQ was used to score potential participants based on their past 
experience of cannabis use.    
Following completion of the online questionnaires, participants were invited to attend 
a session to complete screening and baseline measures.  Screening took 
approximately one hour and the following assessments were administered. 
• Mini-Screen-For SCD from Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV 
(SCID), to screen for psychiatric symptoms (Gibbon & Williams, 2002). 
• Michigan Alcohol Screening Test (MAST) to assess for alcohol abuse. 
• DAST-20 to assess drug use over the previous 12 months (Skinner & Ontario, 
1982). 
 
Following screening, the remaining trait measures were administered.  Baseline data 
was collected for all trait measures with the exception of EEG measures, which were 
collected on the drug administration day.  Basic socio-demographic data (gender, 
ethnicity, date of birth and level of education) were recorded at screening. 
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4.1.6 Assessment	  
Assessment for the study can be divided into trait assessments and state assessments.  
The trait assessment battery was carried out during the recruitment, screening and 
baseline stages.  The state assessment battery was carried out at three time points: 
baseline, post oral tablet administration and post THC administration.  The same 
battery of measures was administered at each point.  However, in order to reduce the 
testing load on the main test day, most of the baseline testing was done in a separate 
session before the drug administration day.  The order of administration and specific 
scales are detailed later.  
4.1.7 Experimental	  Session	  
Participants were asked to abstain from recreational drugs for one week before the 
session and alcohol for one day.   This was confirmed by use of a Urinary Drug 
Screen (UDS).  Caffeine was allowed prior to the study if it was part of the 
participant’s normal routine.   A light lunch was provided and cigarette breaks were 
allowed.  The experimental sessions ran from approximately 9am to 4.30pm. 
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The procedure for the day was as follows: 
• Baseline EEG recording. 
• 0h: Oral capsule administration of 600mg CBD or placebo 
• 2.5h: Administration of test battery 
• 3.5: IV administration of  Δ-9-THC. 
• 4.5: Administration of test battery 
Following the experimental session, participants were asked to abstain from drinking 
alcohol, driving or operating heavy machinery for at least 24 hours.  A follow up 
telephone call was made the next day.  Participants were given £60 reimbursement 
for taking part in the study. 
4.1.8 Pharmaceuticals	  and	  Drug	  Administration	  
CBD was administered orally, with a dose of 600mg (2 X 300mg capsules) based on 
past human studies, which have typically involved doses of 300-600mg per day (e.g.	  Bhattacharyya	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  D’Souza	  et	  al.,	  2004;	  Morrison	  et	  al.,	  2009).  CBD was 
obtained from STI Pharmaceuticals UK.  Double-blinding was achieved via over-
encapsulation  (doses are provided in indistinguishable capsule form).  Capsules were 
administered 3.5 hours prior to IV THC challenge based on the available knowledge 
regarding the pharmacokinetics of CBT (Bhattacharyya et al., 2010). 
Synthetic Δ-9-THC was supplied by THC Parm GmbH, Frankfurt, Germany and 
prepared as 1mg/ml vials for IV injection, by Bichsel Laboratories, Interlaken, 
Switzerland.   After dilution in normal saline, preparations for injection contained 
1.5% ethanol absolute.  Sterile cannulae were inserted into veins into the antecubital 
fossa of both arms: one for administration of THC and one for plasma sampling.  
1.5mg THC was administered in 1ml/min pulses over 10 minutes.  The IV 
administration of  Δ-9-THC allowed for a relatively rapid delivery, with a 
pharmacokinetic time course similar to that of smoked cannabis (Grotenhermen, 
2003). 
Blood samples were taken at 1:00, 2:00 , 3:45, 4:10 and 5:00 hours post capsule.  
Blood pressure and heart rate were also taken at this time.  Samples were analysed for 
CBD and THC concentrations as previously described (Morrison et al., 2009).   
Rescue medicine, in the form of lorazepam (1-3mg), was available.   
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4.1.9 Data	  Analysis:	  
All analyses were performed in SPSS 19.0 (SPSS inc., Chicago).  Data were assessed 
for normality using Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistics.  Baseline group differences 
were assessed using Pearson’s Chi-square and independent t-tests, for categorical and 
ratio data respectively.   
Normally distributed data were analysed using a repeated measures general linear 
model (GLM).  The data was initially analysed using a 3 (SESSION) X 2 (GROUP) 
model. 
As expected given the sample, data on PANSS and SSPS scales were highly 
positively skewed.  This was the case for both state and change scores, thus 
necessitating the use of non-parametic approaches. Friedman’s test was thus used to 
analyse symptom scores. In addition, following D’Souza, for the PANSS, within 
subject change was categorised according to whether it met a-priori criteria for 
clinically significant change (an increase of greater than 2 points).  This categorical 
data was analysed using Fisher’s Exact Test.   
Relationships between psychosis scores and bias/cognitive data were analysed with 
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient.  This was chosen to account for the possible 
distorting effect of outlier data.  Significance was accepted at p<0.05, all comparisons 
were two tailed. 
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Figure	  4.3.	  	  Data	  Collection	  Timetable	   	  
Please refer to the section ‘Experimental Task and Measures’ for details 




Fifty-one participants were tested.  Of these, three had to be excluded due to failure of 
THC cannulation.  Three more subjects did not complete the Chubb task at all three 
sessions.  Thus 45 subjects were available for analysis. 
Identification	  of	  Outliers.	  
The first step in the analysis was to identify possible outliers (as detailed in the 
methods) on the basis of performance on the Chubb task, either with respect to bias or 
threshold and on any session.  Six participants were identified with outlier data on at 
least one session.  Four of these participants were from the placebo group, and two 
from the CBD group.  These participants were excluded from all further analysis, 
leaving 39 participants, 19 in the CBD arm and 20 in the placebo arm. 
4.2.2 Demographics	  and	  Baseline	  Scores	  
Demographics and Baseline scores are shown in Table 2.1.  
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Table 4.1.  At baseline, groups were matched on all demographic variables (age, sex, 
gender, ethnicity and education.  Groups were also matched on their scores on the 
CEQ, CAPS (total score), GPTS, SPQ (total, suspiciousness and unusual perceptual 
experiences) and the number of times they had used cannabis.    
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Table	  4.1.	  Demographics	  and	  Baseline	  Characteristics	  
	   	  




	   	  
	  
	   	  
	  
N	   19	   20	   	  
	  
Sex	  (m:f)	   12,7	   12,18	   ns	  
	  
Ethnicity	  (White	  




2,2,15	   1,1,18	   ns	  
	  
Age	  (mean,	  med,	  sd)	   23.9	   25.0	   2.5	   25.7	   25.0	   3.9	   ns	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Baseline	  Scale	  Scores	   mean	   med	   sd	   mean	   med	   sd	   	  
	  
SPQ	  	  (total)	   11.1	   9	   10.1	   11.4	   11.0	   5.6	   ns	  
	  
SPQ	  (unusual	  perceptual	  
experiences)	   0.89	   0.0	   1.8	   0.61	   0.0	   0.9	   ns	  
	   SPQ	  (suspiciousness)	   0.78	   0.0	   1.2	   0.61	   0.0	   0.9	   ns	  
	  
Green	  Paranoia.	  	  Paranoid	  
subscale	   24.0	   20.0	   10.5	   19.7	   17.0	   5.2	   ns	  
	  
CEQ	  (paranoia/dysphoria)	   43.1	   43	   10.1	   43.5	   46	   9.7	   ns	  
	  
CAPS	  (total)	   2.3	   1.0	   3.2	   2.1	   1.0	   2.2	   ns	  
	  
Previous	  cannabis	  use	  
(episodes)	   135	   20	   258	   99	   30	   222	   ns	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4.2.3 Hypothesis	  1.	  	  Effect	  of	  THC	  and	  CBD	  pre-­‐treatment	  on	  Bias.	  
 
Bias data is shown in Figure 4.4, Figure 4.5, Figure 4.6 and Table 4.2. 
Bias data was analysed using 3 (SESSION) X 2 (GROUP) mixed GLM.  The factor 
‘SESSION’ was treated as a repeated measure.  Within subject difference data 
(between session) was normally distributed according to Kolmogorov-Smirnov.   
Results are shown graphically in Figure 4.4. 
There was a significant linear effect of SESSION (p=0.011) and GROUP on bias 
(p=0.035), and no SESSION*GROUP interaction effect (p=0.244).  Post-hoc 
contrasts revealed that bias was significantly greater in session 3 compared to session 
1 (p=0.007), other differences were not significant. 
As there was a significant group difference on bias, a supplementary analysis (2 X 2 
(SESSION X GROUP) GLM) was conducted with baseline bias used as a covariate.   
Following adjustment for baseline bias, the effects of SESSION and GROUP 
remained significant (p=0.049 and p=0.009), with session 3 bias being significantly 
greater than session 2 bias.  There was no significant SESSION*GROUP interaction. 
4.2.3.1 Conclusions	  
The evidence did not support hypothesis one (that bias would be reduced following 
administration of THC).  Furthermore, as there was no interaction between GROUP 
(placebo/CBD) and SESSION, the evidence does not support any effect of CBD pre-
treatment on bias.   There was however, an unpredicted effect of SESSION, with bias 
increasing over time, either indicating practice effects or a CBD independent effect of 
THC 
The most striking finding was the effect of GROUP upon bias, with groups being 
significantly different at baseline and each timepoint thereafter.  However, as groups 
1. Following administration of THC, participants will show a psychotic-like 
reduced influence of context on processing manifested as reduced 
susceptibility to the Chubb illusion.  This will be reflected by a reduction in 
bias. 
a) The THC induced bias reduction predicted in hypothesis 1 will be blocked 
following pre treatment with CBD. 
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were selected through double-blinded randomisation, this difference must represent a 
random result. 
 
Table	  4.2.	  	  Measures	  by	  SESSION	  and	  GROUP	  
	   	  
CBD	   Placebo	   Overall	  





	   	  
	  




Baseline	   -­‐17.0	   -­‐17.0	   7.1	   -­‐11.9	   -­‐11.8	   7.4	   -­‐14.4	   -­‐14.0	   7.6	  
	  
Post	  Capsule	   -­‐17.6	   -­‐17.5	   7.0	   -­‐13.7	   -­‐11.9	   7.1	   -­‐15.6	   -­‐17.0	   7.2	  
	  
Post	  THC	   -­‐19.3	   -­‐20.6	   6.7	   -­‐15.2	   -­‐14.1	   6.2	   -­‐17.2	   -­‐16.9	   6.8	  
	  
Threshold	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
Baseline	   11.6	   11.3	   1.7	   10.8	   10.6	   0.9	   11.2	   11.1	   1.4	  
	  
Post	  Capsule	   10.9	   10.4	   1.6	   10.7	   10.5	   1.4	   10.8	   10.4	   1.4	  
	  
Post	  THC	   11.7	   11.6	   2.6	   10.4	   10.2	   1.2	   10.8	   10.8	   1.5	  
	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
PANSS	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
Positive	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
Baseline	   7.0	   7.0	   0.0	   7.0	   7.0	   0.0	   7.0	   7.0	   0.0	  
	  
Post	  Capsule	   7.0	   7.0	   0.0	   7.0	   7.0	   0.0	   7.0	   7.0	   0.0	  
	  
Post	  THC	   8.0	   7.0	   1.4	   9.3	   7.5	   3.0	   8.6	   7.0	   2.4	  
	  
Negative	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
Baseline	   7.2	   7.0	   0.5	   7.3	   7.0	   0.7	   7.2	   7.0	   0.6	  
	  
Post	  Capsule	   7.2	   7.0	   0.6	   7.2	   7.0	   0.7	   7.2	   7.0	   0.7	  
	  
Post	  THC	   8.1	   7.0	   2.6	   8.0	   7.0	   1.7	   8.1	   7.0	   2.2	  
	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
SSPS	  (persecution)	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
Baseline	   10.1	   10.0	   0.2	   10.0	   10.0	   0.0	   10.0	   10.0	   0.2	  
	  
Post	  Capsule	   10.1	   10.0	   0.2	   10.0	   10.0	   0.0	   10.0	   10.0	   0.2	  
	  
Post	  THC	   10.2	   10.0	   0.5	   11.0	   10.0	   2.3	   10.6	   10.0	   1.7	  
 64 
Figure	  4.4.	  	  Chubb	  Mean	  Bias	  by	  Group	  and	  Session.
	  








4.2.4 Hypothesis	  2:	  Effect	  of	  THC	  and	  CBD	  Pre-­‐Treatment	  On	  Psychosis	  
Symptoms	  	  
PANSS positive, PANSS negative and SSPS scores were not normally distributed 
according to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.  Continuous data was thus tested using 
Friedman’s test (FT, for analysis of SESSION effects) and Mann-Whitney (M-W, for 
independent group analysis of change scores).  Fischer’s exact test (FET) was used to 
test categorical data.  
Symptom data is shown in Figure 4.7, Figure 4.8, Figure 4.9, Figure 4.10, Figure 4.11 
and Figure 4.12. 
4.2.4.1 PANSS	  Positive	  
There was a significant effect of SESSION on PANSS-positive scores, regardless of 
whether pre-treatment was with CBD (FT, χ2=18, p<0.000) or placebo (FT, χ2=24, 
p<0.000).   From visual inspection of the data, it was clear that this SESSION effect 
was accounted for solely by change at post-THC.   Thus THC, but not CBD, was 
associated with an increase in positive symptoms.   There were no significant 
between-group differences in baseline-postTHC change scores (M-W, p=0.266). 
An alternative approach to the data is to categorically define participants as 
‘responders’ and ‘non responders’.  Following D’Souza (2005), participants were 
categorised according to a clinically significant change in score following THC 
(defined as an increase in PANSS positive scores of >=3 points).  Such changes were 
more common, at trend level in the group treated with placebo (8 of 20 cases), 
compared to the group pre-treated with CBD (2 of 19 cases) (FET, p=0.065). 
Rerunning the analyses with previously removed outliers included resulted in a 
significant difference (FET, p=0.02, CBD responders = 2/21, Placebo responders = 
10/24).  This indicates that CBD counteracts the effect of THC on positive symptoms. 
Administration of THC will increase symptoms of psychosis as measured by 
PANSS (positive and negative) scores as well as by the State Social Paranoia 
Scale (SSPS). 
a) The THC induced increase in symptom scores will be blocked by pre-
treatment with CBD. 
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4.2.4.2 PANSS	  Negative	  
There was a significant effect of SESSION on PANSS-negative scores, regardless of 
whether pre-treatment was with CBD (FT, χ2=8.4, p=0.015) or placebo (FT, χ2=6, 
p=0.050).   From visual inspection of the data, it was clear that this SESSION effect 
was accounted for solely by change at post-THC.  There was no group difference in 
change scores (M-W, p=0.574). 
4.2.4.3 SSPS	  
There was a significant effect of SESSION on SSPS persecution scores for placebo 
(FT, χ2=14, p<0.001), but not CBD (FT, χ2=2, p<0.368) groups.  Inspection of the 
data shows that this effect is accounted for by change post-THC.  Thus THC, but not 
CBD was associated with an increase in SSPS paranoia scores.  Independent group 
analysis of change scores indicated that the group difference was not significant (M-
W, p=0.206).  Examination of scatter plots indicates that the response to THC was 
driven by relatively few participants (5 of 20 in placebo group, 2 of 19 in CBD group). 
4.2.4.4 Conclusions	  
The data supported hypothesis 2, that THC would induce symptoms of psychosis.  
Furthermore, the data supported hypothesis 2a, that the degree of symptom induction 
would be reduced by pre-treatment with CBD.  
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Figure	  4.7	  Effect	  of	  THC	  on	  PANSS	  Positive	  (y	  axis	  truncated,	  7	  is	  baseline)	  
 
Figure	  4.8	  	  PANSS	  Positive.	  Baseline-­‐Post	  THC	  Change	  Scores	  
 
(Data Jittered for clarity) 
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Figure	  4.9	  Effect	  of	  THC	  on	  PANSS	  Negative	  (y	  axis	  truncated,	  7	  is	  baseline)	  
 
Figure	  4.10	  PANSS	  Negative.	  Baseline-­‐Post	  THC	  Change	  Scores	  
 
(Data Jittered for clarity) 
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Figure	  4.11	  Effect	  of	  THC	  on	  SSPS	  Persecution(y	  axis	  truncated,	  10	  is	  baseline)	  
 
Figure	  4.12.	  	  SSPS	  Persecution.	  Baseline-­‐Post	  THC	  Change	  Scores	  
 
(Data Jittered for clarity)
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4.2.5 Hypothesis	  3.	  	  Relationship	  Between	  Baseline	  Symptoms	  and	  Bias.	  
 
Average scores for the CAPS (2.3 and 2.1 for CBD and Placebo groups) were lower than 
those reported by Bell (Bell et al., 2005), which were 7.3 (s.d. 5.8) in a non-clinical 
sample.  There was no correlation between total CAPS score and bias. 
Average scores for the psychotic-like effects subscale of the CEQ (43.1 and 43.5 for CBD 
and Placebo groups) were similar to those reported by Barkus (42.12) (Barkus et al., 
2006), in their study of cannabis using controls.  There was no significant relationship 
between this subscale and bias. 
Average scores for the persecutory subscale of the GPTS (24.0 and 19.7 for CBD and 
Placebo groups) were similar to those reported by Green (22.1) for non-clinical samples 
(Green et al., 2007).  There was no significant relationship between this subscale and bias. 
Average scores for the total score of the SPQ (11.1 and 11.4 for CBD and Placebo 
groups) were more than a standard deviation lower than those reported by (Raine, 1991), 
which were 26.9 and 26.3 (s.d 11 & 11.4) for general population samples.  There was no 
significant relationship between bias and: SPQ total, suspiciousness or unusual perceptual 
experiences. 
4.2.5.1 Conclusions	  
Contrary to the hypotheses, the data did not support any correlations between bias on the 
Chubb illusion and trait measures of anomalous perceptions, reactions to cannabis, 
paranoid thoughts or schizotypal personality.  	  
Susceptibility to the Chubb illusion (bias) before THC administration will be 
negatively correlated with 
a) Lifetime Anomalous Perceptions as measured on the Cardiff Anomalous 
Perceptions Scale (CAPS). 
b) Psychotic-like reactions to cannabis as measured by the psychotic-like effects 
subscale of the Cannabis Experience Questionnaire (CEQ). 
c) Scores on the Green Paranoid Thoughts Scale (GPTS). 
d) Schizotypal Personality as measured by Scores on the Schizotypal Personality 
Questionnaire (SPQ).  Specifically Total score, suspiciousness and unusual 
perceptual experiences. 
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4.2.6 Post-­‐Hoc	  Analyses	  
4.2.6.1 Test-­‐Retest	  Reliability	  (Stability)	  For	  Chubb	  Task	  
From the protocol, the ‘purest’ test-retest data is obtained from comparing session1 and 
session2 in the placebo group.  For this comparison test retest reliability was as below. 
Bias:	  
Spearman’s rho:  0.632 
Pearson’s r:   0.751.  Both significant at p<0.01. 
An alternative method for calculating reliability is Intra-Class Correlation. To confirm the 
first analysis, an intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) was calculated using a two factor 
mixed effects model and type consistency (McGraw & Wong, 1996; Shrout & Fleiss, 
1979).  Single Measures ICC was 0.75 [95% CI 0.47-0.59).  Relationships are shown in 
Figure 4.13. 
Bias is therefore measured with adequate stability. 
Threshhold:	  
Comparing session1 and session 2 for the control group, there was a significant 
correlation with either Spearman’s or Pearson’s tests. 
ICC using placebo group and sessions one and two only was: .0.31 (95% CI: -.14 – 0.63).  
Using all the available data, averaged measures ICC was: 0.20 (95% CI: 0.01 – 0.41).  
The results of standard correlation and ICC analyses therefore suggest that ‘threshold’ 
was not measured with good test-rested reliability.  Given this, no further analyses were 
run on the ‘threshold’ variable. 
 
4.2.6.2 Relationship	  Between	  Previous	  Cannabis	  Use	  and	  Bias.	  











4.2.6.3 Effect	  of	  Session	  Upon	  Accuracy.	  
The reported effect of SESSION upon bias might represent a practice effect.  As 
participants did not know they had performed, and thus could not use such information to 
reduce their bias, a practice effect would most likely have been represented as increased 
response consistency or accuracy at the task.    An estimate of accuracy for each subject 
was available from the 95% confidence interval obtained from the bootstrapping 
procedure (bias-range).    Thus, a supplementary analysis was conducted to explore the 
effect of SESSION on accuracy.   A 1X3 repeated measures GLM was conducted.  
There was a significant effect of SESSION upon accuracy (p=0.033), shown in Figure 
4.14.  Further analysis revealed a significant quadratic (p=0.019), but not linear effect 
(p=0.133).  There was a significant difference between baseline and post-capsule 
(p=0.01), but not between baseline and post-THC (p=0.113) nor between post-capsule 
and post-THC (p=0.329). 
4.2.6.4 Relationship	  Between	  Bias	  and	  Accuracy	  
Correlations between bias and bias-range were significant (p<0.05) at each session and 
were as follows: 
Session 1: -.369 Session 2: -.449 Session 3: -.495 
Figure 4.15 shows the relationship between bias and accuracy (1/bias-range) at baseline.  
As bias range may be considered as the inverse of accuracy at a particular task, these 
correlations would indicate that as accuracy increases, estimates of bias decrease.  These 
results would thus indicate that the change in bias was not due to an increase in accuracy, 
as this would be represented as a reduction in bias. 
4.2.6.5 Conclusion	  
The results of the above analysis indicate that the effect of session was not due to 
accuracy, at least as measured by the bias-range. 
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Figure	  4.14	  	  Bias-­‐Range	  by	  Session	  
 





(Issues common to both Study One and Study Two will be discussed in the final chapter 
of the thesis.  Thus discussion here will be limited to issues specific to Study One.) 
This is the first study to investigate the effects of cannabinoids on performance on the 
Chubb visual illusion.  It was predicted that THC would reduce normal levels of contrast-
induced bias and that this reduction of bias would be offset by treatment with CBD.  
Contrary to this prediction, the results of the study demonstrate an increase in bias 
between baseline and post-THC conditions, and no effect of CBD.  It was also predicted 
that performance on the Chubb illusion would be correlated with baseline schizotypy 
scores and THC induced change in symptom scores.  No such correlations were identified.    
Thus the primary hypotheses of study one must be rejected  
The study did, however replicate previous findings that THC can induce transient 
psychosis-like symptoms and that this symptom induction can be reduced by pre-
treatment with CBD.  The implications and interpretation of these findings are discussed 
below.  
4.3.1 Effect	  of	  Session	  on	  Bias.	  
Regardless of treatment group, bias became significantly greater between baseline and 
post-THC timepoints.   There was no interaction effect between groups.   This is the 
opposite of what was predicted.   The study was designed primarily to identify an 
interaction between THC and CBD, and did not have a THC-control component.  It is 
therefore difficult to say conclusively whether this unexpected finding represents an 
effect of THC or a more general session effect (such as a practice effect).   The analysis 
identified a linear effect of session on bias, indicating that bias became progressively 
greater from baseline to post-THC.  This would suggest that the effect was not due to the 
administration of THC, as it was evident before THC administration. 
It is possible that there was a practice effect of session on bias.  This might arguably have 
been due to participants developing greater response accuracy over time.   As we had 
estimates of the accuracy of each person’s bias measurement at each session level, it was 
possible to analyse this by looking at whether the size of the confidence intervals 
decreased over time.  This was found to be the case, with a significant effect of session on 
confidence interval range.  It is not conceptually clear how bias and response accuracy are 
related, if at all.  Correlation analysis indicated that there was a significant negative 
relationship between bias and bias-range (regardless of session), indicating that as 
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response accuracy increased, bias decreased.  This result argues against increased 
accuracy being responsible for increased bias.  It should however noted, that bias-range is 
a proxy measure of accuracy and thus these results do not represent a optimal analysis of 
participant accuracy on bias. 
4.3.2 Test-­‐Retest	  Reliability	  of	  Bias	  and	  Threshold	  Variables.	  
To my knowledge this is the first study to investigate test retest reliability of the two 
dependent variables from the Chubb paradigm: bias and threshold.  To recap briefly, bias 
is a measure of the degree to which an individual’s perception of a target stimulus is 
affected by the presence of a surround stimulus.   Threshold is a measure of the smallest 
difference in stimulus that the observer can reliably distinguish. 
From the results, it is clear that bias has reasonable test-retest reliability with an intra-
class correlation (ICC) of 0.75.  This means that it provides a relatively consistent and 
accurate measure of an individual’s bias.  By contrast, threshold did not have a significant 
ICC, indicating that it was very poorly measured in the current paradigm.  This is likely 
due to the limited number of trials used in the task; accurate threshold estimation is 
difficult without collecting a full psychometric function. 
4.3.3 Psychotomimetic	  Effects	  of	  THC	  and	  Protective	  Effects	  of	  CBD	  
The study provides clear evidence that THC increases both positive and negative 
symptoms of psychosis as measured by the PANSS scale.  Furthermore for positive 
symptoms, pre-treatment with CBD dramatically reduced the number of people for whom 
THC induced clinically significant symptom change (only 10% of the CBD pre-treated 
participants had a clinically significant increase, compared to 42% of the placebo pre-
treated participants).  An important proviso to this conclusion is that clinically significant 
change was defined as a greater than 2 point change in PANSS-positive symptoms.  
Depending on how many items underlie this change, this may actually represent a fairly 
minor change.  For instance, a person could achieve this score by moving from having no 
symptoms to minimal symptoms on three items, or by moving from no to moderate 
symptoms on one item, which would represent much more significant clinical change.   
Nonetheless, symptom change was observed and the CBD-THC interaction was observed 
under double blinded conditions and so remains an important result.  The clinical 
implications of these findings are discussed in the final chapter. 
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4.3.4 Cannabis	  and	  Visual	  Illusions,	  What	  Does	  the	  Current	  Study	  Tell	  Us?	  
The present study indicates that neither THC nor CBD result in any reduction of bias on 
the Chubb Illusion.  This is in contrast to the finding that THC reduces susceptibility to 
the Binocular Depth Inversion Illusion (BDII).  Cannabis resin (Emrich et al., 1991), 
dronabinol3 (Leweke	  et	  al.,	  1999) and nabilone4 have been shown to decrease 
susceptibility to the BD-II and this decrease was attenuated when nabilone was 
administered with cannabidiol (Leweke et al., 2000).  Furthermore, cannabis users have 
been shown to have reduced susceptibility to the BDII relative to matched controls 
(Semple et al., 2003).   Also of interest is that sleep deprivation has been shown to result 
in a reduction of the illusion (Sternemann et al., 1997). 
Although the BDII and the Chubb illusion share some conceptual similarities, especially 
in that they may be considered as examples of top-down processing, their underlying 
mechanisms are likely to be quite different.  The Chubb illusion is primarily explained by 
mechanisms early in the visual system.   Evidence for this comes both from early 
experiments by Chubb involving direct measurement of visual system cells in the cat, and 
from the observation that if the illusion is presented dichoptically (to different eyes) the 
illusion disappears (Chubb et al., 1989).  This suggests that the mechanism of the illusion 
is primarily at a level before the information from both eyes is integrated (either pre-
cortical or cortical), possibly in V1 of the human visual cortex.  It has been suggested that 
surround interactions in V1 provide contextual priors that help disambiguate information 
based on the statistics of natural scenes.  Higher areas (V2 and above) may also provide 
feedback contextual suppression, although the extent to which this happens is not clear (Seriès	  et	  al.,	  2003).   Lotto and Purves’s data (2001) suggests that higher levels may be 
involved in providing necessary feedback for interpretation of even these relatively basic 
stimuli.  However, it is possible that their explanation overlooks the possibility that 
classical surround mechanisms in V1 may explain their data. 
What is certain is that in the visual system, feedback mechanisms (which may specify 
priors) are more numerous than feed-forward mechanisms.  Area V1 sends more 
projections back to the Lateral Geniculate Nucleus (LGN) than it receives from the LGN 
– and receives more connections from V2 than it sends upwards (Felleman & Van Essen, 
1991).  The brain thus invests a lot of biologically expensive wiring in these processes, 
                                                   
3 A pure isomer of THC 
4 A synthetic THC equivalent 
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supporting the idea that the ‘heavy lifting’ in perception is carried out by processes 
encoding contextual (or prior) knowledge.  The literature is not clear on this point, but it 
is possible that the ‘top-down’, contextual processes in the Chubb illusion are entirely 
encoded in V1.  Equally, it is possible that higher levels may be drawn upon.  In keeping 
with the principles of evolution, Occam’s razor and indeed Bayesian theory, it seems 
likely that the brain will use the least complex mechanism it can to process data at this 
level.  At the same time, feedback projections would not be in place, unless they were 
necessary.  
The BDII by contrast, depends on dichoptic presentation, indicating that it must involve 
higher level processing.  Furthermore, the BDII is likely a more complex example of top-
down processing.  For instance, the illusion is stronger for more familiar objects, such as 
faces, than it is for unfamiliar objects (Hill & Johnston, 2007).  Object recognition thus 
plays an important role in the illusion; this may indicate the influence of context (past 
experience) on perception of objects.  This evidence fits with Bayesian interpretation of 
illusions as Bayes optimal perception.  In this interpretation, the brain perceives the most 
likely interpretation of ambiguous data based on statistical probability, thus the BDII 
effect is stronger for familiar objects.  The effect of familiarity makes it likely that the 
BDII involves processing in the ventral stream of the visual pathway and perhaps higher 
areas.   The ventral stream (the “what pathway”) is involved in identifying objects, while 
the dorsal stream  (the “where pathway”) is involved in spatial awareness (Milner & 
Goodale, 2006).  In particular it is likely that the BDII, when using face stimuli will 
engage the fusiform face area.  This area, which is part of the ventral stream, has been 
directly linked to processing of facial stimui, but has also been linked to recognition of 
other familiar stimuli (Gauthier et al., 2000).  Another area which has been linked to the 
BDII is the hippocampus, which has been suggested as a comparator mechanism, 
involved in determining the ultimate conscious experience of the outer world (Gregory & 
Langton, 1966).  This area is particularly dense in cannabinoid receptors (Abush & 
Akirav, 2010) and presents a possible location for the effect of THC on the BDII.  
Furthermore, in the hippocampus, cannabinoids act presynaptically to inhibit Ca2+-
induced release of glutamate and acetylcholine, neurotransmitters that Corlett et al 
(Corlett et al., 2009) have argued are responsible for the specification of priors.  
Inhibition of these neurotransmitters may thus reduce the top-down input on the system, 
thus weakening the BDII illusion. 
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Given the above, is possible that THC affects visual perception at higher brain areas than 
V1 and thus alters performance on the BD-II but not on the Chubb illusion.  However, 
significant further work would be necessary to confirm this hypothesis.  Studies exploring 
the effect of THC on illusions similar to the Chubb illusion (such as the Ebbinghaus size 
illusion) would be a step in this direction.  A battery of such illusions would help further 
characterise any effects of THC on visual perception. 
 
4.3.5 Limitations	  
Use	  of	  PANSS	  scale.  The PANSS scale is not designed for use in non-clinical populations.  
It was chosen for the current study based on its use in previous studies of cannabis 
compounds (Bhattacharyya	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  D’Souza	  et	  al.,	  2005).  Further it was used for 
its comparability with clinical samples, as the research is interested in the similarities 
between psychiatric psychosis and drug induced psychotic symptoms. 
Although the PANSS was sufficient to detect THC induced psychopathology and its 
reduction by CBD pre-treatment, other scales such as the CAPE (Stefanis et al., 2002), 
may be more sensitive to cannabis induced symptoms.    This scale is a stable, reliable 
and valid measure of self reported dimensions of psychotic experiences in the general 
population, which captures both positive and negative symptoms (Konings et al., 2006).   
The 42-item scale is based on items from the PDI-21 (which is designed to measure 
symptom levels in the general population) with additional items to measure auditory 
hallucinations, negative symptoms and depressive symptoms.  The scale has three main 
dimensions: positive, negative and depressive.  A disadvantage of self-report measures 
such as the CAPE is that transient symptoms may not be clear to the person experiencing 
them, and clinician delivered tools might be more suitable in acute drug administration.  
However, to my knowledge, no study has compared available measures of psychosis 
symptoms with regards to their sensitivity to cannabis-induced change and thus choosing 
a particular scale is not straightforward.  It may therefore be useful in future to design and 
test a scale to measure such symptoms.  Further research investigating the subjective 
experience of cannabis use may be a good place to begin this process. 
4.3.5.1 Environment,	  Dose	  and	  Administration	  
Testing took part in an old building, in a space that used to house an MRI scanner.  The 
environment was somewhat run down, characterised by loose cabling and peeling paint.  
Beyond this, the environment was plain, with white walls, white Formica surfaces, plain 
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carpet and no decoration.  A variety of equipment was in place, including a number of 
computers and EEG machines.   How this compares to each individual’s normal drug 
using environments is an open question, but it was certainly not akin to a comfortable 
living room.  Although there is a lack of systematic research, informal reports of cannabis 
use fairly consistently report that initial mood and environment play a large part in the 
subjective experiences of using cannabis (Booth, 2005; Ludlow, 1857).  Thus the effects 
of the THC and CBD in the current study may not be readily generalizable to the full 
range of situations in which cannabis may be used.  Although there is a lack of evidence 
to support firm conclusions, it seems plausible that certain environments would be more 
likely to induce paranoia than others, for instance being around strangers is presumably 
more anxiogenic/pro-psychotic than being around friends. 
The dose and administration methods used for CBD and THC were based on previous 
studies and chosen so as to provide reliable levels of the drugs and a measurable CBD-
THC interaction effect.  Intravenous THC was chosen instead of smoking, as smoking is 
a very unreliable method (differing lung capacities and smoking styles mean that it is 
impossible to ensure that all participants have the same dose).  The three most typical 
methods of cannabis use are smoking, eating and drinking.  In the UK currently, smoking 
is almost certainly the normal method (as a cigarette, although pipes and vaporisers are 
also used).  Intravenous THC works on a similar time scale to smoking.  However, with 
smoking, the user can regulate their dose according to their subjective experience, thus to 
some extent receiving the effect that they are looking for.   In the present study, this was 
not possible and therefore individual’s experiences may not have represented their typical 
experience of cannabis use.   Equally, in normal use, THC and CBD are delivered 
simultaneously through the same method and thus the interaction may be different.   
Another issue here is the dose of CBD chosen, as there is limited evidence as to what a 
‘therapeutic’ does might be.  It is possible that higher doses, or doses administered over 
several days would have stronger ‘protective effects’. 
4.3.6 Conclusions.	  
The findings here indicate that neither THC nor CBD have significant effects on 
contextual visual processing as measured by the Chubb illusion.  This indicates that the 
effects of cannabis on visual perception may have their mechanisms in higher brain areas.   
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Previous experimental and epidemiological studies have suggested that cannabis 
preparations low in CBD are more psychogenic than those with higher levels.  The 
present findings, under controlled experimental conditions, provide support for this view. 
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5 Study	  Two:	  Visual	  Context	  Processing	  in	  
Recent	  Onset	  Psychosis	  
5.1 Methods	  
Recruitment and data collection for this study was conducted in conjunction with another 
researcher, Dr Oliver Suendemann.  Only those measures directly relevant to the current 
study will be described in full.  Control participants were recruited as part of Study One 
and details can be found in the corresponding methods section.  Methods below are 
therefore restricted to the clinical sample. 
5.1.1 Ethical	  approval	  and	  Consent.	  
The study was approved by the local research ethics committee (South East London 
Research Ethics Committee, Ethics reference: 11/LO/0573). Individuals provided 
informed consent and were free to stop the study at any stage.  
5.1.2 Study	  Design	   	  
The study was of cross-sectional, case-control design. 
5.1.3 Procedure	  
The session consisted of three stages: 
1. In the first stage, participants first read the study information sheet and, after all 
questions had been clarified with the investigator, provided written informed 
consent.  Following this, participants were interviewed to assess both positive and 
negative symptoms of psychosis.  Positive symptoms were assessed for both 
current state and retrospective recall of the most severe symptoms of psychosis, 
typically by identifying a most severe fortnight. Negative symptoms were only 
assessed for current state.   Participants then completed the CES Depression 
measure. 
 
During this stage, participants were also interviewed using the time budget 
measure, completed the Social Support Scale and filled in visual analogue scales 
(VAS) assessing baseline loneliness, anxiety, distress, happiness, paranoia, and 
sadness.  These measures are not directly relevant to this thesis and will be 
discussed elsewhere. 
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2. The second stage of the session consisted an experimental task in which 
participants were shown two sets of pictures (one with negative and one with 
neutral valance).  Repeated visual analogue scales were used to assess the impact 
of these interventions.  Presentation was randomised and counterbalanced, and a 
distractor task was completed in between (FAS verbal fluency task).  Results of 
this experiment will be reported elsewhere.  
3. In the third stage, participants first completed the Cardiff Anomalous Perception 
Scale (CAPS), they then completed the Chubb task.  This was completed once by 
default.  If time allowed, the task was repeated.  
5.1.3.1 Participants	  and	  Recruitment	  
The clinical sample consisted of 38 individuals with a recent onset in psychosis. In line 
with other studies, “recent onset” was defined as illness onset within the last five years 
(e.g. Baldwin et al., 2005). Individuals were recruited from outpatient services and 
psychosis teams within the South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust (SLaM).  
Of these participants, 29 were able to come to the Institute of Psychiatry for the full 
battery of tests.  
This study collaborated with Dr. Craig Morgan’s psychosis research team who at the start 
of this project was running a large multi-centred trial attempting to recruit all first onset 
psychosis clients who presented within any of the SLAM services. The aim of this 
collaboration was twofold, namely: (1) facilitating recruitment and (2) reduce  
unnecessary duplication of data collection and participant fatigue (3) sharing some of the 
data.  
• Patients who had completed Dr. Morgan’s study were asked whether they would 
be interested in taking part in some further research. If participants expressed an 
interest and provided consent, Dr. Morgan’s team passed on their contact details 
to the author of this study who made arrangements to contact the participant.  
Participants were initially contacted by telephone and provided with details about 
the study. They were subsequently sent written information in the post or by 
electronic mail. Participants were then either booked in for an appointment or in 
case they required more information or contacted again one week later. sent the 
information sheet via email/mail and contacted.  
• In order to avoid over-fatiguing and over-researching of clients by asking the 
same questions multiple times, some of the relevant client information that had 
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already been collected was provided by Dr. Morgan’s team (demographic 
information).  
5.1.3.2 Eligibility	  Criteria	  
Inclusion criteria were: 
• Recent episode of psychosis (within 5 years) 
• Age 18-65 
• Sufficient comprehension of English 
• Absence of history of brain injury, known organic cause of psychosis or primary 




5.1.4 Materials	  and	  Measures	  
5.1.4.1 Assessment	  of	  Symptoms	  
Psychosis symptoms and functioning were assessed using the following measures: 
• Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms (SAPS). 
The SAPS is a widely used semi-structured interview for assessment of positive 
psychosis symptoms (Andreasen & Olsen, 1982). The scale consists of 35 items 
and is divided into four subscales: hallucinations, delusions, bizarre behaviour, 
and formal thought disorder. Items are rated on 6-point scale from 0 (no 
abnormality) to 5 (severe). The SAPS was carried out twice. First with regards to 
the patient’s worst episode and second with regards to current positive symptoms.  
Total scores were calculated as sums of the symptom cluster subscores. 
• Scale for the Assessment of Negative Symptoms SANS. 
The SANS a widely used semi-structured interview to assess negative symptoms 
of psychosis in the past month (Andreasen & Olsen, 1982).  It consists of 25 items 
which are divided into 5 subscales: affective flattening or blunting, alogia, apathy, 
asociality, and inattention.  Items are rated on a 6-point scale from 0 (no 
abnormality) to 5 (severe). The SANS was carried out with regards to current 
symptoms. Total scores were calculated as sums of the symptom cluster subscores. 
• Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-D). 
The CES-D is a widely used 20-item self-report questionnaire to measure 
depressive symptomatology in adults (Radloff, 1977).  
5.1.4.2 Medication	  
Current medication was recorded for all participants.  Where participants were taking 
antipsychotic drugs, the Defined Daily Dose (DDD) was used to calculate an equivalency.  
The DDD is the assumed average maintenance dose per day for a drug used for its main 
indication in adults.  DDD data for antipsychotics is available from the World Health 
Organisation (Word Health Organisation, 2012), thus for each participant, it is possible to 
calculate an antipsychotic equivalence variable as follows: 
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 = 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡  𝐷𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦  𝐷𝑜𝑠𝑒𝐷𝐷𝐷 ∗ 100 
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5.1.5 Chubb	  Illusion	  Task.	  
The Chubb Illusion Task is a modified version of that used by Dakin, Carlin and Hemsley 
(Dakin et al., 2005).   Full details of the task can be found in the methods for Study 1. 
 
5.2 	  Data	  Analysis:	  
All analyses were performed in SPSS 19.0 (SPSS inc., Chicago).  Data were assessed for 
normality using Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistics.  Baseline group differences were 
assessed using Pearson’s Chi-square and independent t-tests, for categorical and ratio data 
respectively.   
Normally distributed data were analysed using Student’s T-Test. 
Relationships between psychosis scores and bias/cognitive data were analysed with 
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient.  This was chosen to account for the possible 
distorting effect of outlier data.  Significance was accepted at p<0.05, all comparisons 





29 participants from the clinical group completed test battery.  Of these, one participant 
was excluded for clearly incorrect responses.  This participant appeared to give opposite 
responses for high contrast target patches, even after the task had been explained several 
times. 
45 control participants were available from Study One. 
5.3.1.1 Identification	  of	  Outliers.	  
The first step in the analysis was to identify possible outliers (as detailed in the methods 
of Study 1) on the basis of performance on the Chubb task, either with respect to bias or 
threshold.  One participant, from the clinical group, was identified as representing outlier 
data.   The final dataset thus included 45 control participants and 27 clinical participants. 
5.3.2 Demographics	  and	  Symptom	  Scores	  
Demographics and symptom scores are shown in   
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Table 5.1.   Ethnicity and education data were collapsed into binary outcomes (White 
European/other and non-university/university respectively in order to facilitate statistical 
analysis).  
Clinical and control groups were matched for gender but were significantly different for 
ethnicity and education.  The clinical group has significantly a lower proportion of 
participants reaching university education and significantly more participants of non-
White-European background.  The control group was also significantly younger than the 
clinical group (25.6 vs 32 years). 
Duration of untreated psychosis (DUP) ranged from 0 to 2652 weeks, with a mean of 208 
and a median of 6 weeks.  The highest DUPs may be explained by a late onset, combined 
with early experience of subclinical symptoms.  
5.3.2.1 Psychosis	  Symptoms	  
For symptoms of psychosis, group could not be directly compared as they were assessed 
using different scales.  However, control participants did not have any positive symptoms 
as assessed by the PANSS.  For PANSS negative symptoms, 42 of 45 participants were 
without symptoms.  3 participants had mild negative symptoms. 
For clinical participants, scores for current state were generally low.   16 of 27 
participants had no positive symptoms (SAPS), while 6 of 27 had no negative symptoms 
(SANS).  Mean scores were 2.6 and 4.8 respectively. 
5.3.2.2 Anomalous	  Experiences	  
Scores on the CAPS measure of anomalous experiences were not normally distributed, 
thus data was analysed using Mann Whitney.  Clinical participants had significantly 
greater scores on CAPS total score than control participants (p=0.000).  These differences 




5.3.3 Hypothesis	  1:	  	  Reduced	  Bias	  in	  First	  Episode	  Psychosis	  
 
Bias data were normally distributed in both groups according to Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test.  Group differences were tested with an independent groups T-test.    There was no 
significant difference between case and control group for bias.  However, there was a 
trend level difference between groups, with bias being greater in the control than in the 
case group (p=0.089, mean difference 4.1, 95% CI of difference: -0.6 – 8.8).   
Model fitting of individual subject data provides a 95% estimate of confidence in the bias 
estimate (bias-range).  This may be considered as a proxy measure of participant response 
accuracy.  A further analysis was thus conducted to analyse whether bias-range was 
different between groups.  Bias-range was significantly greater in the case than control 
groups (p=0.008). 
Controlling for bias-range using univarate GLM with bias as dependent variable, group as 
fixed factor and bias-range as a covariate resulted in the group difference becoming 
significant (p=0.023).  This result should be treated with caution as controlling for 
variables on which groups differ significantly and non-randomly risks issues of co-
linearity.  
5.3.3.1 Conclusion	  
Although a significant difference was not demonstrated between groups, there was 
evidence of a difference in the expected direction at trend level.  The effect size (Cohen’s 




1st Episode Patients will show a reduced influence of context, indicated by reduced 
bias on the Chubb illusion. 
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Table	  5.1	  Demographics	  
	   	  




	   	  
	  
	   	  
	  
N	   45	   27	   -­‐	  
	  
Sex	  (m:f)	   26:19	   15:12	   ns	  
	  
Ethnicity	  (White	  
European/other)	   37:8	   13:14	   0.002	  
	  
Education	  (Non-­‐
university,	  University)	   7:38	   16:10	   0.000	  
	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   mean	   med	   s.d.	   mean	   med	   sd	   	  
	  
Age	   25.6	   25	   4.13	   32	   30	   8	   0.001	  
	   DUP	  (weeks)*	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   165	   4	   531	   -­‐	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Symptom	  Scores	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
CAPS	  (total)	   2.0	   1	   2.6	   9.7	   8.5	   7.6	   0.000	  
	   	  	  	  Distress	   3.6	   2	   5.5	   25.2	   22	   23.7	   -­‐	  
	   	  	  	  Distraction	   4.2	   2	   6.3	   21.6	   20.5	   14.4	   -­‐	  
	   	  	  	  Frequency	   2.9	   1	   7.9	   17.1	   17	   11.2	   -­‐	  
	  
SAPS	  Current	   	   	   	   2.6	   0	   4.4	   -­‐	  
	   	  	  	  Episode	   	   	   	   9.1	   10	   4.1	   -­‐	  
	   SANS	  Current	   	   	   	   4.8	   4	   4.7	   -­‐	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   PANSS	  Positive	   7	   7	   0	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
	   PANSS	  Negative	   7.18	   7	   .576	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
*Duration of Untreated Psychosis (First symptoms to first formal psychiatric contact)	  	  
	  
Table	  5.2	  Bias	  by	  Group	  
	   	  
Control	   Psychosis	   Sig	   d	  
	  




	   	  
	  
	  
	   	  
	  
Bias	   -­‐15.3	   -­‐14.2	   8.3	   -­‐11.2	   -­‐12.9	   11.8	   0.089	   0.40	  
	  
Threshold	   11.8	   11.2	   3	   12.9	   11.6	   4.1	   -­‐	   	  
	   Bias	  Range	   7.3	   6.3	   2.6	   9.8	   8.9	   4.2	   0.008	   0.46	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Figure	  5.1.	  	  Bias	  Data	  By	  Group.	  	  Scatter	  Plot	  
	  
(Data jittered for clarity) 
	  
Figure	  5.2	  Bias	  Data	  By	  Group,	  Means	  and	  95%	  CI.	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5.3.5 Hypothesis	  2:	  	  Correlations	  Between	  Bias,	  Symptoms	  and	  Demographics	  
 
Due to the number of tests, correlations were only reported if they were significant at 
p<0.05. 
5.3.5.1 Correlations	  with	  Bias	  
Symptoms	  
In the clinical group, there were no significant correlations between bias and SAPS 
(current or worst episode) or SANS scores.  There were also no significant correlations 
between bias and CAPS scores.  Symptom correlations for the control group have already 
been reported in Study One. 
Demographics	  
As groups differed on age, ethnicity and education variables, relationships between these 
variables and bias were investigated.   No significant correlations were identified.  
Medication	  
There was no significant correlation between participant’s dose of antipsychotic 
(calculated as percentage of Daily Dose Equivalence) and bias. 
5.3.5.2 Post	  Hoc:	  Correlations	  with	  Bias-­‐Range	  
Model fitting of individual subject data provides a 95% estimate of confidence in the bias 
estimate (bias-range).   This may be considered as a proxy measure of participant 
response accuracy.  It was therefore of interest to know if symptom scores might affect 
bias range.  Correlations were thus run between bias range and SAPS and SANS scores.   
In the patient group, there was a significant correlation between bias range and SANS 
scores (Pearson: r=0.496, p=0.009).  The was no significant relationship between bias-
range and SAPS (rho=.349, p=0.075).   
 
 
Bias on the Chubb illusion will be negatively correlated with: 
a) Negative symptoms as measured by the SANS 
b) Positive symptoms as measured by the SAPS 
c) Anomalous experiences as measured by the CAPS. 
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5.3.5.3 Correlations	  	  
Given this relationship between bias-range and symptom scores, further analyses were 
run investigating the relationship between bias-range and CAPS scores.  Correlations 
were run separately for each group and were not significant. 
5.3.5.4 Conclusion	  
There was no support for a relationship between bias and symptoms, as measured by the 
SAPS, SANS and CAPS.  There was however an unpredicted relationship between 




Figure	  5.3.	  	  Correlation	  between	  Bias	  Range	  and	  SANS	  scores.	  
 






(Issues common to both Study One and Study Two will be discussed in the final chapter 
of the thesis.  Thus discussion here will be limited to issues specific to Study Two.) 
Previous studies have reported that psychosis is associated with differences in contextual 
visual processing – specifically reduced levels of suppression.  These differences have 
been found in the Chubb illusion and analogues of the Chubb illusion (Barch et al., 2012; 
Dakin et al., 2005; Tadin et al., 2006; Tibber et al., In Preperation; Uhlhaas et al., 2004; 
Yoon et al., 2009, 2010).   None of these studies however, looked at whether such 
differences were present early in the development of psychosis.  This study thus set out to 
expand on these findings by investigating whether such differences were present in recent 
onset psychosis. 
The study found limited evidence to support the idea that differences in visual context 
processing are present even in recent onset psychosis.  Although the main finding of the 
study, that contextual visual suppression (as measured by bias) was reduced in people 
with recent onset psychosis, was not statistically significant at p<0.05, it was consistent 
with previous findings.  The study did not however find any evidence of predicted 
associations between symptom measures and bias.    
5.5 Interpretation	  
The data are consistent with an association between reduced levels of suppression and 
thus abnormal cortical gain in psychosis.  Although the results are not statistically strong, 
they indicate that the reduced suppression effects seen in psychosis may be present from 
onset if not before.  Reduced suppression may therefore represent a vulnerability factor 
for the development of psychosis.  The pattern of data in the literature indicates that these 
suppression effects may be stronger in people with a longer duration of psychotic disorder 
(effect sizes appear greatest in the chronic forensic sample of Dakin, with other studies of 
less chronic samples showing smaller effect sizes (Barch et al., 2012; Tibber et al., In 
Preperation).  However, the data is insufficient to view this as more than speculation at 
this point.  Further replications, and preferably longitudinal studies would be necessary to 
draw stronger conclusions. 
Virtually all neurotransmitter systems have been in some way linked to psychotic 
experience.  Of these dopamine is perhaps the most prominent (Howes & Kapur, 2009), 
with glutamate also increasingly studied (Javitt, 2010).  However, as Tibber et al (In 
Preperation) argues, another neurotransmitter that has been linked to psychosis (Javitt, 
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2010), GABA, may be particularly relevant to visual suppression.  GABA has been 
linked to reduced surround suppression in schizophrenia(Yoon et al., 2010) and  GABA 
also mediates inhibition in a number of other tasks reported to be affected in psychosis, 
such as contour integration (Silverstein	  et	  al.,	  2000,	  2006), and orientation 
discrimination (Edden et al., 2009).  Thus, it is possible that GABA neurotransmission 
abnormalities may underlie the altered surround suppression effects seen in psychosis.  It 
is however, not clear how such putative visual system neurotransmitter differences might 
relate to the more general psychopathology in psychosis.  Certainly, benzodiazepines, 
which enhance GABAergic activity, have no clear utility as an antipsychotic agent (Volz 
et al., 2007).  If GABA deficits are related to visual dysfunction in psychosis, it is 
virtually certain that interactions with other neurotransmitter systems will be involved.  
The clinical implications of these findings are discussed in the final chapter. 
5.5.1 Limitations	  
The study had a number of important limitations, which are discussed below. 
5.5.1.1 Group	  Selection	  
This study adopted a pragmatic approach, using available data from Study One, combined 
with new data from an on-going study of participants with recent onset psychosis.  A 
number of issues arise from this approach.  Perhaps the most important of these issues is 
that the groups were poorly matched, the control group having significantly higher levels 
of education and being predominantly white European (whereas the case group were of 
mixed ethnicity, with an equal mixture of white European and other ethnicities).   
However, none of these demographic variables were correlated with the outcome measure, 
and as such, the poor matching of groups is of limited concern.  A secondary difficulty 
with this approach was that the symptoms measures chosen in each case were not directly 
comparable (PANSS in the control group and SAPS/SANS in the case group).  Although 
this was not ideal, the control group were essentially asymptomatic as measured on the 
PANSS and it is likely that they would not have scored significantly on the SAPS/SANS. 
Finally, the control group were somewhat unusual, in that they all had experience of 
cannabis use (although they were not classified as dependent).   Although Study One did 
not demonstrate any clear effect of THC or CBD on bias scores, it is possible that chronic, 
rather than acute use of cannabis might affect bias.  Chronic cannabis smokers have been 
shown to exhibit reduced susceptibility to the BDII (Semple et al., 2003), thus it is 
possible the control group may not be representative of the general population with regard 
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to their performance on the Chubb Illusion.  If a history of cannabis use also reduced 
susceptibility to the Chubb effect, this would reduce the power of the present study to 
detect a group difference.   Arguing against this possibility however is the fact that in the 
control group there was no relationship between lifetime use of cannabis and bias.  
Further, given that cannabis use is considered a risk factor for the development of 
psychosis (Murray et al., 2007), and that cannabis use is common in people ages 16-40 
(with a lifetime prevalence of between 30-50% according to the British Crime Survey 
(Roe, 2005)), a control group with no experience of cannabis would likely be equally 
unmatched.  Unfortunately cannabis use data was not available for the clinical group and 
so a group comparison of cannabis use was not possible. 
5.5.1.2 Medication	  
The majority of the clinical group were taking antipsychotic medication.  It is possible 
that medication may affect surround-suppression.  However, there was no significant 
correlation between percentage of Defined Daily Dose and bias.  This indicates that 
medication was unlikely to be responsible for the between group difference in surround-
suppression effects.  This conclusion is supported by data from Dakin et al (2005), in 
which reduced suppression was not seen in a group of patients with a diagnosis of bipolar 
disorder, several of whom were taking antipsychotics.  Finally, Tibber (In Preperation) 
found that while contrast surround-suppression was reduced in patients with 
schizophrenia, a matched analogous task (luminance surround-suppression) was robust to 
diagnosis.   
5.5.1.3 Other	  Cognitive	  Confounds	  
General cognitive, attentional or motivational factors that differ between groups may 
represent confounds in the present study.  This is discussed in more detail in the next 
chapter. 
5.5.2 Summary	  
In summary, the data from this study provide further support for a reduction of surround 
suppression in psychosis.  Furthermore, they demonstrate that this reduction may be 
present even in people with recent onset of psychosis.  However, the evidence from this 
study is relatively weak and replication with larger samples will be necessary in order to 
draw stronger conclusions. 
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6 Overall	  Discussion	  and	  Conclusions	  
This thesis aimed to extend research into context processing, hypothesised to be the basic 
cognitive difference in psychosis, by examining the performance of non-clinical controls 
who had completed measures of psychotic symptoms and a first episode psychosis group 
on a visual context processing task; and to further investigate context processing as a 
candidate mechanism linking psychosis and cannabis use, by comparing the effects of 
two consituents of cannabis on the same task.  Specifically, it has investigated: A.  The 
effect on of cannabinoids on suppression of visual context and B.  The relationship 
between recent onset psychosis and suppression of visual context.  In both cases, the 
Chubb Illusion was used as a measure of suppression of visual context.  
In Study One, it was predicted that THC, an important component of cannabis, would 
reduce context based visual suppression (bias) and that this reduction would be attenuated 
by pre-treatment with CBD, another key component of cannabis.  It was also predicted 
that THC would induce transient psychotic symptoms, and that this induction would be 
attenuated by pre-treatment with THC.  No evidence was found to support the first 
prediction of an effect on bias, while the second prediction was supported by the data. 
In Study Two it was predicted that a clinical group consisting of participants who had 
experienced a recent onset of psychosis would show a reduction in context based visual 
suppression (bias) relative to a control group.  Although not statistically significant, the 
results of the study supported this prediction, with the clinical group showing reduced 
bias relative to the control group.  In both studies, it was predicted that bias would be 
correlated with symptom scores.  No evidence was found to support this prediction. 
Issues specific to the individual studies have been discussed previously.  I shall now 
consider a number of issues common to both studies as well, before considering the 
clinical implications of the findings.  
6.1.1 Relationships	  Between	  Bias	  and	  Symptom	  Scores	  
Conceptually, one might expect that altered visual context processing, which may be 
considered non-optimal in an adaptive sense, would predispose an individual to 
anomalous visual experiences.  If this processing difference was not limited to the visual 
domain, but representative of a general context processing difference, one might expect 
anomalous experiences in other domains.   At the same time, reduced contextual 
suppression, as demonstrated by a reduction in Chubb bias, has been interpreted as 
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reflecting an overall reduction in top-down processing in psychosis.   According to the 
models of Hemsley (Hemsley, 2005b) and Corlett (Corlett et al., 2009), such reductions 
in top-down processing are predicted to result in increased relative influence of bottom-
up signalling, leading to anomalous experiences and thus  increasing the likelihood of 
delusion formation.  Put another way, the brain normally engages top-down processes as 
a way of using past experience to make sense of the present.  A reduction in the use of 
such contextual knowledge makes it more likely that novel, but unlikely explanations of 
experience will be formed (delusions). 
Based on the above, if altered perceptual processing was indeed a vulnerability factor for 
psychosis, it might be expected that there would be a correlation between measures of this 
process and symptom scores.   It was therefore predicted that bias (as measured by the 
Chubb illusion) would be correlated with symptom scores, in particular anomalous 
experiences (as measured by the CAPS), and also positive and negative symptoms (as 
measured by the PANSS, SAPS and SANS) and paranoid ideation (as measured by the 
GPTS).  However, neither study in this thesis found any evidence of a relationship 
between bias and symptoms measures.   
Clearly, there are two possible general interpretations of these results: (1) that no such 
relationships exist and (2) that such relationships exist, but that the current study was 
unable to confirm them.  With regard to the first possibility, it could be that differences in 
visual context processing are associated with psychosis but not with symptom scores.  
Such differences could predispose a person to psychotic experience generally, but not 
predict symptom levels.  Alternatively, it could be, as has been suggested by others, that 
the reported difference on the Chubb illusion are an artefact of another aspect of 
psychosis, in particular inattention (discussed below). 
With regard to the second possibility, it is possible that a lack of sensitively of the scales 
used meant that there was not enough variability to detect a significant relationship.   
Certainly, in Study One, there was negligible variance in PANSS scores at baseline (this 
floor effect was not surprising given the non-clinical sample).  In Study Two, the clinical 
participants were generally quite well, with many being asymptomatic on SAPS scores 
(just 16 of the 27 participants had any current symptoms).  Partly this is to do with the 
sampling method, as participants who were currently too unwell to come to the testing lab 
could not be assessed on the Chubb task.  The study may therefore have been 
underpowered to detect significant relationships.  This lack of variability and relatively 
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small sample size also precluded more fine-grained, and potentially more informative 
analyses looking at individual symptoms. 
Given the above, it is interesting to note that in the clinical sample, bias-range (a measure 
of confidence in the bias estimate, used here as a proxy measure of response accuracy) 
was significantly correlated with both negative and positive symptom scores.   This 
would indicate that although bias was not systematically influenced by symptom levels, 
participants’ response accuracy was affected.  This is perhaps not surprising as the 
presence of positive symptoms may reduce a person’s cognitive capacity available to 
concentrate on a task, while negative symptoms may result in a lack of motivation or 
energy to concentrate on a task.  This is perhaps particularly relevant to the Chubb task as 
unfortunately many participants find the Chubb paradigm used here to be somewhat 
tedious.   
6.1.1.1 The	  Chubb	  Task:	  Some	  Behavioural	  Observations	  and	  Suggestions.	  
In both studies, a number of participants reported finding the Chubb task tedious and in a 
few cases quite aversive (although a few participants also reported enjoying it).  I propose 
that a number of factors contribute to this response.  For the participant, the task is 
repetitive and lacks a obvious purpose, performance feedback and reward.  The 
participant must complete 64 trials, all of which are essentially the same and is never told 
if their response is correct or incorrect (given that a veridical response is not ‘normal’, it 
not meaningful to talk of correct responses).   It is possible that this ambiguity is part of 
what makes the task aversive for some people.  Evidence from Freeman et al (2006).  
suggests that this may be especially true of people with psychosis.  Indeed, while some 
participants responded quickly on each trial, others appeared to find it much more 
difficult to commit to a decision (response latency was not recorded).  Such participants 
were given prompts such as to ‘go with their hunch’, yet often still struggled.  An obvious 
consequence of such an approach is that the task takes significantly longer, which may 
compound a participant’s frustration.  Other participants found it difficult to focus on the 
computer monitor for the full duration of the testing.  Although many scientific tasks are 
less than enjoyable, in future it may be worth trying to develop more user-friendly tasks 
that measure similar constructs.  Apart from making tasks less aversive, such an approach 
could lessen the attentional confounds that are a common problem in psychological 
assessment. 
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In designing such tasks, researchers could follow the example of computer games.  Like 
the Chubb task, many computer games can be repetitive, yet are better tolerated (or even 
enjoyed!).  Perhaps the key difference between the Chubb task and simple, repetitive 
games such as the classic Pong (a very basic tennis game) is that Pong provides feedback 
(there are points, sounds and visual feedback) on performance, which also removes 
ambiguity and provides reward.  Although providing contingent feedback may not always 
be appropriate, making tasks more interesting by providing goals, breaks, non-contingent 
feedback or varying the point of fixation might all help.  One clear example of a task that 
draws on the computer game industry is Daniel Freeman’s virtual reality assessment of 
tendency to paranoia (Freeman et al., 2005); this provides an interesting, immersive 
environment, and indeed is currently being used to investigate the effects of cannabis use 
(personal communication). 
An alternative, and much simpler solution, is not to obtain a full psychometric response 
function (the relationship between varying stimulus and an individual’s response), but to 
simply obtain an estimate of bias alone.  This could be done in a simple matching task.  
Here the participant would be shown both target and reference patches simultaneously.  
The participant would simply have to change (with a slider) the contrast of the target 
patch, so that it matched that of the reference patch. Running this several times while 
varying the contrast of the reference patch would provide an average estimate of bias.  
Although this matching approach is less rigorous, and potentially subject to experimenter 
bias, it is an order of magnitude faster and thus perhaps appropriate for incorporating into 
larger test batteries. 
 
6.1.2 The	  Problem	  of	  Attention	  
It has been argued that psychosis is accompanied by a general cognitive disturbance may 
be responsible for many of the more specific findings of cognitive differences in 
psychosis.  An early candidate for such a disturbance was selective attention (McGhie & 
Chapman, 1961).  The more veridical performance of patients with psychosis in the 
Chubb task is a compelling finding in that it represents objectively (but not adaptively) 
better performance in psychosis, something rarely reported in the literature.  Nevertheless, 
Barch et al (2012) have argued that impaired attentional mechanisms may account for the 
patient-control differences in bias on the Chubb illusion in their own study.  They 
measured attention by incorporating a number of ‘catch trials’ in which there was a very 
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high contrast target stimulus, for which the correct response was clear.  It is possible that 
the same applies in this study; however unlike Barch et al, the paradigm used here does 
not have the necessary catch trials to analyse the data in this way.  A potential problem 
with the approach of Barch et al is that the two groups differed in their performance on 
catch trials.  One might presume (although the authors do not provide details) that those 
participants with greater psychiatric impairment would also have poorer attention.  Thus 
Barch et al face a problem of collinearity, in that either removing those participants with 
attention impairment, or covarying for attentional performance (both approaches were 
used), may remove a real group difference from the study (see Miller & Chapman, 2001). 
Previously it was not thought that attention would have any systematic effect on measures 
of bias.  There is no clear mechanism by which this would occur.  Although if all 
responses were random (all noise, no data), bias would become zero, if random responses 
were added into a normal response pattern, it should have a random and thus unbiasing 
effect on bias (the noise should not systematically change the data).  In the control sample 
there was unexpectedly a significant negative relationship between bias and bias-range 
indicating that at least in this proxy measure, as accuracy increased, estimates of bias 
decreased.    This is the opposite of what would be expected if accuracy systematically 
affected bias estimates.   There was no significant relationship between bias and bias-
range in the clinical sample, which may perhaps cast doubt on the relationship found in 
the control sample.  One way to clarify this issue would be to run a simulation study, 
discussed later. 
Finally, Tibber et al (in preparation, discussed in more detail in the introduction), have 
shown patient-control difference in bias in the Chubb illusion, but not in a luminance-
contrast analogue, further indicating that reduced bias is not an artefact of attention, but 






6.2 Clinical	  Implications	  
6.2.1 Cannabis	  
The results of Study One are consistent with previous experimental and epidemiological 
studies that suggest that cannabis may induce symptoms of psychosis.  Of course, the 
development of transient psychotic symptoms is not in itself a matter of serious concern.  
However, considered together with evidence that cannabis use is associated with 
increased risk of developing a chronic psychotic disorder, these findings may play a role 
in informing public health policy.  What role they should play is however, unclear.  The 
relative harms of cannabis, and indeed other illegal drugs have been compared to both 
legal drugs such as alcohol and tobacco, as well as to other recreational pursuits (perhaps 
most famously Professor David Nutt’s comments comparing the dangers of horse riding 
to those of ecstasy).  Additionally the relative costs and benefits of prohibition and 
legalisation policies are controversial.  
Perhaps of more significance is the finding that CBD and THC play very different roles in 
the effects of cannabis.  This finding joins a growing body of evidence that suggests that 
treating ‘cannabis’ as if it were one homogenous substance is an approach that fails to 
consider complexity and variability of the substance.  Cannabis plants can vary 
significantly in their proportion of THC, CBD and other cannabinoids.  Thus from a 
public health perspective, treating all cannabis alike is akin to considering vintage 
Bordeaux and Moonshine as the same substance.  Although it has long been known that 
cannabis consists of many active compounds, only recently has significant effort gone 
into characterising their various effects and mechanisms.  The present study addresses 
just two of these components, Δ9-THC and cannabidiol and provides clear support to the 
notion that not only do these components have different effects, but also that cannabidiol 
moderates the effect of Δ9-THC.    
Clinically, some cannabis using clients with psychosis report both positive and negative 
effects of cannabis.   There may be a tendency for concerned clinicians, in their attempts 
to dissuade clients from using cannabis, to dismiss the positive effects and focus on the 
negative effects.  There are two clear problems with this.  The first is a problem of 
engagement and motivation; such approaches tend to leave the client feeling like they are 
not being listened to and indeed may result in the client taking a defensive posture that 
entrenches their position on cannabis.  A strong denial of a substance’s positive aspects 
may also lead to a loss of the clinician’s credibility in the client’s eyes.  Thus, the client 
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and clinician enter into an adversarial debate rather than a Socratic process of learning 
from each other.   Motivational Interviewing approaches (Rollnick & Miller, 1995), 
which have been shown to be important in working with substance use require that 
among other things, in trying to help a client, the clinician must first try to understand the 
client’s frame of reference - and this means understanding their subjective experience. 
The second problem is that the ‘cannabis is bad for you’ approach ignores not only the 
subjective experience but also complex nature of cannabis itself.  The same cannabis 
preparation may have different effects in different people, and may also  have multiple 
effects in the same person.  Thus, it is quite conceivable that smoking a joint may lead to 
concurrent anxiolytic, anti-psychotic and pro-psychotic effects. The pharmacokinetics 
and pharmacodynamics of cannabis compounds are complex and varied, thus these 
effects may operate over different time-scales.  These effects may also present differently 
depending on the environment and the person’s pre-drug presentation.   
The finding that CBD reduces the pro-psychotic effects of THC leads also to the 
intriguing idea that ‘cannabis’ may be useful as an anti-psychotic.  Cannabis itself has 
long been used as a medicinal drug; indeed in the 19th century it was a widely prescribed 
in the UK and elsewhere as a tonic for a wide variety of presentations.  In other regions of 
the world, especially in the Middle and Far East, it has a long history as a medical and 
spiritual aid.  In India, cannabis was used as a tranquiliser in the treatment of anxiety, 
mania and hysteria over 3000 years ago (Crippa et al., 2010).  The twentieth century led 
to a demonization and prohibition of cannabis that meant that doctors were forced to 
abandon it as a medical aid (Booth, 2005).  In common with other traditional treatments, 
belief in many of cannabis’ uses may prove to be unfounded.  Nevertheless, cannabis as a 
medicine is in the midst of something of a renaissance and is a now an important 
therapeutic drug for many with multiple sclerosis (Zajicek & Apostu, 2011).  
A recent review by Crippa et al (Crippa et al., 2010) details a wide range of investigations 
into the potential psychiatric effects of CBD and report that its anxiolytic effects are now 
well established.  In terms of its use as an antipsychotic, a number of studies are of 
particular interest.   Trials in humans began in 1995 with a case report of a 19 year old 
who had experienced severe side effects in response to antipsychotic medication (Zuardi	  et	  al.,	  1995).  CBD reduced psychotic symptoms as well as did haloperidol and did so 
without side effects.  This was followed by a treatment trial of three patients with a 
diagnosis of treatment resistant schizophrenia (Zuardi et al., 2006); of these two had a 
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mild improvement with CBD.  However, clearly, given their diagnosis, the prognosis for 
a strong response was poor.  More recently Leweke at al (2012) published the results of a 
randomised controlled trial comparing the effects of CBD and amisulpiride.  They found 
that both treatments led to a comparable clinical improvement, but that CBD had a better 
side-effect profile.  This is quite a remarkable result, and indeed may pave the way for 
cheaper, and less aversive treatments for psychosis.  One might also imagine that many 
clients would be rather more accepting of a ‘natural’, cannabis-based drug than of 
existing antipsychotics.  Finally, to muddy the waters a little, it has been reported that in 
clients who report that cannabis reduces their psychotic symptoms, treatment with 
synthetic THC (dronabinol) has been shown to do exactly that (Schwarcz et al., 2009).  




6.2.2 Reduced	  Contextual	  Processing	  in	  Psychosis	  
The study provides further evidence of an association between psychosis and reduced 
surround suppression in psychosis.  Assuming that this may be considered as evidence of 
reduced influence of contextual/top-down processing in psychosis, what might the 
clinical implications be? 
Let us first reconsider the possible effects of reduced top-down processing, before 
moving on to the clinical implications.  As has already been discussed in detail in the 
introduction, top-down processing is the mechanism whereby contextual information 
guides stimulus-response functions.  To put it another way, the influence of top-down 
processing is why we jump at a loud crash when we are alone in a house, but not when 
we know someone else (or the cat) is in.  If we are alone, having jumped, we may worry 
about who has just broken into the house.  Or even if we are not alone, but have 
previously experienced a traumatic break-in, we may fear for our lives (the image we 
form in our mind is a prediction).  Our prior experiences, evolution and our knowledge of 
our present circumstances all affect how we process new stimuli.   
A reduction in top-down processing will theoretically increase the relative influence of 
bottom-up signalling (the loud crash becomes more important).   Such a change may also 
reduce our confidence in our prior beliefs, allowing other belief to form more easily.  
Drawing on the cannabis literature, the effects of putative reduced top-down processing 
clearly include changed to the salience of internal and external stimuli.  Sounds and 
colours may appear louder and more vivid, previously meaningless patterns become 
meaningful, and sensations of touch taste and smell are altered and so on (Tart, 1970).  As 
noted before, there are clear similarities between drug use experiences and those of 
psychosis.  Patients with psychosis, even those who don’t use cannabis, report very 
similar experiences.  Although there may also be both qualitative and quantitative 
difference in the experience one clear difference is the person’s belief about the 
experiences.  The cannabis user generally knows why they are having unusual experience 
and also knows that the experiences will stop.  The patient, by contrast, may have no 
explanation for their experiences and has no idea of when they will recede; the patient 
thus needs to try and explain their experiences.  In Bayesian terms, the patient needs to 
minimise the disparity between their experiences and their predictions (prior beliefs).   
Carl Sagan has said that “extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence”; the 
patient may have extraordinary evidence, they just need to invent the extraordinary claim.   
As discussed earlier, cannabis can also cause paranoia; perhaps (and this fits with the 
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anecdotal literature) this also happens primarily when the user fails to see the connection 
between their drug use and their experiences.  There is now considerable evidence to 
suggest that the unusual experiences are not in themselves pathological, and that a 
person’s beliefs about their experiences mediate their distress (Perez‐Alvarez et al., 2008).  
Cognitive models of psychosis invoke the idea of ‘confirmation bias’ and argue that 
following the development of delusional ideas, an individual may actively seek out 
evidence to support their ideas (Cameron, 1951; Woodward et al., 2006).  A bias against 
non-confirmatory evidence has also been reported to be associated with psychosis 
proneness in non-clinical samples (Woodward et al., 2007).  Thus once beliefs have 
formed, they may contain mechanisms to maintain themselves.  Indeed, at the risk of 
tautological argument, beliefs that persist must contain such mechanisms (they are 
competing against other beliefs).  Interestingly, this fits with the idea that Bayesian priors 
guide not only perception but also action; indeed, it is argued that in order to minimise 
prediction error, we will move to minimise the disparity between our predictions and 
perception.  Reduced top-down processing may also fit with the well-replicated finding 
that patients with psychosis jump to conclusions more quickly that controls (the ‘jumping 
to conclusions’ bias), which has been interpreted as a possible failure to engage Bayesian 
decision-making processes(Moutoussis et al., 2011) , perhaps translating ‘abnormal 
experiences directly into belief statements with no intervening stage of considering 
evidence which might be relevant to the related hypothesis’ (Hemsley & Garety, 1986). 
In order to consider the clinical implications, we may fit these arguments within Garety et 
al’s cognitive model of psychosis (e.g. Garety et al., 2001), which has more recently been 
considered with reference to the neurobiological literature (Garety et al., 2007).  The 
model is shown in Figure 6.1. 
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Figure	  6.1.	  	  Cognitive	  Model	  Of	  Psychosis.	  	  Adapted	  From	  Garety	  et	  al	  2001.	  
 
In this model, a biopsycho-social vulnerability, combined with stressful events leads to 
emotional changes, which combined with cognitive dysfunction and anomalous 
experiences and mediated by appraisals of experience, lead to positive symptoms such as 
delusions.  Appraisals are themselves affected by cognitive biases, dysfunctional schemas, 
isolation and adverse environments.   Positive symptoms are maintained by cognitive 
biases, dysfunctional schemas, emotional processes and appraisal of experience. 
Within the model, reduction of top down processes fits most clearly into the vulnerability 
factors and cognitive dysfunction/anomalous experience boxes.  Evidence from the 
current thesis indicates that weakened contextual processing may be present early in 
psychosis and may represent a risk factor for the development of psychosis.  These ideas 
are complemented by research suggesting that schizoptypy, in particular a history of 
anomalous experiences, is a risk factor for traumatic intrusions (Holmes & Steel, 2004) 
and that these intrusions are more intrusive, vivid and affective in people reporting 
anomalous experiences than in ‘low-scoring schizotypes’ (Marks et al., 2012).  These 
findings add weight to the idea that weak contextual integration increases the risk of 
intrusive memories/experiences.  A history of trauma, recent stressful events and perhaps 
cannabis use may further increase the likelihood of anomalous experiences.   Furthermore, 
loosening of the influence of prior beliefs may make dysfunctional appraisals of 
experience more likely, increasing the probability of delusion formation.    
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The model suggests a number of loci for intervention.  Intervention may start prior to the 
development of psychosis, in populations at risk of developing psychosis (e.g. Power et 
al., 2007), or may take place after the development of clinical symptoms.  Ideally, early 
intervention takes place before delusional beliefs have become well established, with the 
early stages of psychosis seen as a “critical period” (Birchwood et al., 1998) in which the 
“blueprint” for long term trajectories may be laid down (Harrison et al., 2001).  This 
“blueprint” may perhaps be seen as a mixture of helpful and unhelpful beliefs about the 
world as well as the development of unhelpful behavioural patterns.  The clinician’s job 
at this stage is perhaps to aid the client in strengthening their helpful beliefs, increasing 
their cognitive flexibility and expanding their behavioural repertoire.    
There may also be a role here for explicitly addressing cognitive processing dysfunction.  
Cognitive Remediation Therapy (CRT) aims to help patients improve cognitive function 
and thus everyday functioning.  Evidence suggests that it may be effective in this aim 
(Bowie et al., 2012; Wykes & Reeder, 2005)..  However, it has also been argued that 
despite many years of research, CRT has not increased in its effectiveness(McGurk et al., 
2007).  As CRT is guided primarily by the research evidence of cognitive dysfunction in 
psychosis, the more that is understood of the basis of such dysfunction, the better-targeted 
CRT can be. 
With regard to the reported differences in contextual processing as measured in the BDII 
and Chubb Illusion, without longitudinal data, it is not possible to say to what degree such 
differences are state or trait in nature.  Thus, it is not clear if any psychological 
intervention would be able to directly address these differences.  Nevertheless, even if 
these differences represent a trait like tendency to weaker influence of context, this may 
be counteracted by work targeted at helping clients to alter the relationships between their 
thoughts, perceptions, beliefs and actions.  Increasingly evidence suggests that 
interventions (such as person based CBT and ACT (Bach, 2005; Chadwick, 2006)) 
targeted towards increasing meta-cognitive awareness and development of a different 
relationship with experience, may be effective in reducing the distress associated with 
psychosis, as well as reducing symptom levels (Chadwick, 2006; White et al., 2011).  
Increasing meta-cognitive awareness may also help clients to more carefully consider the 
psychological and environmental context within which they are viewing the world, 
perhaps restraining the tendency to jump to unlikely conclusions.  Equally, an awareness 
of the cognitive biases as promoted by traditional CBT for psychosis may help the client 
realise when they are applying (for instance) confirmatory biases to their experience.   
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Further, given that the way we relate to our experiences may be conceptualised as 
contextual processing, mindfulness training might be conceptualised as a CRT 
intervention for contextual processing. 
Environmental factors in psychosis have often been overlooked in favour of biological 
factors.  However, there is strong support for the theory that our environment alters our 
predisposition to psychotic beliefs, both clinical and subclinical (Bentall et al., 2007).  A 
striking example of this is the finding that immigrants are at increased risk of psychosis 
and that this risk varies in a dose dependent fashion with the proportion of immigrants in 
the destination area – perhaps indicating that real and perceived discrimination play a role 
in the development of psychosis (Boydell et al., 2001).   Other identified risk factors for 
psychosis include adverse life events, childhood trauma, isolation and family 
environment (Garety et al., 2007).   Our environment, of course, is the context within 
which we learn.  Our prior experiences determine how we see the world now.  Thus even 
in the absence of weakened top-down processing, traumatic past events are likely to 
predispose us to negative appraisals of future events (unusually salient events mays also 
be judged to occur more frequently than is the case (Hemsley & Garety, 1986)).  Thus, in 
order to address the effect of these negative past events, it may be necessary to work on 
them in therapy, in effect changing a person’s prior beliefs.  Finally, therapy may not be 
enough; following from the argument that people will try to find evidence to fit their 
existing beliefs, it seems logical that if such evidence is readily available then our beliefs 
will be more easily reinforced.   Thus, although helping people to develop a different way 
of relating to their experiences may be useful, helping the client to change their current 
environment may also be necessary in many cases.   
With regard to the treatment of pre-existing delusions, Corlett at al (Corlett et al., 2010) 
have suggested a novel approach that involves ‘involves engaging the prior belief and 
administering a drug that destabilizes it, preventing its reconsolidation’.  They have 
suggested the use of propranolol, which has been shown to attenuate learned fear 
responses in humans, may be useful for this purpose.  Interestingly, propranolol has been 
used before in the treatment of psychosis, with research dating back to the 1970s 
(Yorkston et al., 1974).  However, propranolol has also been reported to cause psychosis, 
both with acute treatment and in withdrawal (Ananth & Lin, 1986), which may explain 
why it has largely remained unused as an anti-psychotic agent.  Perhaps with better 
understanding of how psychological therapy and pharmacotherapy may be integrated, 
such agents may prove to be more useful in future.  
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This suggested synergistic combination of psychological and pharmacological 
interventions is not a new idea.  Kapur (2003) and others suggest that current 
antipsychotics may work by dampening the salience of stimuli and thus reducing the 
impact of bottom up perception on the maintenance of delusions.  This process may be 
effective by itself; however, the process of belief change may be accelerated via cognitive 
therapies (van der Gaag, 2006).  Given that medication remains the primary treatment for 
psychosis, considering how current and novel medications (including cannabis 
compounds such as CBD) may be most effectively combined with psychological 
intervention is an obvious direction for future research. 
 
6.3 Future	  Work	  
The results of the present study suggest a number of directions for future research, these 
are briefly discussed below. 
6.3.1 Simulation	  Study	  of	  Poor	  Attention	  to	  Task	  
Given concerns about the effect of poor attention to task on bias estimates, a future study 
might wish to formally simulate the effect of random responses on bias estimates.  This 
should be relatively straightforward.  A suggested method would be to programme a 
virtual respondent with (e.g.) 15% bias.   Multiple simulation runs could be generated, 
each with a varying number of random responses (thus modelling inattention) varying 
from 0/64 to 64/64 trials.  In this way a function could be generated showing the effect of 
random responding on the bias estimate.     
6.3.2 Further	  Investigation	  of	  the	  Effects	  of	  Cannabinoids	  on	  Context	  Processing.	  
Study One did not find any evidence that the cannabinoids THC and CBD reduce 
contextual suppression as measured on the Chubb task.  This was in contrast to evidence 
from another illusion the BDII.  It was hypothesized that this difference was due to the 
two illusions working at different levels.   The use of a battery of different illusions, 
involving a variety of different neural processes would help to be more specific about the 
areas of the brain implicated in the effects of cannabis on context processing.  Functional 
neuroimaging techniques would provide another way of characterising the effect of 
cannabinoids on processing during illusion perception. 
 113 
6.3.3 Replication	  of	  Study	  Two	  
To my knowledge, Study Two represents the only study to investigate contextual 
suppression in recent onset psychosis.  As the results of the study were consistent with 
previous research, but not statistically significant, they require replication.  A future study 
could be conducted with a number of adaptations.  As discussed above, an estimate of 
bias on the Chubb illusion could be obtained significantly faster using a matching to 
sample method.  By using such a method, it would be possible to also incorporate other 
illusions in the study (as in Tibber et al (in preparation).  Other measures of context based 
processing believed to be altered in psychosis (such as Latent Inhibition (Gray et al., 
2001)) might also be incorporated so that the relationship between different aspects of 
contextual processing could be investigated.  Finally, based on the current study, a larger 







6.4 Final	  Thoughts	  
Distinguishing between real and perceived risks is a difficult task for us all (and arguably, 
evolutionary processes may not have kept pace with the way in which we have changed 
out environments).  Witness the young male client in London who is convinced that 
straying into the wrong postcode will cost him his life – sadly, for the clinician, deciding 
whether this represents a delusion is a remarkably hard task.  A predisposition to reduced 
contextual processing may increase the client’s tendency to unusual experiences and 
unusual explanations of events.  Cannabis use may further reduce the influence of context 
on the client’s perception of the world.  Combine this with media coverage of gang 
warfare and real personal experiences and it is perhaps unsurprising that the client 
develops ‘paranoid’ thoughts.  Considering this example also demonstrates some of the 
difficulties with the model.  For this client, experience may well have led to the belief that 
the world is a dangerous place, thus for appropriate caution to develop into excessive 
paranoia does not represent a reduction in prior beliefs, but a selective strengthening of 
the influence of particular priors at the expense of others.  Thus in psychosis, the 
modification of prior beliefs is likely to be a dynamic process, whereby the conditions are 
first set for the development of unusual beliefs, followed by a process in which such 
beliefs become relatively established.  Finally, of course, the response (internal and 
external) to such beliefs is key to how they affect the person who holds them. 
The essence of clinical research is the iterative development and testing of models that 
provide ever-closer approximations to real life experience.   The data presented in this 
thesis, is intended to inform our thinking about the processes by which psychosis is 
developed and maintained.  These experiments were inspired by convergent evidence that 
indicates that alterations of contextual processing may underlie the experiences 
commonly associated with both psychosis and cannabis use.  The results, although 
certainly not clear-cut, provide further information within which to develop these models 
and design future research.  To put it another way, the results of this thesis provide 
evidence with which to test our prior beliefs, which are in turn, the consequence of past 
personal, cultural and evolutionary experiences.  Where these data fit with our predictions, 
our beliefs may be strengthened, where they don’t, we may change our beliefs.  We must 
thus be mindful of the context within which we fit our evidence; our prior beliefs 
inevitably affect how we react to new evidence, and we may resist evidence that does not 
fit our beliefs. 
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In research there are inevitably trade offs to be made between ecological validity and 
experimental feasibility, and the current study is no exception.   The experiments 
presented here, while useful for testing our models, bear limited resemblance to the 
complexity and heterogeneity of real life experience.  Equally, when we report average 
differences between groups of people, we risk overlooking the similarities.  At the same 
time, it is important to remember that models are just models.  A bit like illusions, the 
important question is not so much whether they are ‘true’ but whether they are useful – 
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Abstract	  	  Neuropsychological	  assessment	  requires	  the	  use	  of	  tools	  that	  sometimes	  have	  very	  high	  upfront	  costs,	  and	  which	  may	  appear	  expensive.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  due	  to	  initiatives	  such	  as	  Payment	  by	  Results	  and	  the	  Health	  and	  Social	  Care	  Act,	  there	  is	  increasing	  pressure	  for	  individual	  services	  to	  be	  fully	  costed.	  	  Prior	  to	  this	  audit,	  there	  were	  no	  figures	  either	  for	  usage	  or	  costs	  of	  psychological	  measures	  in	  South	  London	  and	  Maudsley’s	  (SLAM)	  National	  and	  Specialist	  (N&S)	  child	  units.	  	  The	  aim	  of	  the	  current	  audit	  was	  thus	  to	  assess	  the	  real	  world	  usage	  and	  costs	  associated	  with	  such	  tools	  within	  SLAM	  N&S	  child	  services.	  	  Estimates	  of	  measure	  usage	  and	  related	  expenditure	  were	  calculated	  based	  on	  a	  3-­‐month	  sample	  between	  from	  October	  2010	  through	  to	  December	  2010.	  	  This	  was	  used	  to	  estimate	  yearly	  usage	  within	  each	  individual	  service	  and	  for	  the	  N&S	  services	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  The	  results	  of	  the	  audit	  are	  considered	  within	  the	  context	  of	  current	  service	  pressures	  and	  a	  putative	  move	  to	  devolve	  costs	  to	  individual	  teams.	  	  Possible	  strategies	  for	  reducing	  the	  costs	  associated	  with	  neuropsychological	  and	  psychometric	  assessment	  are	  discussed.	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1 Introduction	  
1.1 Aim	  Neuropsychological	  assessment	  requires	  the	  use	  of	  tools	  that	  sometimes	  have	  very	  high	  upfront	  costs,	  and	  which	  may	  appear	  expensive.	  	  The	  aim	  of	  the	  current	  audit	  was	  to	  assess	  the	  real	  world	  usage	  and	  costs	  associated	  with	  such	  tools	  within	  South	  London	  and	  Maudsley’s	  (SLAM)	  National	  and	  Specialist	  child	  services.	  More	  specifically,	  the	  current	  audit	  set	  out	  to:	  
• Assess	  the	  current	  usage	  of	  neuropsychological	  and	  psychometric	  tests,	  both	  within	  each	  service	  and	  overall	  for	  all	  services.	  
• Determine	  whether	  there	  was	  significant	  scope	  for	  financial	  savings.	  
• Determine	  whether	  there	  was	  any	  broader	  scope	  for	  systems	  change	  to	  make	  the	  service	  more	  efficient.	  
1.2 Background	  This	  service	  evaluation	  is,	  in	  part,	  as	  response	  to	  the	  demands	  of	  Payment	  By	  Results,	  a	  Department	  of	  Health	  initiative	  from	  2002.	  	  	  However,	  more	  recent	  proposed	  changes	  to	  the	  NHS	  and	  the	  severe	  cuts	  to	  local	  government	  funding	  are	  also	  of	  significance	  to	  the	  current	  audit.	  The	  NHS	  was	  set	  up	  by	  Clement	  Attlee’s	  Labour	  government	  in	  the	  1940s,	  being	  formally	  launched	  by	  health	  minister	  Aneurin	  Bevan,	  on	  July	  5,	  1948.	  	  The	  three	  guiding	  principles	  of	  the	  NHS	  were:	  A.	  That	  it	  meet	  the	  needs	  of	  everyone,	  B.	  	  That	  it	  be	  free	  at	  the	  point	  of	  delivery	  and	  C.	  	  That	  it	  be	  based	  on	  clinical	  need,	  not	  ability	  to	  pay.	  Since	  its	  inception,	  the	  NHS	  has	  been	  under	  pressure	  to	  improve	  its	  services	  and	  reduce	  its	  costs	  (Rivett,	  1998).	  	  This	  pressure	  has	  arguably	  increased	  dramatically	  over	  the	  last	  few	  decades.	  	  Politicians	  who,	  when	  in	  opposition	  have	  decried	  constant	  change,	  have	  found	  it	  impossible	  to	  resist	  major	  change	  when	  in	  government	  (e.g.	  HM	  Government,	  2010,	  p.	  24).	  	  Among	  the	  most	  significant	  of	  the	  initiatives	  put	  in	  place	  over	  the	  last	  two	  decades	  is	  Payment	  by	  Results	  (PbR).	  	  PbR	  was	  intended	  to	  provide	  a	  “transparent,	  rules-­‐based	  system	  for	  paying	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trusts”	  and	  to	  “reward	  efficiency,	  support	  patient	  choice	  and	  diversity	  and	  encourage	  activity	  for	  sustainable	  waiting	  time	  reductions”.	  	  This	  was	  contrasted	  to	  a	  putative	  existing	  model	  in	  which	  the	  money	  a	  service	  received	  was	  “reliant	  principally	  on	  historic	  budgets	  and	  the	  negotiating	  skills	  of	  individual	  managers”	  (Department	  of	  Health,	  2006).	  The	  basis	  of	  PbR	  is	  that	  price	  X	  activity	  =	  income;	  essentially,	  a	  service	  gets	  paid	  for	  how	  much	  of	  a	  certain	  activity	  they	  are	  carrying	  out.	  	  Although	  this	  sounds	  simple,	  the	  reality	  is	  more	  complex	  and	  controversial;	  in	  particular	  there	  are	  fears	  that	  quality	  of	  work	  will	  be	  sacrificed	  for	  quantity	  (Oyebode,	  2007)	  –	  however	  this	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  present	  discussion.	  	  In	  order	  to	  implement	  PbR,	  it	  has	  thus	  been	  necessary	  for	  services	  to	  fully	  cost	  all	  of	  their	  activities.	  	  This	  process	  is	  difficult	  and	  labour	  intensive,	  but	  without	  going	  through	  the	  process,	  a	  service	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  effectively	  apply	  for	  funding.	  	  Beyond	  the	  controversy,	  it	  is	  undeniably	  good	  practice	  for	  any	  service	  to	  audit	  and	  understand	  the	  underlying	  costs	  of	  its	  activities.	  	  	  	  In	  2012,	  service	  providers	  within	  the	  NHS	  arguably	  face	  greater	  uncertainty	  than	  at	  any	  time	  since	  its	  inception.	  	  The	  NHS	  Health	  and	  Social	  Care	  Act,	  which	  received	  royal	  ascent	  on	  the	  27th	  March	  2012,	  proposes	  to	  fundamentally	  change	  the	  way	  the	  NHS	  in	  England	  works,	  with	  80%	  of	  the	  NHS	  budget	  being	  transferred	  to	  GP	  led	  commissioning	  bodies.	  	  The	  Health	  and	  Social	  Care	  Bill	  was	  highly	  controversial	  and	  faced	  strong	  opposition	  from	  within	  the	  NHS,	  parliament	  and	  the	  House	  of	  Lords.	  	  Nevertheless,	  the	  government	  prevailed	  and	  the	  bill	  was	  passed	  into	  law.	  	  It	  is	  therefore	  more	  important	  than	  ever	  that	  services	  within	  the	  NHS	  prepare	  themselves	  for	  further	  disruptive	  change.	  	  The	  current	  evaluation,	  both	  as	  part	  of	  such	  preparation	  and	  as	  good	  practice,	  aims	  to	  provide	  an	  accurate	  measure	  of	  the	  material	  costs	  involved	  in	  the	  provision	  of	  neuropsychological	  tests	  and	  psychometric	  measures,	  within	  Maudsley	  Child	  and	  Adolescent	  Mental	  Health	  Services	  (CAMHS).	  
1.3 Neuropsychological	  and	  Psychometric	  Assessment.	  Neuropsychological	  testing	  and	  psychometric	  assessment	  tools	  are	  essential	  to	  both	  research	  and	  clinical	  practice.	  	  	  Without	  neuropsychological	  testing,	  our	  ability	  to	  assess	  and	  help	  people	  with	  disorders	  that	  affect	  brain	  function	  would	  be	  vastly	  impaired.	  	  The	  use	  of	  neuropsychology	  to	  collect	  valid	  and	  reliable	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information	  from	  multiple	  sources	  enhances	  diagnostic	  precision	  and	  clinical	  management	  (Braun	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  	  Among	  other	  things,	  combined	  use	  of	  neuropsychology	  and	  psychometric	  assessment	  allows	  us	  to	  objectively	  assess	  current	  function,	  identify	  specific	  difficulties	  or	  disorders,	  track	  change	  over	  time	  and	  measure	  response	  to	  treatment.	  	  Early	  identification	  of	  a	  person’s	  specific	  difficulties	  may	  allow	  services	  to	  provide	  appropriately	  matched	  support	  to	  maximise	  their	  developmental	  potential	  (Silver	  et	  al.,	  2006).	  	  Conversely,	  failure	  to	  identify	  such	  difficulties	  may	  mean	  that	  no	  or	  inappropriate	  support	  is	  provided.	  	  For	  instance,	  difficulties	  that	  are	  neurodevelopmental	  in	  origin	  may	  be	  misattributed	  as	  behavioural,	  while	  difficulties	  due	  to	  mood	  disorders	  may	  be	  missed.	  	  Adequate	  provision	  of	  neuropsychological	  assessment	  is	  therefore	  an	  imperative	  in	  a	  modern	  National	  Health	  Service,	  and	  this	  is	  especially	  important	  in	  child	  services.	  Despite	  this,	  neuropsychology	  is	  sometimes	  viewed	  as	  an	  expensive	  luxury,	  especially	  in	  stretched	  health	  care	  systems.	  	  Neuropsychological	  assessments	  are	  time	  consuming,	  and	  they	  need	  to	  be	  administered	  by	  highly	  trained	  clinicians	  if	  they	  are	  to	  be	  delivered	  and	  interpreted	  correctly.	  	  To	  add	  to	  this,	  the	  upfront	  costs	  of	  purchasing	  measures	  may	  seem	  high,	  with	  neuropsychological	  batteries	  costing	  anywhere	  between	  £100	  and	  £1600.	  The	  current	  audit	  does	  not	  extend	  to	  the	  cost	  of	  clinician	  time	  and	  training.	  	  Instead,	  it	  is,	  by	  design,	  limited	  to	  provide	  a	  picture	  of	  the	  levels	  of	  resource	  use	  within	  National	  and	  Specialist	  Child	  Services	  and	  the	  related	  monetary	  costs	  of	  such	  use.	  
1.3.1 Costs	  of	  Assessment:	  Upfront	  Vs	  Running	  Costs	  Many	  assessment	  tools	  involve	  both	  an	  upfront	  cost	  and	  on-­‐going	  running	  costs.	  	  The	  upfront	  cost	  is	  typically	  for	  buying	  a	  ‘test	  kit’,	  which	  generally	  includes	  manuals,	  equipment	  and	  assessment	  forms.	  	  Once	  the	  kit	  has	  been	  bought,	  additional	  assessment	  forms	  may	  be	  purchased	  separately.	  	  	  An	  example	  would	  be	  the	  Wechsler	  Intelligence	  Scale	  for	  Children,	  version	  4	  (WISC-­‐IV).	  	  The	  upfront	  cost	  of	  the	  WISC-­‐IV	  is	  £948.00,	  which	  includes:	  administration,	  scoring	  and	  technical	  manuals,	  25	  record	  forms,	  25	  response	  booklets,	  scoring	  keys	  and	  physical	  test	  equipment.	  	  The	  kit	  therefore	  provides	  all	  a	  psychologist	  needs	  to	  test	  25	  participants.	  	  After	  this,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  buy	  more	  response	  booklets	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and	  record	  forms;	  in	  total	  these	  cost	  £177	  for	  25	  assessment	  or	  £7.08	  per	  participant.	  	  	  Thus,	  the	  upfront	  cost	  of	  a	  kit	  is	  equivalent	  to	  the	  running	  costs	  of	  testing	  over	  130	  participants.	  	  The	  balance	  between	  upfront	  costs	  and	  on-­‐going	  costs	  thus	  depends	  on	  how	  often	  a	  particular	  tool	  is	  used	  and	  its	  useful	  lifespan.	  Assessment	  tools	  are	  also	  updated	  on	  a	  semi-­‐regular	  basis,	  in	  order	  to	  update	  normative	  datasets	  and	  to	  incorporate	  scientific	  advances.	  	  These	  updates	  also	  provide	  a	  part	  of	  the	  publisher’s	  revenue	  stream.	  	  	  The	  WISC	  was	  first	  published	  in	  1949,	  and	  was	  updated	  in	  1974,	  1991	  and	  2003	  (Flanagan	  &	  Kaufman,	  2009).	  	  The	  original	  adult	  form,	  the	  WAIS,	  was	  first	  published	  in	  1939,	  and	  was	  updated	  in	  1946,	  1955,	  1981,	  1997	  and	  2008	  (Lichtenberger	  &	  Kaufman,	  2009).	  	  Thus	  based	  on	  recent	  publication	  history,	  updates	  can	  be	  expected	  every	  10-­‐15	  years.	  	  Clinicians	  and	  researchers	  are	  typically	  encouraged	  to	  use	  the	  latest	  versions.	  	  Thus,	  practitioners	  and	  services	  will	  typically	  have	  to	  budget	  for	  purchasing	  updated	  kits.	  There	  is	  no	  easy	  way	  to	  identify	  how	  many	  kits	  a	  service	  needs	  to	  purchase.	  This	  will	  clearly	  vary	  depending	  on	  how	  many	  assessments	  the	  service	  needs	  to	  carry	  out	  and	  how	  many	  psychologists	  will	  be	  carrying	  out	  the	  assessments.	  	  Many	  psychologists	  can	  share	  the	  same	  kit,	  but	  clearly	  a	  kit	  may	  only	  be	  used	  by	  one	  psychologist	  at	  a	  time.	  	  	  Thus	  good	  organisational	  practice	  and	  resource	  management	  is	  needed	  to	  maximise	  the	  efficient	  use	  of	  psychological	  measures.	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1.4 The	  Audit	  Process.	  Audit	  in	  the	  NHS	  is	  a	  process	  designed	  to	  ultimately	  improve	  the	  quality	  and	  efficiency	  of	  patient	  care.	  	  It	  does	  this	  via	  a	  process	  of	  systematically	  reviewing	  current	  practice	  and	  identifying	  current	  strengths,	  weaknesses	  and	  areas	  for	  improvement.	  	  According	  to	  NICE,	  ‘The	  time	  has	  come	  for	  everyone	  in	  the	  NHS	  to	  take	  clinical	  audit	  very	  seriously.	  	  Anything	  less	  would	  miss	  the	  opportunity	  we	  now	  have	  to	  re-­‐establish	  the	  confidence	  and	  trust	  on	  which	  the	  NHS	  is	  founded’	  (Rawlins,	  2002).	  	  NICE	  guidance	  describes	  the	  audit	  process	  as	  a	  cycle	  (Figure	  1),	  within	  which	  are	  a	  number	  of	  stages	  that	  lead	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  best	  practice.	  	  The	  essential	  point	  of	  this	  cycle	  is	  to	  iteratively	  improve	  practice.	  	  It	  is	  essential	  to	  this	  process	  that	  the	  outcome	  of	  each	  stage	  of	  the	  audit	  be	  taken	  forward;	  where	  improvements	  are	  indicated,	  they	  must	  be	  followed	  though	  and	  further	  evaluated.	  	  
	  
Figure	  1	  The	  Clinical	  Audit	  Cycle	  According	  to	  NICE	  The	  audit	  cycle	  pictured	  in	  Figure	  1,	  must	  begin	  with	  the	  question	  “what	  are	  we	  trying	  to	  achieve?”	  	  The	  context	  to	  this	  question	  is	  an	  overall	  goal	  to	  accurately	  cost	  CAMHS	  services.	  	  Within	  this	  context,	  the	  primary	  aim	  of	  the	  current	  audit	  is	  to	  identify	  the	  level	  and	  cost	  of	  psychological	  audit	  use.	  	  Currently	  there	  is	  no	  specific	  budget	  for	  psychological	  equipment.	  	  Further,	  it	  is	  envisaged	  that	  this	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information	  will	  be	  used	  to	  help	  devolve	  costs	  to	  individual	  teams.	  	  It	  is	  hoped	  that	  the	  audit	  will	  provide	  information	  to	  help	  achieve	  an	  efficient,	  cost-­‐effective	  use	  of	  psychological	  measures	  within	  CAMHS	  services.	  	  The	  first	  step	  in	  the	  audit	  is	  thus	  to	  collect	  data	  on	  what	  the	  current	  levels	  of	  measure	  use	  are	  and	  what	  the	  associated	  costs	  are.	  	  	  The	  second	  step	  is	  to	  use	  this	  data	  to	  draw	  conclusions	  about	  whether	  current	  usage	  is	  efficient	  and	  cost	  effective.	  	  The	  third	  step	  is	  to	  identify	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  system	  could	  be	  made	  more	  efficient.	  	  To	  close	  the	  audit	  cycle,	  recommendations	  must	  be	  communicated,	  acted	  upon	  and	  levels	  of	  progress	  identified	  (“have	  we	  made	  things	  better?”).	  
1.5 The	  Structure	  of	  South	  London	  And	  Maudsley	  CAMHS.	  South	  London	  and	  Maudsley	  NHS	  Trust	  encompasses	  many	  different	  CAMHS	  services.	  	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  current	  audit,	  only	  National	  and	  Specialist	  CAMHS	  teams	  based	  at	  the	  Maudsley	  and	  Bethlem	  hospitals	  were	  considered.	  At	  the	  Bethlem	  Hospital	  the	  following	  services	  were	  considered:	  	  Acorn	  Lodge	  Children’s	  Unit,	  Bethlem	  Adolescent	  Unit,	  Bill	  Yule	  Adolescent	  Unit	  	  	  At	  the	  Maudsley	  Hospital	  the	  following	  services	  were	  considered:	  Conduct	  Adoption	  and	  Fostering	  Service,	  Autism	  and	  Related	  Disorders	  Service,	  Challenging	  Behaviour	  Service,	  Forensic	  Service,	  Mood	  Disorder	  Service,	  Neuropsychiatry	  and	  Neuropsychology	  Service,	  Child	  Anxiety	  and	  PTSD	  Team,	  Child	  Care	  Assessment	  Team,	  Dielectical	  Behavioural	  Therapy	  Service,	  Snowsfield	  Adolescent	  Service,	  Obsessive	  Compulsive	  Behaviour	  Service,	  Learning	  Disability	  Service	  and	  Eating	  Disorders	  Service.	  
To	  provide	  context,	  brief	  descriptions	  of	  each	  unit	  are	  provided	  below	  (information	  is	  primarily	  sourced	  from	  the	  document	  ‘CAMHS	  National	  and	  Specialist	  Services	  Directory’,	  published	  by	  South	  London	  and	  Maudsley	  NHS	  Trust).	  	  All	  services	  are	  based	  at	  the	  Maudsley	  hospital	  unless	  otherwise	  indicated.	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1.5.1 Inpatient	  Care	  
1.5.1.1 Acorn	  Lodge	  Children’s	  Unit	  	  Provides	  inpatient	  (10	  beds)	  and	  outpatient	  services	  for	  children	  (4	  to	  13	  years	  old)	  with	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  emotional	  and/or	  behavioural	  disorders,	  the	  only	  exclusion	  criterion	  being	  a	  primary	  difficulty	  of	  conduct	  disorder.	  	  Work	  is	  conducted	  within	  a	  flexible	  model	  designed	  to	  help	  families	  understand	  their	  children’s’	  needs	  and	  provide	  support	  for	  both	  families	  and	  children.	  
1.5.1.2 Bethlem	  Adolescent	  Unit	  (BAU)	  Provides	  inpatient	  (12	  beds)	  and	  outpatient	  assessment	  and	  treatment	  for	  adolescents	  (12-­‐18)	  with	  serious	  mental	  illnesses.	  	  About	  half	  of	  the	  young	  people	  have	  psychosis,	  the	  remainder	  include	  young	  people	  with	  mood	  disorders,	  who	  pose	  a	  risk	  to	  themselves	  or	  for	  whom	  there	  is	  diagnostic	  uncertainty.	  	  The	  primary	  exclusion	  criterion	  is	  a	  need	  for	  a	  secure	  environment.	  The	  unit	  also	  has	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  day	  patients.	  	  
1.5.1.3 Bill	  Yule	  Adolescent	  Unit	  Provides	  medium	  secure	  inpatient	  care	  (10	  beds)	  for	  young	  people,	  between	  12	  and	  18	  years	  old,	  with	  severe	  behavioural	  and	  psychiatric	  problems.	  	  The	  unit	  caters	  for	  male	  clients	  who	  are	  under	  a	  Mental	  Health	  Act	  detention	  order	  and	  who	  cannot	  be	  cared	  for	  by	  local	  services.	  Exclusion	  criteria	  are	  need	  for	  a	  high	  security	  setting,	  severe	  learning	  disabilities	  preventing	  basic	  self	  care	  and	  admissions	  under	  a	  secure	  care	  order.	  
1.5.1.4 Snowsfield	  Adolescent	  Unit	  Has	  essentially	  the	  same	  rationale,	  inclusion	  and	  eligibility/exclusion	  criteria	  as	  the	  BAU;	  it	  has	  11	  inpatients	  beds	  and	  four	  day-­‐patient	  beds.	  The	  service	  is	  currently	  piloting	  a	  supported	  discharge	  element	  to	  the	  team	  that	  comprises	  a	  further	  small	  caseload.	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1.5.2 Outpatient	  Care	  
1.5.2.1 Developmental	  Neuropsychiatry	  and	  Neuropsychology	  Service	  
Acquired	  Brain	  Injury	  Service	  Provides	  neuropsychological	  and	  neuropsychiatric	  assessment	  and	  treatment	  to	  children	  and	  adolescents	  with	  acquired	  brain	  injury.	  	  	  
Autism	  and	  Related	  Disorder	  Service	  (ARD)	  Provides	  assessment	  and	  treatment	  for	  young	  people	  with	  autism	  and	  pervasive	  developmental	  disorders.	  	  The	  service	  has	  specialist	  experience	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  rare	  disorders	  such	  as	  Cri	  Du	  Chat	  syndrome.	  	  	  Consultation	  and	  support	  are	  also	  offered	  to	  the	  family	  or	  carers	  of	  young	  people	  with	  autism	  or	  related	  disorders.	  
Behavioural	  Phenotype	  Learning	  Disability	  Service	  Provides	  assessment,	  consultation,	  advice,	  support	  and	  counselling	  for	  young	  people	  with	  intellectual	  and	  other	  disabilities.	  
Challenging	  Behaviour	  Service	  This	  service	  provides	  support	  for	  young	  people	  with	  intellectual	  disability	  or	  neurodevelopment	  for	  whom	  challenging	  behaviour	  is	  the	  primary	  concern.	  	  
Neuropsychiatry	  and	  Neuropsychology	  Service	  This	  service	  provides	  assessment	  and	  interventions	  for	  young	  people	  presenting	  with	  neuropsychiatric	  difficulties	  including	  ADHD,	  epilepsy	  and	  cello-­‐cardio-­‐facial	  syndrome.	  
Mental	  Health	  of	  Learning	  Disability	  Service	  Provides	  assessment	  and	  management	  for	  young	  people	  with	  a	  learning	  disability	  and	  behavioural	  or	  mental	  health	  problems,	  including	  autism,	  ADHD,	  obsessive	  compulsive	  disorder,	  psychosis,	  depression,	  feeding	  disorders,	  offending	  behaviours	  and	  sleep	  disorders.	  	  
1.5.2.2 Conduct	  Adoption	  and	  Fostering	  Service.	  A	  specialist	  outpatient	  service	  of	  young	  people	  who	  have	  been	  fostered	  or	  adopted	  and	  who	  are	  experiencing	  difficulties.	  	  These	  difficulties	  may	  be	  general	  emotional	  or	  behavioural	  difficulties	  or	  more	  specific	  placement	  related	  issues.	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1.5.2.3 Anxiety	  Service	  (incorporating	  the	  Child	  Traumatic	  Stress	  Service)	  A	  specialist	  outpatient	  service	  for	  young	  people	  (up	  to	  18)	  suffering	  from	  anxiety	  disorders	  including	  posttraumatic	  stress	  disorder	  (PTSD).	  	  Exclusion	  criterion:	  requirement	  for	  urgent	  assessment	  or	  treatment	  for	  another,	  overriding	  problem.	  	  This	  service	  now	  includes	  the	  Child	  Traumatic	  Stress	  Service,	  which	  was	  previously	  separate.	  
1.5.2.4 Mood	  Disorder	  Service	  This	  service	  provides	  assessment	  and	  treatment	  for	  young	  people	  suffering	  from	  mood	  disorders.	  	  Exclusion	  criteria:	  emergency	  referrals,	  self	  harm	  as	  a	  primary	  difficulty,	  another	  primary	  psychiatric	  disorder.	  
1.5.2.5 Child	  Care	  Assessment	  Service	  This	  service	  provides	  assessments	  and	  court	  reports	  for	  children	  and	  their	  parents	  or	  carers,	  where	  they	  are	  undergoing	  care	  proceedings	  in	  public	  or	  private	  courts.	  
1.5.2.6 Conduct	  Problems	  Service	  This	  service	  provides	  assessment	  and	  treatment	  for	  children	  (aged	  3	  to	  8)	  who	  are	  presenting	  with	  behaviours	  considered	  to	  be	  disruptive,	  difficult	  or	  antisocial	  and	  who	  persistently	  behave	  in	  an	  aggressive	  or	  defiant	  way.	  
1.5.2.7 Dialectical	  Behaviour	  Therapy	  Service	  This	  service	  provides	  assessment	  and	  treatment	  for	  young	  people	  who	  have	  a	  history	  of	  self-­‐harm	  and	  symptoms	  associated	  with	  borderline	  personality	  disorder.	  
1.5.2.8 Eating	  Disorders	  Service	  This	  service	  provides	  individual	  and	  family	  therapy	  for	  clients	  suffering	  from	  eating	  disorder	  and	  their	  carers.	  
1.5.2.9 Forensic	  Service	  This	  service	  provides	  assessment	  and	  treatment	  for	  young	  people	  who	  are	  engaged	  in	  or	  are	  at	  risk	  of	  offending	  behaviour.	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1.5.2.10 Obsessive	  Compulsive	  Disorder	  Service	  This	  service	  provides	  assessment	  and	  treatment	  for	  young	  people	  with	  a	  diagnosis	  of	  obsessive-­‐compulsive	  disorder	  (OCD)	  and	  related	  disorders.	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2 METHOD.	  
2.1 Data	  Collection	  A	  key	  contact	  was	  identified	  for	  each	  team	  via	  Dr	  Maxine	  Sinclair.	  	  The	  contact	  was	  then	  emailed	  and	  asked	  to	  provide	  detailed	  information	  of	  which	  and	  how	  many	  neuropsychological	  and	  psychometric	  measures	  they	  had	  used	  over	  a	  representative	  set	  period.	  The	  representative	  period	  was	  chosen	  following	  consultation	  with	  the	  contact	  member	  from	  each	  team	  that	  responded	  to	  the	  initial	  consultation	  e-­‐mail.	  A	  period	  of	  3	  months	  was	  decided	  upon	  as	  a	  compromise	  method,	  which	  would	  provide	  a	  fair	  representation	  of	  each	  team's	  workload,	  while	  not	  placing	  undue	  strain	  on	  the	  resources	  available	  to	  carry	  out	  the	  audit.	  The	  period	  chosen	  was	  from	  1	  October	  2010	  until	  31	  December	  2010.	  	  	  The	  majority	  of	  services	  provided	  their	  own	  summary	  data	  of	  the	  number	  of	  measures	  used.	  	  Where	  this	  was	  not	  possible	  two	  alternative	  methods	  were	  used:	  	  1. A	  list	  of	  clients	  seen	  during	  the	  period	  was	  requested	  and	  the	  number	  of	  measures	  used	  was	  established	  by	  cross-­‐referencing	  against	  ePJS	  (electronic	  Patient	  Journey	  System),	  SLAM’s	  electronic	  patient	  notes	  database.	  	  	  Information	  was	  gathered	  from	  two	  sources	  within	  ePJS:	  A:	  ‘events’,	  which	  consists	  of	  general	  clinical	  notes	  and	  B:	  ‘correspondence’,	  which	  consists	  of	  reports	  and	  letters	  attached	  to	  the	  system	  as	  documents.	  2. In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  OCD	  and	  ARD	  teams,	  data	  was	  calculated	  from	  details	  of	  the	  teams’	  standard	  assessment	  procedures	  and	  client	  throughput.	  
2.2 Acquisition	  of	  Costing	  Information	  for	  Measures	  SLAM’s	  supplies	  department	  was	  contacted	  to	  ascertain	  what,	  if	  any	  specific	  contracts	  existed	  for	  the	  purchase	  of	  psychometric	  or	  neuropsychological	  measures.	  	  Laura	  Hurst	  of	  the	  supplies	  department	  was	  liaison	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  audit.	  	  According	  to	  the	  supplies	  department,	  supplies	  are	  ordered	  on	  a	  requirement	  basis	  and	  no	  bulk	  orders	  are	  placed,	  there	  are	  therefore	  neither	  formal	  contracts	  nor	  negotiated	  discounts.	  	  	  However,	  discounts	  are	  negotiated	  on	  an	  individual	  basis	  by	  the	  ordering	  department	  and	  these	  negotiated	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discounts	  are	  communicated	  to	  the	  supplies	  department.	  	  Detailed	  information	  on	  such	  discounts	  was	  unavailable	  and	  therefore	  prices	  for	  measures	  were	  sourced	  from	  publically	  available	  pricing	  information	  from	  publishers’	  websites.	  	  Where	  the	  only	  source	  was	  from	  the	  US	  (E.g.	  Pearson	  Assessments	  US	  for	  the	  Mullen	  Scales	  of	  Early	  Learning),	  a	  dollar/sterling	  conversation	  rate	  of	  1.6	  was	  used.	  	  Prices	  are	  all	  provided	  exclusive	  of	  VAT.	  
2.3 Calculation	  of	  Per	  Use	  Costs	  Costs	  for	  psychological	  measures	  have	  been	  calculated	  in	  two	  ways.	  
• Ongoing	  Cost.	  	  The	  on-­‐going	  costs	  of	  each	  measure	  have	  been	  calculated	  based	  on	  the	  costs	  of	  ordering	  extra	  materials.	  	  This	  is	  straightforward	  and	  calculated	  as	  the	  price	  of	  a	  consumable	  pack	  (or	  packs)	  divided	  by	  the	  number	  of	  assessments	  in	  the	  pack.	  
• Overall	  Cost.	  	  An	  estimated	  measure	  of	  total	  cost	  has	  been	  calculated,	  including	  both	  kit	  cost	  and	  on-­‐going	  costs.	  This	  is	  more	  complex	  and	  involves	  a	  key	  assumption.	  	  The	  primary	  assumption	  is	  that	  each	  kit	  ordered	  will	  be	  used	  200	  times.	  	  	  Most	  kits	  come	  with	  25	  sets	  of	  forms,	  thus	  for	  such	  a	  kit,	  the	  overall	  costs	  would	  be:	  	   𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙  𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 𝐾𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 + (𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 175)200 	  	  It	  is	  likely	  that	  some	  kits	  will	  be	  used	  more	  than	  200	  times	  and	  some	  less	  than	  200	  times.	  	  However,	  if	  a	  kit	  life	  of	  10	  years	  is	  assumed,	  20	  assessments	  per	  year	  is	  likely	  a	  conservative	  estimate	  for	  usage.	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3 RESULTS.	  
3.1 Response	  from	  Services/Units.	  	  	  Data	  was	  collected	  from	  the	  following	  units/services:	  	  
Inpatient	  Care:	  	  Acorn	  Lodge	  and	  Snowsfield	  
Outpatient	  Care:	  	  Neuropsychiatry	  and	  Neuropsychology,	  Challenging	  Behaviour,	  Forensic	  Service,	  Adoption	  and	  Fostering	  Service,	  Mood	  Disorder	  Team,	  Anxiety	  and	  PTSD	  Team,	  Child	  Care	  Assessment	  Service,	  Dielectical	  Behaviour	  Therapy	  Service,	  Learning	  Disability	  Service,	  OCD	  Team.	  Data	  was	  not	  acquired	  from	  the	  following	  unit/services:	  Bill	  Yule,	  Bethlem	  Adolescent	  Unit	  and	  Eating	  Disorders.	  	  	  Usage	  by	  these	  teams	  could	  therefore	  not	  be	  accounted	  for.	  	  	  The	  figures	  quoted	  below	  thus	  represent	  an	  underestimation	  of	  the	  overall	  usage	  by	  Maudsley	  and	  Bethlem	  CAMHS	  services.	  
3.1.1 Measures	  and	  Tests	  A	  list	  of	  55	  different	  assessment	  measures	  were	  identified	  across	  the	  teams.	  	  Of	  these	  measures,	  27	  measures	  were	  copyrighted,	  paid	  measures.	  	  The	  remaining	  28	  measures	  were	  a	  mixture	  of	  freely	  available	  scales	  and	  measures,	  as	  well	  as	  service	  specific	  idiosyncratic	  measures.	  	  	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  clarity	  in	  the	  current	  discussion,	  freely	  available	  and	  idiosyncratic	  measures	  have	  been	  removed	  from	  the	  tables;	  however,	  details	  are	  available	  in	  the	  appendix.	  
3.2 Measures	  Used	  From	  1	  October	  2010	  until	  31	  December	  2010	  
3.2.1 Paid	  Measures	  All	  paid	  measures	  are	  listed	  in	  Table	  1,	  along	  with	  the	  number	  used	  over	  the	  audit	  period	  and	  the	  cost	  to	  the	  service	  of	  each	  measure.	  	  	  Costs	  per	  team	  are	  shown	  in	  Table	  2.	  	  Costs	  per	  publisher	  are	  shown	  in	  Table	  3.	  The	  total	  cost	  to	  the	  service	  of	  all	  paid	  measures,	  including	  the	  cost	  of	  initial	  kit	  purchase	  was	  £2532	  for	  the	  quarter	  year	  between	  1st	  October	  2010	  and	  31st	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December	  2010.	  	  Assuming	  equal	  usage	  over	  the	  year,	  the	  yearly	  cost	  was	  therefore	  £10,128.	  The	  most	  used	  measures	  were	  (from	  most	  to	  least	  used,	  with	  quarterly	  usage	  in	  brackets):	  Conners’	  ADHD	  Scales	  (82),	  Beck	  Depression	  Inventory	  (60),	  Social	  Communications	  Questionnaire	  (39),	  Wechsler	  Individual	  Achievement	  Test	  (38),	  Beck	  Youth	  Inventory	  (33),	  Anxiety	  Disorders	  Interview	  Schedule	  (33),	  Wechsler	  Intelligence	  Scale	  for	  Children	  (29),	  NEPSY	  (20).	  
3.3 Overall	  SLAM	  Spending	  on	  Neuropsychological	  Measures	  SLAM	  supplies	  department	  were	  able	  to	  provide	  figures	  for	  overall	  purchasing	  from	  the	  major	  suppliers	  of	  measures	  for	  the	  year	  from	  21st	  March	  2011	  until	  21st	  March	  2012.	  	  Total	  spending	  for	  the	  year	  was	  £52,257.63.	  	  A	  breakdown	  of	  this	  cost	  by	  publisher	  is	  provided	  in	  the	  appendices.	  	  A	  full	  breakdown	  by	  publisher	  and	  order	  is	  available	  on	  request.	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Table	  1.	  	  Measures.	  	  Number	  Used	  and	  Cost	  To	  Service.	  	  1st	  October	  2010	  until	  31st	  December	  2010.	  
Measure	   Full	  Name	   Publisher	  
No.	  











AARS	   Adolescent	  Anger	  Rating	  Scale	   Ann	  Arbour	   3	   £155.00	   £61.75	  for	  25	  forms	  	   £2.47	   £2.94	   £7.41	   £8.81	  
ABAS	   Adaptive	  Behavior	  Assessment	  System	   Pearson	  Assessment	   11	   £190.00	   £62	  for	  25	  forms	   £2.48	   £3.12	   £27.28	   £34.32	  
ADI	   Autism	  Diagnostic	  Interview	   Pearson	  Assessment	   5	   £190.00	   £72	  for	  10	  forms	   £7.20	   £7.25	   £122.40	   £123.25	  
ADIS	   Anxiety	  Disorders	  Interview	  Schedule	   OUP	   33	   £40.00	   £40	  for	  pack	  10	   £4.00	   £4.00	   £132.00	   £132.00	  
ADOS	   Autism	  Diagnostic	  Observation	  Schedule	   Hogrefe	   11	   £1,538.00	   £42	  for	  10	  forms	   £4.20	   £11.68	   £96.60	   £268.64	  
BAI	   Beck	  Anxiety	  Inventory	   Pearson	  Assessment	   2	   £83.00	   £44:	  	  25	  forms	   £1.76	   £1.96	   £3.52	   £3.91	  
BDI	   Beck	  Depression	  Inventory	   Pearson	  Assessment	   60	   £82.00	   £43.50:	  25	  forms	   £1.74	   £1.93	   £104.40	   £115.95	  
BYI	   Beck	  Youth	  Inventory	   Pearson	  Assessment	   33	   £182.00	   £87:	  25	  forms	   £3.48	   £3.96	   £114.84	   £130.52	  
CELF	  IV	   Clinical	  Evaluation	  of	  Language	  Fundamentals	   Pearson	  Assessment	   2	   £565.00	  
£69	  for	  record	  forms,	  £26.50	  for	  rating	  
forms	   £3.82	   £6.17	   £7.64	   £12.34	  
Connors	   Conners’	  Rating	  Scales–Revised	  /	  Connors-­‐3	   Pearson	  Assessment	   82	   £294.50	   £42.50	  each	  for	  parent/teacher	  forms	   £3.40	   £4.45	   £479.40	   £557.89	  
DKEFS	   Delis-­‐Kaplan	  Executive	  Function	  System	   Pearson	  Assessment	   2	   £568.00	   £48.50:	  25	  forms	   £1.94	   £4.54	   £3.88	   £9.08	  
Family	  Relations	  
Test	   Bene-­‐Anthony	  Family	  Relations	  Test.	   GL	  Assessment	   3	   £280.00	   £20:	  25	  forms	   £2.08	   £3.22	   £6.24	   £9.66	  
MULLEN	   Mullen	  Scales	  of	  Early	  Learning	   Pearson	  Assessments	  US	   6	   £581.09	   $43.30:	  25	  forms	   £1.08	   £3.85	   £6.50	   £23.12	  
NEPSY	   NEPSY	   Pearson	  Assessment	   20	   £775.00	   £51	  each:	  response	  form	  and	  record	  books	  X25	   £4.08	   £7.45	   £81.60	   £148.90	  
PSI	   Parenting	  Stress	  Index	   Hogrefe	   3	   £160.00	   £58:	  25	  forms	   £2.32	   £2.83	   £6.96	   £8.49	  
RCMAS	   Revised	  Children's	  Manifest	  Anxiety	  Scale	   Hogrefe	   5	   £98.00	   £46:	  25	  forms	   £1.84	   £2.10	   £9.20	   £10.50	  
SCQ	   Social	  Communications	  Questionnaire	   Hogrefe	   27	   £108.00	   £34:	  20	  forms	   £1.70	   £2.03	   £66.30	   £79.07	  
SIQ	   Suicidal	  Ideation	  Questionnaire	  	   PAR	  (parinc.com)	   6	   £107.50	   $54:	  25	  forms	   1.35	   £1.72	   £8.10	   £10.31	  
STAXI	   State-­‐Trait	  Anger	  Inventory	   AnnArbour	   9	   £228.00	   £75	  :	  50	  rating	  forms,	  £65	  :	  50	  profile	  
forms	  
£2.80	   £3.59	   £25.20	   £32.31	  
TEACH	   Test	  of	  Everyday	  Attention	  for	  Children	   Pearson	  Assessment	   4	   £454.00	   £47.50:	  50	  forms	   £1.90	   £3.70	   £7.60	   £14.78	  
TVPS	   Test	  of	  Visual-­‐Perceptual	  Skills	   AnnArbour	   1	   £199.00	   £36:	  25	  forms	   £1.44	   £2.26	   £1.44	   £2.26	  
WAIS	   Wechsler	  Adult	  Intelligence	  Scale	  	   Pearson	  Assessment	   9	   £1,150.00	   £111.50,	  £68.50,	  £41.50	  for	  forms,	  
response	  book	  1	  and	  2	  X	  25	  
£8.86	   £13.50	   £79.74	   £121.52	  
WASI	   Weschler	  Abreviated	  Scale	  of	  Intelligence	   Pearson	  Assessment	   4	   £282.00	   44:	  25	  forms	   1.76	   £2.95	   £28.16	   £47.20	  
WIAT	   Wechsler	  Individual	  Achievement	  Test	  	   Pearson	  Assessment	   26	   £437.00	  
£63.00	  and	  £63.00	  for	  record	  forms	  and	  
response	  booklets	  X25	   £5.04	   £6.60	   £191.52	   £250.61	  
WISC	   Wechsler	  Intelligence	  Scale	  for	  Children	   Pearson	  Assessment	   29	   £948.00	   £50.50,	  50.50,	  £76.00	  for	  Response	  book	  1+2	  and	  record	  forms.	  X25	   £7.08	   £10.94	   £205.32	   £317.12	  
WPPSI	  
Wechsler	  Preschool	  and	  Primary	  Scale	  of	  
Intelligence	   Pearson	  Assessment	   7	   £915.00	  
	  £65.50	  for	  25	  record	  forms,	  £46.50	  for	  
25	  response	  booklets	   £4.46	   £8.48	   £31.22	   £59.34	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   TOTAL	  	   £1,854.47	   £2,531.88	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Table	  2.	  	  Cost	  of	  Measures.	  	  Per	  Team.	  	  Per	  Quarter.	  










Inpatient	  Care	   	   Acorn	  Lodge	   £123	   £184	   £737	  
	   Snowsfield	   £127	   £203	   £811	  
	   BAU	   unknown	   unknown	   unknown	  
	   Bill	  Yule	   unknown	   unknown	   unknown	  




Neuropsychiatry	   £310	   £394	   £1,578	  
	  	   ARD	   £300	   £437	   unknown	  
	  	   Challenging	  Behaviour	   £24	   £46	   £185	  
	  	   Learning	  Disability	   £159	   £207	   £827	  
	  	   	   Forensic	   £224	   £326	   £1,306	  
	  	   	   CAFT	   £88	   £123	   £492	  
	  	   Mood/Anxiety	   Mood	  Disorders	  Team	   £27	   £41	   £162	  
	  	   Anxiety/PTSD	  Team	   £24	   £35	   £140	  
	  	   	   CCAT	   £185	   £253	   £1,010	  
	  	   	   DBT	   £25	   £32	   £127	  
	   	   Eating	  Disorders	   unknown	   unknown	   	  
	  	   OCD	  Team	   TCBT	   £115	   £119	   £475	  
	  	   DCS	   £61	   £63	   £250	  
	  	   Clinic	   £63	   £70	   £278	  
	  	   OCD	  Total	   £239	   £251	   £1,003	  
	   	   Total	   £1,854	   £2,532	   £10,128	  	  	  
Table	  3.	  	  Spend	  By	  Publisher	  
Publisher	   Total	  
Adjusted	  for	  
Kit	  /	  Quarter	  
Total	  
Adjusted	  for	  
Kit	  /	  Year	  
Putative	  15%	  
Discount	  
Pearson	  Assessment	   	  £1,946.72	  	   	  £7,786.86	  	   	  £1,168.03	  	  
Hogrefe	   	  £366.70	  	   	  £1,466.81	  	   	  £220.02	  	  
PAR	  (parinc.com)	   	  £10.31	  	   	  £41.25	  	   	  £6.19	  	  
AnnArbour	   	  £43.37	  	   	  £173.50	  	   	  £26.02	  	  
GL	  Assessment	   	  £9.66	  	   	  £38.64	  	   	  £5.80	  	  
OUP	   	  £132.00	  	   	  £528.00	  	   	  £79.20	  	  
Peason	  Assessments	  US	   	  £23.12	  	   	  £92.46	  	   	  £13.87	  	  
	   	   	   	  
Total	   	  £2,531.88	  	   	  £10,127.52	  	   	  £1,519.13	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4 Discussion	  
The	  aim	  of	  the	  current	  audit	  was	  to	  provide	  a	  representative	  picture	  of	  the	  level	  of	  use	  of	  neuropsychological	  and	  psychometric	  resources	  within	  South	  London	  and	  Maudsley	  National	  and	  Specialist	  Services.	  	  Towards	  this	  aim,	  data	  was	  collected	  from	  the	  majority	  of	  team	  within	  the	  Maudsley	  and	  Bethlem	  CAMHS	  services.	  Taking	  into	  account	  the	  initial	  costs	  of	  buying	  testing	  kits,	  the	  total	  estimated	  yearly	  spend	  on	  psychological	  measures	  was	  £10,128.	  	  Annual	  spending	  on	  consumables	  alone	  was	  estimated	  at	  £7,418.	  	  The	  later	  figure	  is	  more	  reliable	  as	  it	  is	  not	  dependent	  on	  assumptions	  about	  the	  number	  of	  times	  each	  kit	  is	  used	  during	  its	  lifetime.	  	  Both	  figures	  are	  also	  based	  only	  on	  those	  teams	  that	  responded	  to	  the	  audit	  and	  therefore	  represent	  an	  underestimate	  of	  total	  usage/costs.	  	  Usage	  varied	  considerably	  by	  team	  (total	  yearly	  costs	  estimated	  from	  £127	  to	  £1749),	  with	  the	  highest	  usage	  in	  Autism	  and	  Related	  Disorders	  (ARD).	  	  	  At	  this	  stage,	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  comment	  on	  whether	  each	  service’s	  individual	  usage	  represents	  optimal	  use	  of	  resources.	  It	  may,	  however,	  be	  considered	  unlikely	  that	  clinicians	  will	  carry	  out	  significantly	  more	  testing	  that	  is	  necessary;	  there	  being	  little	  incentive	  to	  do	  so	  within	  the	  current	  system.	  Discussion	  shall	  therefore	  focus	  on	  possible	  ways	  in	  which	  costs	  may	  be	  reduced	  without	  reduction	  in	  the	  actual	  level	  of	  assessment.	  
4.1 Strategies	  For	  Reduction	  of	  Costs	  There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  potential	  strategies	  by	  which	  costs	  may	  be	  reduced.	  	  These	  include:	  reduction	  of	  neuropsychological	  testing,	  better	  usage	  of	  economies	  of	  scale,	  research	  collaboration	  and	  the	  use	  of	  open-­‐source	  or	  limited	  copyright	  measures.	  
4.1.1 Reduction	  of	  Use	  of	  Neuropsychological	  Testing	  Measures	  Clearly	  the	  costs	  incurred	  by	  neuropsychological	  testing	  could	  be	  reduced,	  but	  restricting	  the	  frequency	  and	  range	  of	  the	  measures	  used	  by	  psychologists.	  	  	  However,	  neuropsychological	  testing	  is	  a	  core	  part	  of	  both	  the	  assessment	  and	  monitoring	  of	  the	  type	  of	  conditions	  seen	  by	  National	  and	  Specialist	  units.	  	  Psychologists	  are	  trained	  in	  the	  judicious	  use	  of	  tests	  and	  are	  unlikely	  to	  use	  any	  measures	  unless	  they	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  useful	  in	  assessing	  or	  treating	  clients	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4.1.2 Economies	  of	  Scale	  The	  NHS	  employs	  approximately	  1.7	  million	  people,	  making	  it	  one	  of	  the	  world’s	  largest	  employers	  (NHS	  Choices,	  2011)	  and	  has	  a	  budget	  of	  over	  £100	  billion	  annually	  (Department	  of	  Health,	  2010).	  	  It	  therefore	  has	  huge	  spending	  power	  and	  theoretical	  purchasing	  leverage,	  which	  should	  enable	  it	  to	  get	  the	  very	  best	  deals	  from	  suppliers.	  	  However,	  this	  can	  only	  work	  if	  purchasing	  is	  to	  some	  extent	  centralised.	  	  SLAM	  National	  and	  Specialist	  Child	  Services	  currently	  have	  a	  centralised	  store	  of	  measures,	  which	  in	  turn	  orders	  these	  measures	  from	  SLAM	  supplies	  department.	  	  The	  supplies	  department	  purchases	  measures	  for	  the	  whole	  of	  SLAM	  on	  an	  as	  needed	  basis	  and	  has	  no	  specific	  contracts	  with	  suppliers.	  	  	  Two	  potential	  options	  for	  reducing	  the	  cost	  of	  measures	  to	  SLAM	  would	  be:	  1. SLAM	  Supplies	  Department	  to	  negotiate	  further	  discounts	  for	  bulk	  orders	  of	  measures	  from	  publishers.	  2. SLAM	  to	  use	  a	  company	  such	  as	  ‘NHS	  Supply	  Chain’	  (http://www.supplychain.nhs.uk/)	  to	  source	  measures.	  	  According	  to	  its	  website,	  NHS	  Supply	  Chain	  acts	  to	  provide	  coordinated	  purchasing	  for	  NHS	  trusts.	  	  	  	  	  	  These	  options	  are	  certainly	  worth	  exploring.	  	  For	  instance,	  Maria	  Priestly,	  at	  the	  Institute	  of	  Psychiatry	  has	  negotiated	  a	  15%	  discount	  for	  orders	  from	  Pearson	  assessment.	  	  Thus	  despite	  publishers’	  apparent	  monopoly	  on	  most,	  if	  not	  all,	  of	  the	  available	  measures,	  there	  is	  clearly	  scope	  for	  negotiation.	  	  	  Dr	  Sinclair,	  on	  behalf	  of	  N&S	  CAMHS	  services,	  also	  negotiates	  various	  discounts	  with	  Pearson,	  ranging	  from	  between	  5	  and	  10%.	  	  Over	  the	  last	  year,	  SLAM	  has	  an	  overall	  spend	  at	  Pearson	  Assessment	  of	  	  £33,977,	  a	  15%	  discount	  on	  this	  spend	  would	  represent	  an	  actual	  saving	  of	  £5,097	  per	  year.	  	  Spend	  at	  Pearson	  Assessment	  by	  the	  CAMHS	  services	  included	  in	  this	  audit	  at	  Pearson	  Assessment	  is	  estimated	  at	  £7787	  per	  year.	  	  A	  15%	  discount	  on	  this	  would	  represent	  £1168	  per	  year.	  	  Factoring	  VAT	  into	  account,	  savings	  would	  be	  20%	  higher.	  	  Potential	  savings	  however,	  will	  be	  lower	  than	  this	  as	  discounts	  are	  already	  negotiated	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis.	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4.1.3 Research	  Collaboration	  Where	  clinical	  and	  research	  work	  overlap,	  there	  is	  potential	  to	  share	  costs	  and	  to	  save	  on	  VAT.	  	  If	  assessments	  are	  being	  provided	  both	  for	  research	  and	  clinical	  purposes,	  the	  research	  grant	  may	  include	  provision	  for	  assessment	  tools.	  	  In	  addition	  research	  costs	  from	  a	  project	  conducted	  by	  a	  registered	  charity	  (such	  as	  a	  University)	  do	  not	  attract	  VAT	  and	  thus	  there	  is	  potential	  for	  savings	  here.	  	  	  There	  may	  also	  be	  potential	  for	  discounts	  where	  research	  or	  clinical	  work	  contributes	  to	  the	  further	  development	  of	  measures.	  	  For	  instance	  Pearson	  Assessment	  US’s	  Research	  Assistance	  Programme	  offers	  a	  50%	  discount	  on	  measures	  in	  such	  circumstances,	  with	  a	  maximum	  discount	  of	  $5000	  (Pearson	  Assessments,	  2012).	  
4.1.4 Use	  of	  Alternative	  Measures	  Not	  all	  psychological	  measures	  attract	  a	  charge.	  	  There	  are	  a	  variety	  of	  measures	  that	  are	  available	  either	  for	  free	  use	  or	  for	  free	  use	  with	  permission	  from	  the	  authors.	  For	  some	  measures	  there	  are	  clear	  alternatives	  available,	  while	  for	  others	  there	  are	  either	  no	  alternatives,	  or	  the	  alternative	  are	  less	  attractive	  (for	  instance,	  a	  service	  might	  want	  to	  use	  the	  most	  widespread	  or	  validated	  scale	  for	  research	  purposes).	  	  A	  list	  of	  paid	  measures	  and	  possible	  free	  alternatives	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Table	  5.	  	  	  With	  regard	  to	  the	  paid	  measures	  identified	  in	  the	  current	  audit,	  for	  the	  majority,	  no	  viable	  alternatives	  were	  identified.	  	  However,	  for	  measures	  of	  mood,	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  possible	  publically	  available	  measures	  including	  the	  Self-­‐Report	  for	  Childhood	  Anxiety	  Related	  Disorders	  (SCARED),	  Spence	  Children's	  Anxiety	  Scale	  (SCAS),	  Depression	  Anxiety	  Stress	  Scale	  (DASS)	  and	  the	  Center	  for	  Epidemiological	  Studies	  Depression	  scale	  (CES-­‐D).	  	  These	  measures	  have	  the	  extra	  attraction	  of	  essentially	  always	  being	  in	  stock,	  as	  they	  may	  be	  photocopied	  or	  printed.	  	  The	  estimated	  annual	  spend	  on	  mood	  measures	  (BAI,	  BDI	  and	  BYI)	  is	  £1,111,	  which	  would	  represent	  the	  maximum	  possible	  saving	  from	  a	  switch	  to	  publically	  available	  measures.	  Choice	  of	  measures	  though,	  depends	  on	  more	  than	  cost.	  	  A	  good	  NHS	  service	  involves	  clinical,	  research	  and	  teaching	  roles,	  and	  the	  measures	  it	  uses	  must	  fit	  these	  roles.	  	  Thus	  in	  selecting	  a	  measure,	  concerns	  such	  as	  reliability,	  validity,	  ease	  of	  use,	  research	  applicability	  and	  transferability	  must	  be	  considered.	  	  As	  an	  example	  we	  may	  consider	  the	  CED-­‐D	  and	  the	  BDI.	  	  The	  CES-­‐D	  and	  the	  BDI	  are	  reported	  to	  be	  equally	  useful	  for	  screening	  for	  depression	  across	  a	  variety	  of	  settings,	  with	  no	  clear	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differences	  in	  terms	  of	  sensitivity	  and	  specificity,	  reliability	  or	  validity	  (Andriushchenko	  et	  al.,	  2003;	  Fountoulakis	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Tandon	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  	  The	  CES-­‐D	  may	  provide	  more	  information	  where	  severity	  is	  low,	  with	  the	  opposite	  applying	  for	  the	  BDI	  (Olino	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  	  The	  CES-­‐D	  has	  been	  reported	  to	  be	  more	  sensitive	  to	  change	  than	  the	  BDI	  (Santor	  et	  al.,	  1995).	  	  Patient	  preference	  for	  the	  CES-­‐D	  has	  also	  been	  reported	  (Wilcox	  et	  al.,	  1998),	  with	  patients	  reporting	  the	  CES-­‐D	  to	  be	  ‘less	  depressing	  and	  quicker	  than	  the	  BDI.	  	  Given	  the	  results	  of	  these	  studies,	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  little	  compelling	  reason	  to	  stick	  with	  the	  BDI	  over	  the	  CES-­‐D.	  	  A	  possible	  reason	  is	  that	  the	  BDI	  has	  been	  more	  widely	  used	  in	  research;	  however,	  such	  self-­‐fulfilling	  concerns	  should	  be	  carefully	  considered	  –	  especially	  given	  that	  the	  above	  studies	  provide	  information	  on	  relative	  cut-­‐offs	  for	  the	  two	  scales,	  allowing	  results	  to	  be	  compared.	  
4.2 Purchasing	  Process.	  The	  ordering	  process	  for	  measures	  appears	  rather	  convoluted.	  	  New	  stock	  and	  new	  measures	  are	  ordered	  via	  Dr	  Maxine	  Sinclair.	  	  Individual	  psychology	  staff	  identify	  when	  stock	  is	  running	  low,	  or	  new	  measures	  are	  required.	  	  	  This	  information	  is	  passed	  to	  Dr	  Sinclair,	  who	  then	  places	  an	  order	  with	  the	  Business	  Manager.	  	  Orders	  are	  then	  authorised	  by	  the	  Service	  Manager	  (Patricia	  O’Neil)	  and	  Deputy	  Director	  (Jo	  Fletcher).	  	  Once	  authorised,	  orders	  go	  to	  SLAM	  supplies.	  	  Consumables	  and	  replacements	  are	  authorised	  automatically.	  	  Purchase	  of	  new	  equipment	  needs	  to	  be	  justified;	  such	  requests	  are	  therefore	  taken	  to	  the	  two-­‐monthly	  National	  and	  Specialist	  psychology	  meeting	  and	  must	  be	  agreed	  by	  the	  professional	  group	  and	  the	  lead	  psychologist	  (previously	  Dr	  Troy	  Tranah,	  now	  Dr	  Sinclair).	  	  	  While	  checks	  on	  purchasing	  are	  important	  in	  any	  system,	  it	  is	  unclear	  why	  so	  many	  steps	  are	  involved	  in	  this	  process.	  	  Having	  multiple	  steps	  in	  purchasing	  has	  two	  clear	  disadvantages.	  	  Firstly,	  with	  each	  extra	  step,	  additional	  staff	  time,	  and	  therefore	  costs	  are	  involved.	  	  Secondly,	  each	  step	  provides	  the	  potential	  for	  delay	  and	  thus	  inefficiency.	  	  This	  may	  impact	  on	  both	  staff	  efficiency	  and	  quality	  of	  clinical	  care,	  in	  terms	  of	  delays	  in	  assessment.	  	  Given	  these	  disadvantages,	  a	  convincing	  case	  should	  be	  made	  for	  every	  step	  in	  a	  process.	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4.3 Devolution	  of	  Costs	  to	  Individual	  Services	  As	  part	  of	  the	  adjustment	  of	  services	  to	  the	  demands	  of	  PbR	  and	  more	  recent	  NHS	  reform,	  devolution	  of	  costs	  to	  individual	  services	  is	  being	  considered.	  	  Advantages	  and	  disadvantages	  of	  this	  process	  with	  regard	  to	  assessment	  measures	  are	  discussed	  below.	  
4.3.1 Advantages	  The	  primary	  advantage	  of	  devolving	  costs	  to	  individual	  services	  is	  that	  it	  can	  facilitate	  more	  accurate	  costing	  of	  each	  service.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  burden	  of	  costs	  may	  fall	  more	  appropriately	  to	  each	  service,	  with	  services	  paying	  for	  only	  the	  measures	  that	  they	  use.	  	  Service	  level	  costing	  could	  also	  arguably	  incentivise	  staff	  to	  reduce	  any	  unnecessary	  use	  of	  psychological	  measures.	  	  However,	  as	  previously	  noted,	  due	  to	  the	  effort	  required	  in	  administering	  such	  measures,	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  they	  would	  be	  employed	  without	  good	  reason.	  	  Another	  advantage	  is	  that	  each	  service	  would	  have	  direct	  responsibility	  for	  their	  own	  measures,	  thus	  reducing	  the	  potential	  for	  any	  abuse	  of	  resources.	  
4.3.2 Disadvantages	  Although	  devolution	  is	  envisaged	  as	  a	  route	  to	  increased	  efficiency,	  all	  devolution	  approaches	  carry	  with	  them	  a	  risk	  that	  desired	  efficiencies	  would	  be	  offset	  by	  extra	  bureaucracy.	  	  To	  some	  extent	  this	  depends	  on	  how	  devolution	  is	  managed.	  At	  the	  extreme,	  all	  services	  would	  have	  to	  order,	  maintain	  and	  store	  their	  own	  measures.	  	  This	  would	  potentially	  result	  in	  a	  loss	  of	  efficiency	  of	  resource	  use.	  	  For	  instance,	  a	  WISC	  assessment	  takes	  approximately	  3	  hours	  to	  conduct	  and	  score,	  meaning	  that	  with	  one	  kit,	  two	  can	  be	  conducted	  in	  a	  day	  and	  thus	  hundreds	  in	  a	  year.	  	  With	  a	  fairly	  basic	  booking	  system1	  tests	  can	  be	  shared	  between	  multiple	  teams.	  	  By	  contrast,	  if	  measures	  are	  owned	  by	  individual	  services,	  they	  will	  likely	  be	  underused.	  	  For	  instance,	  the	  CAFT	  service	  used	  the	  WISC	  assessment	  once	  in	  a	  three-­‐month	  period,	  compared	  to	  29	  uses	  for	  all	  N&S	  CAMHS	  services.	  	  If	  CAFT	  had	  to	  purchase	  its	  own	  WISC,	  this	  would	  represent	  an	  inefficient	  use	  of	  the	  measure.	  	  Additionally,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  consider	  the	  potential	  penalty	  in	  terms	  of	  staff	  time	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Booking	  systems.	  	  This	  may	  be	  an	  area	  for	  further	  investigation.	  	  The	  current	  system	  is	  paper	  based.	  	  Moving	  to	  an	  electronic	  system	  could	  make	  it	  easier	  to	  see	  when	  and	  which	  resources	  were	  available	  and	  make	  booking	  of	  resources	  quicker.	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involved	  in	  having	  multiple	  staff	  individually	  auditing	  and	  ordering	  measures.	  	  Further,	  it	  is	  arguably	  better	  to	  have	  one	  member	  of	  staff	  who	  knows	  the	  procurement	  system	  intimately,	  than	  many	  with	  vague	  and	  intermittent	  experience,	  although	  this	  approach	  carries	  the	  risk	  of	  reliance	  on	  one	  staff	  member.	  
4.3.3 A	  Compromise	  Solution	  A	  possible	  compromise	  solution	  would	  be	  for	  N&S	  CAMHS	  services	  to	  retain	  a	  central	  storage	  and	  ordering	  system,	  but	  to	  charge	  services	  according	  to	  their	  use	  of	  measures.	  	  Costs	  could	  be	  based	  on	  calculations	  such	  as	  those	  in	  this	  audit.	  	  Thus	  it	  would	  be	  possible	  to	  reduce	  the	  burden	  of	  ordering	  tests	  and	  maintain	  efficient	  use	  of	  resources,	  whilst	  at	  the	  same	  time	  allowing	  for	  accurate	  costing	  of	  resource	  use.	  	  If	  devolution	  of	  costs	  is	  the	  intended	  outcome,	  then	  this	  might	  be	  the	  most	  appropriate	  solution.	  	  	  Even	  so,	  the	  cost	  of	  additional	  bureaucracy	  (include	  setting	  up	  such	  a	  system,	  raising	  internal	  invoices	  and	  getting	  them	  paid)	  involved	  in	  such	  a	  solution	  need	  to	  be	  outweighed	  by	  the	  benefits,	  and	  it	  is	  not	  immediately	  clear	  that	  this	  would	  be	  the	  case.	  
4.4 Keeping	  Perspective	  When	  considering	  the	  costs	  of	  psychological	  assessment	  measures	  to	  services,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  compare	  the	  material	  costs	  to	  other	  pertinent	  costs	  of	  assessment.	  	  Many	  cognitive	  assessments	  will	  be	  conducted	  by	  trainee	  and	  band	  7	  psychologists.	  	  	  Specialist	  neuropsychological	  assessments	  will	  often	  be	  conducted	  by	  neuropsychologists	  at	  band	  8	  or	  above.	  	  Furthermore,	  psychologists	  not	  familiar	  with	  neuropsychological	  testing	  require	  considerable	  supervision	  and	  training,	  in	  order	  that	  results	  are	  reliable	  and	  comparable.	  	  Band	  6	  and	  7	  staff	  will	  attract	  an	  annual	  salary	  of	  between	  £25k	  and	  £40k,	  which	  equates	  to	  an	  hourly	  pay	  of	  between	  approximately	  £12.5	  and	  £20	  per	  hour,	  with	  band	  8	  salaries	  of	  up	  to	  £40	  per	  hour.	  	  The	  costs	  to	  the	  NHS	  will	  be	  higher.	  	  	  A	  full	  assessment	  might	  take	  3-­‐8	  hours,	  with	  considerable	  extra	  time	  necessary	  for	  scoring	  and	  report	  writing.	  	  Time	  for	  both	  assessment	  and	  report	  writing	  varies	  considerably	  with	  case	  complexity.	  An	  assessment	  for	  an	  individual	  client	  by	  the	  Neuropsychiatry	  Service	  is	  priced	  at	  £1485.00.	  	  A	  typical	  assessment	  might	  use	  the	  following	  measures:	  Beck	  Youth	  inventory	  for	  mood	  assessment,	  Connors	  ADHD	  assessment	  form	  (parent,	  teacher	  and	  self-­‐report),	  WISC-­‐IV	  for	  IQ	  assessment,	  plus	  a	  NEPSY-­‐II.	  	  The	  total	  cost	  of	  these	  assessments	  is	  £28.27	  excluding	  VAT.	  	  	  Thus,	  for	  comparison	  the	  purchase	  cost	  of	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measures	  is	  2%	  of	  the	  total	  assessment	  cost	  or	  about	  two	  hours	  of	  trainee	  salary.	  	  It	  should	  also	  be	  noted	  that	  insufficient	  supplies	  of	  kits	  and	  consumables	  inevitably	  reduces	  the	  efficiency	  of	  a	  service.	  	  	  
4.5 Overall	  Conclusion.	  The	  costs	  of	  neuropsychological	  assessment	  to	  SLAM	  National	  and	  Specialist	  units	  are	  not	  negligible,	  at	  over	  £11,000	  per	  annum.	  	  There	  may	  be	  limited	  scope	  for	  reducing	  this	  cost	  though	  alternative	  buying	  practices	  or	  the	  use	  of	  publically	  available	  measures.	  	  Overall	  however,	  the	  comparative	  cost	  of	  purchasing	  neuropsychological	  measures	  remains	  a	  small	  component	  of	  the	  overall	  costs	  of	  assessment	  and	  treatment.	  	  	  Devolution	  of	  costs	  to	  individual	  teams	  carries	  a	  number	  of	  benefits,	  but	  these	  have	  to	  be	  weighed	  against	  the	  potential	  inefficiencies	  of	  such	  a	  move.	  	  	  As	  a	  final	  comment,	  the	  impact	  of	  such	  changes	  on	  the	  culture	  of	  a	  service	  should	  also	  be	  considered.	  	  Services	  may	  wish	  to	  think	  twice	  before	  implementing	  a	  system	  in	  which	  resource	  competition	  risks	  taking	  priority	  over	  cooperation.	  	  	  
4.5.1 Specific	  Feedback	  From	  Teams	  Only	  one	  team	  gave	  specific	  feedback.	  	  The	  Child	  Care	  Assessment	  Team	  reported	  that	  the	  Beck	  Anxiety	  and	  Depression	  scales	  were	  not	  always	  available.	  	  They	  also	  reported	  that	  they	  use	  the	  Family	  Relations	  Test	  in	  a	  qualitative	  fashion,	  but	  that	  the	  most	  up	  to	  date	  versions	  are	  not	  available	  in	  store.	  
4.5.2 Feedback	  to	  Service	  Feedback	  has	  been	  provided	  to	  the	  lead	  psychologist,	  Dr	  Maxine	  Sinclair.	  	  Further	  feedback	  is	  scheduled	  be	  provided	  to	  the	  relevant	  committees	  within	  SLAM	  N&S	  services.	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6 Appendix	  
Table	  4.	  	  SLAM	  Total	  Spend	  on	  Measures	  and	  Related	  Items	  (21/3/11	  until	  21/3/12).	  
Supplier	   Value	  
Pearsons	   33,977.63	  
Hogrefe	   15,430.11	  
Ann	  Arbour	   849.00	  
OUP	   563.00	  
GL	  Assessment	   99.35	  
PAR	  (parinc.com)	   0.00	  
MHS	   1,338.54	  
Total	   52,257.63	  	  
Table	  5	  Alternative	  Free	  Measures	  
Measure	   Abreviation	   Possible	  Free	  Alternatives	  
Adolescent	  Anger	  Rating	  Scale	   AARS	   None	  identified	  
Adaptive	  Behavior	  Assessment	  System	   ABAS	   None	  identified	  
Autism	  Diagnostic	  Interview	   ADI	   None	  identified	  
Anxiety	  Disorders	  Interview	  Schedule	   ADIS	   None	  identified	  
Autism	  Diagnostic	  Observation	  Schedule	   ADOS	   None	  identified	  
Beck	  Anxiety	  Inventory	   BAI	   Self-­‐Report	  for	  Childhood	  Anxiety	  Related	  
Disorders	  (SCARED),	  Spence	  Children's	  
Anxiety	  Scale	  (SCAS),	  Depression	  Anxiety	  
Stress	  Scale	  (DASS)	  
Beck	  Depression	  Inventory	   BDI	   Center	  for	  Epidemiological	  Studies	  
Depression	  scale	  (CES-­‐D),	  DASS	  
Beck	  Youth	  Inventory	   BYI	   SCARED,	  SCAS,	  CES-­‐D,	  DASS	  
Clinical	  Evaluation	  of	  Language	  
Fundamentals	  
CELF	  IV	   None	  identified	  
Conners’	  Rating	  Scales–Revised	  /	  
Connors-­‐3	  
Connors	   None	  identified	  
Delis-­‐Kaplan	  Executive	  Function	  System	   DKEFS	   None	  identified	  
Bene-­‐Anthony	  Family	  Relations	  Test.	   Family	  
Relations	  Test	  
None	  identified	  
Mullen	  Scales	  of	  Early	  Learning	   MULLEN	   None	  identified	  
A	  Developmental	  NEuroPSYchological	  
Assessment	  
NEPSY	   None	  identified	  
Parenting	  Stress	  Index	   PSI	   None	  identified	  
Revised	  Children's	  Manifest	  Anxiety	  
Scale	  
RCMAS	   None	  identified	  
Social	  Communications	  Questionnaire	   SCQ	   None	  identified	  
Suicidal	  Ideation	  Questionnaire	  	   SIQ	   Many	  available,	  but	  costs	  not	  clear.	  
State-­‐Trait	  Anger	  Inventory	   STAXI	   None	  identified	  
Test	  of	  Everyday	  Attention	  for	  Children	   TEACH	   None	  identified	  
Test	  of	  Visual-­‐Perceptual	  Skills	   TVPS	   None	  identified	  
Wechsler	  Adult	  Intelligence	  Scale	  	   WAIS	   None	  identified	  
Weschler	  Abreviated	  Scale	  of	  
Intelligence	  
WASI	   None	  identified	  
Wechsler	  Individual	  Achievement	  Test	  	   WIAT	   None	  identified	  
Wechsler	  Intelligence	  Scale	  for	  Children	   WISC	   None	  identified	  
Wechsler	  Preschool	  and	  Primary	  Scale	  
of	  Intelligence	  
WPPSI	   None	  identified	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Table	  6.	  	  List	  of	  Freely	  Available	  /	  Licenced	  Measures	  Identified	  in	  Audit	  
Acronymn	   Name	  
CGAS	   Children's	  Global	  Assessment	  Scale	  
CHOCI	   Children's	  Obsessional	  Compulsive	  Inventory	  
CY-­‐BOCS	   Children's	  Yale-­‐Brown	  Obsessive	  Compulsive	  Scale	  
DASS	   Depression	  Anxiety	  Stress	  Scales	  
DBT-­‐WCCL	   Ways	  of	  Coping	  Checklist	  	  	  
DERS	   Difficulties	  in	  Emotion	  Regulation	  Scale	  	  	  	  
FAS	   Verbal	  Fluency	  FAS	  
FFMQ	   Five	  Facet	  Mindfulness	  Questionnaire	  	  
IES-­‐R	   Impact	  of	  Event	  Scale	  -­‐	  Revised	  
MacLean	   MacLean	  Questionnaire	  	  	  
MFQ	   Mood	  and	  Feelings	  Questionnaire	  	  
NIMH	  OCD	   NIMH	  OCD	  
PEAS	   Physical	  Education	  Activities	  Scale	  
RLQ	   Reasons	  for	  Living	  Questionnaire	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
SCARED	   Screen	  for	  Child	  Anxiety	  Related	  Disorders	  
SDQ	   Strenths	  and	  Difficulties	  Questionnaire	  
TASC-­‐r	   Therapeutic	  Alliance	  Scale	  for	  Children	  
BAT	   Behavioural	  Avoidance	  Task	  
CARBBQ	   Cognitive	  and	  Avoidant	  Response	  Bias	  Questionnaire	  
CARER-­‐SUS	   Carer	  Service	  Use	  Schedule	  	  
CASUS	   Child	  and	  adolescent	  service	  user	  schedule	  
COIS-­‐RP/C	   The	  Child	  Obsessive	  Compulsive	  Impact	  Scale,	  revised-­‐parent	  report	  	  /	  child	  report	  
EQ-­‐5D	   Euroquol-­‐5D	  	  
